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 Preface 
 
 
 
In 1998 I chaired the student-run UNAM History Society, which was open for all 
students with an interest in history. We called ourselves ‘history activists’ and 
travelled the country from North to South where we were lobbying, discussing, 
convening exhibitions or just indulging in the wealth of personal, social, natural and 
other forms of history found throughout the country.  
In December 2001, the History Society went on a five-day tour of southern 
Namibia. The trip was part of what we called the ‘Historical Landscapes Tour’, 
which sought to generate ideas about history as a resource in the Namibian tourism 
industry. On our travel itinerary was a two-day stay in Lüderitz, the main coastal 
town in southern Namibia. With their considerable insights, our two chaperones Dr. 
Jeremy Silvester of UNAM and Professor Robert Gordon of Vermont made our visit 
exciting and, above all, historical. The two scholars guided us through the rich 
history of Lüderitz, as we visited the former boomtown come ghost town of Kool-
manskop, the mysterious Lüderitz peninsula, with stories of pirates, hidden treasures 
and Hitlerjugend, as well as Shark Island in the Lüderitz harbour.  
I knew about Shark Island from Horst Drechsler’s study of the 1904-08 wars, 
which did not dwell long on the island, yet stated that it had been used as a 
concentration camp and that many people had died there. It made a profound 
impression on most of us, knowing that people were imprisoned in such a barren 
place, where we hadn’t even managed to stay for one night – initially we had 
considered camping there, a plan abandoned due to the gale-force winds sweeping 
across the island.  
I was particularly uncomfortable with the many monuments planted in the centre 
of the island that paid homage to just about everything related to Lüderitz, it seemed, 
except for the many Nama and Herero people who had died in the concentration 
camp on Shark Island. Instead, the centrepiece of the island was a small circular 
wall, listing the names of German soldiers who had passed away in the course of the 
Herero and Nama wars. Knowing that there had not been any battles or even 
skirmishes in Lüderitz, it struck me as particularly odd to so solemnly remember a 
group of soldiers who had most probably died of disease; especially venereal 
ailments were common in those days. 
When we later returned to Namibia’s capital, Windhoek, I was still haunted by 
what I had seen in Lüderitz. I therefore decided to read up on the history of Shark 
xv 
 
 Island, only to find that there was none. Apart from a few pages in Drechsler that I 
had already read, there was basically nothing written about neither Shark Island nor 
the camps in general. As a result I decided to make the forgotten history of Shark 
Island the topic of my MA thesis. 
My research necessarily focussed most of its attention on ‘the privileged 
historical site’1 of the archives. The task was not straightforward, however, because 
files dealing with the administration of the concentration camps, a task that befell 
the German Army, no longer existed. In 1915, the German Colonial Administration 
had these files destroyed to avoid them falling in the hands of the rapidly 
approaching Union troops. German copies of these files are similarly believed to 
have gone up in flames during the heavy bombardment of Germany in the latter 
stages of the Second World War. So, there were no files that directly related to the 
day-to-day administration of Shark Island or the other concentration camps. 
Moreover, the former head of the archives once claimed not to have seen any 
substantial evidence of the concentration camps in her alleged research of the 
archival collection.2  
In the end, it took more than eight months to locate the many pieces that 
eventually made up the puzzle. The always helpful and knowledgeable Werner 
Hillebrecht, who is currently the Head of the Namibian Archives, played no small 
part in finding this information. The files of the Central bureau (the ZBU files) and 
the District files for both Keetmanshoop3 (BKE) and Lüderitz (BLU)) were 
especially useful. Other collections were also very valuable such as the Criminal 
Case files of Lüderitz (GLU) as well as the archive’s accession files. It must be said, 
however, that much of the evidence was found after extensive searching that at times 
yielded results in the unlikeliest of places. At the outset, I decided to look at 
everything even remotely related to my search topic, which was time-consuming and 
often frustrating. The archival files were nevertheless a veritable treasure-trove of 
information. At the point of writing I therefore had thousands of photocopies from 
archival files as well as other references and asides relating to Shark Island and the 
camps in general. 
The mosaic of information formed a picture of brutality and human suffering in 
Namibia’s concentration camps that at times almost defy belief. 
                                                 
1  Hayes et al. in Hartmann et al., p. 6.  
2  Lau: 1995, pp.44-45. 
3  Initially Luderitz fell under the Keetmanshoop District. 
xvi 
 Introduction 
 
 
Like most other African nations, Namibia has, to use David Soggot’s phrase, had a 
‘violent heritage’.1 From German colonialism to the decades of South African rule 
and eventually apartheid, Namibia’s history is fraught with atrocities and human 
rights abuses, war and violence. In many ways the country is still in the process of 
healing wounds from its violent past.  
This book deals with what is here perceived to be the epicentre of colonial 
malevolence, namely the mass killings of peoples and conquest of land by German 
colonial forces between 1904-08 in what was then known as German South West 
Africa (GSWA). 
The German State formally began its colonial venture in Namibia in 1884, but 
the territory and its inhabitants effectively only succumbed to German colonialism 
following the wars waged against the Herero and Nama societies between 1904 and 
1908. These wars resulted in massive loss of African life and in the destruction of 
socio-political structures throughout central and southern Namibia.  
In January 1905, as part of the campaign to beat down Herero and Nama 
resistance, the German colonial authorities officially embarked on a policy of 
interning prisoners-of-war in what was labelled Konzentrationslager. The concept of 
the concentration camps was ‘borrowed’ from the South African Boer War, where 
four years earlier thousands of people had died as a result of internment in such 
camps.2  
In the Namibian concentration camps, prisoners were forced to perform hard, 
unpaid labour regardless of gender, age or physical condition. The result was 
exceedingly high mortality rates in the camps – as high as 70 percent of all interned 
prisoners in some cases. Overall, deaths among prisoners-of-war between 1905-08 
accounted for a third of the total wartime mortality among Herero and Nama.3 It is 
estimated that the Nama population was decimated by as much as 50% and the 
Herero by up to 80%.4 
Following the interment of Nama and Herero combatants and non-combatants in 
concentration camps, lands and livestock formerly belonging to these communities 
                                                 
1  Soggot, D. Namibia: The Violent Heritage, (London: Collins, 1986) 
2  Erichsen, C.W. “A forgotten history”, Weekly Mail and Guardian, August 17 to 23, 2001 
3  Erichsen, C.W. “The Angel of Death Has Descended Violently Among Them”, Unpublished Masters 
Thesis (UNAM: 2004) 
4  Drechsler, p. 214. 
1 
2 
were expropriated by imperial decree and declared crown land. Congruent to these 
events, the colonial and national governments made increased physical colonization 
of GSWA a priority and facilitated the arrival of several thousands of new German 
settlers on land formerly belonging to the Nama and Herero.5 Apart from small 
reserves, where communities that had not rebelled against German rule were 
allowed to live, the lands of central and southern parts of the colony were now 
entirely in German hands. 
Although the 1904-08 events are subject to contemporary debate, this history 
was silent for half a century6 and even today remains highly contentious. There hare 
still a number of historians who argue that numbers are vastly exaggerated and that 
the concentration camps, inasmuch as they ever existed, did not form part of an 
alleged genocide.7 In fact, Genocide denial has become increasingly visible and 
generally accepted in academic discourse as well as in public forums.8 
To avoid generalisation, however, it should be noted that many German-speaking 
Namibians take emphatic pride in and work tirelessly for the development of post-
independent Namibia. There are and have been several German-speakers in the post-
independent Namibian government, for example, who have committed themselves 
to their country for better or worse. The former Deputy Minister Michaela 
Huebschle speaks annually at the Herero day of remembrance, the Otjiserandu, in 
recognition of the country’s dark history. Former Minister Klaus Dierks is very 
outspoken about the genocide and regards denial with the deepest antipathy. 
Although a devout Lutheran, he and his family no longer go to the German Lutheran 
Church in the centre of the capital Windhoek. The Church contains a list of German 
war-dead from the 1904-08 wars, but has no mention of the numerous Herero and 
Nama casualties. Dierks argues that as long as the church do to remove or at least re-
contextualise this colonial relic, he will not enter the building.9 There are many other 
German–speaking Namibians who honestly recognise and regret the genocide and 
they should not be forgotten when reading this text. 
                                                 
5  Erichsen: 2004 
6  In fact the history of the concentration camps has not been dealt with in-depth before now, i.e. close to a 
century after the camps were first opened. 
7  See here especially Gert Sudholt, Brigitte Lau, Claus Nordbruch.  
8  Denialist Claus Nordbruch’s books are frontal pieces in Namibian bookshops and at a recent conference in 
Windhoek, German academic Andreas Eckl called for historians dealing with 1904-08 to incorporate 
denialist arguments in their work on this history. 
9  Interview 2003. 
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‘Konzentrationslager’ 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The history of Namibia’s concentration camps has long been overlooked and largely 
forgotten in the existing historiography about the 1904-08 anti-colonial wars. Most 
theses or histories dealing with these anti-colonial wars at best only make passing 
reference to concentration camps and the prisoners kept there.1 Illustrating this 
amnesia, the former Head of the Namibian Archives, the late Brigitte Lau, remarked 
in 1989 that existing records of Swakopmund and Windhoek were ‘silent’ about the 
camps thereby posing questions about their existence.  
                                                 
1  Pool: 1991, p. 251 and 280; Pool: 1979, pp. 411-412; Drechsler, pp. 207-214; Gewald: 1996, pp. 241-250; 
Heywood and Lau: 1996, pp. 12-14; Hellberg, p. 120; and many others. 
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In acknowledging that information about the camps has been scarce in the close 
to 100 years following their formal closing in 1908, this chapter seeks to retrace the 
history of the concentration camps and to answer very basic questions about them, 
more specifically: when, where and what they were. The chapter goes a step further 
in looking at patterns in terms of treatment of prisoners and what internment in the 
camps entailed for these people. 
Ironically the bulk of the research for this chapter was conducted in what is today 
known as the Brigitte Lau Reading Room at the National Archives of Namibia and 
the records were not all that silent. 
 
Context 
The herero uprising 
On January 12, 1904 the Herero nation rose up against German colonial rule, united 
under the leadership of paramount chief Samuel Maharero. The fighting began in the 
small town of Okahandja, approximately 70 kilometres north of the capital 
Windhoek, a town of both historical and social significance for the Herero.2 During 
these first days of fighting, the German population was under siege in the town’s 
lone fort, while shops and homes were being raided and destroyed. Subsequently 
fighting spread across central German South West Africa (GSWA) as bands of 
Hereros sacked German farms and settlements. 
There are various theories about the causes of the uprising that mostly recount 
the main factors as being increasingly evident loss of power and resources to the 
Europeans.3 More recently, however, a very compelling theory was put forward by 
Dr. Jan-Bart Gewald, who essentially argued that the paranoid if not provocative 
actions of the German officer, Lieutenant Zürn, in Okahandja was the actual catalyst 
for the uprising.4 On a similar note, a German settler wrote in her diary in mid 1904 
that Zürn had been sent home to Germany because of issue relating to the outbreak 
of the war. She also recounted Samuel Maharero’s letter to German Governor 
Theodor Leutwein, writing: 
                                                 
2  In 1890 Chief Maharero died and was buried in Okahandja. In 1894 Okahandja became the seat of the 
newly installed paramount chieftaincy under Samuel Maharero and two years later, in 1896, two 
significant Herero leaders, Nikodemus Kavikuna and Kahimemua Nguvauva, were executed following a 
mock trial presided over by Hendrik Witbooi, Colonial Governor Lindequist and Samuel Maharero 
himself. 
3  See Drechsler, Bley, Pool, Lau, Katjavivi, Hellberg, Zimmerer and others. 
4  See Gewald: 1996, pp. 178-191.  
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“A while back the Governor sent a letter to Samuel…and asked him why he had made war, 
Samuel answered him: “because of the traders and because of Zürn!” 5  
The initial phase of the Herero-German War was characterised by Herero control 
and military success, targeting German interests from farms to railway lines. These 
successes were in no small measure due to the absence a large section of the colonial 
army. In late 1903 Colonial Governor Leutwein and parts of the army had gone 
south to quell the Bondelswartz rebellion.6 The Herero attack had therefore come at 
an inopportune time for the colonisers. Yet in spite of their tactical advantage the 
Herero forces did not fully capitalise on the situation and stopped short of 
overrunning main German positions, focussing in stead on smaller more sporadic 
targets. All in all the Herero aggression was short-lived and contrary to German 
propaganda,7 was fought according to a strict policy of seeking out only German 
men, leaving women, children and missionaries largely unharmed.8  
The Herero uprising clearly came as a surprise to Governor Leutwein, who had 
maintained a close alliance with Samuel Maharero since 1891 when the latter had 
succeeded his father Maharero Tjamuaha to the Okahandja chieftaincy; an alliance 
that in 1894 had also led to the mutually beneficial creation of a Herero para-
mouncy.9 Because of this close relationship, Leutwein was confident that the war 
could be ended peacefully, and upon his return to ‘Hereroland’ the governor 
prepared to settle the conflict through negotiations.10 However, Berlin did not 
sanction negotiations as a means of ending the conflict and especially the Kaiser and 
the military High Command were dismissive of Leutwein’s approach.11 Orders were 
sent from the Colonial Department on February 20th that only an unconditional 
surrender would be acceptable. In his subsequent reply, Leutwein voiced fears that 
an “extermination policy” was being planned for the Herero and that this would 
have grave consequences for the colony, explicitly mentioning the negative effects 
this would have on the economy.12 In the telegram he wrote: 
                                                 
5  NAN, Acession 453, pp. 58-59. 
6  In late 1903 the Bondelswartz community had risen up against German rule. 
7  Patemann, pp. 111-112; Drechsler, pp. 144-147; Silvester and Gewald, p. 101. 
8  Drechsler, p. 143. 
9  Through the creation of a Herero paramouncy, Governor Leutwein could circumvent the complexities of 
the various Herero chieftaincies and manipulate and influence Herero politics solely through his relations 
with Maharero. Samuel Maharero on the other hand gained the paramouncy and got rid of two of his main 
political rivals. 
10  Pool: 1991, p. 247 and Drechsler, p. 148. To show his resolve in the face of incensed and deeply worried 
settlers, Leutwein, nevertheless, insisted on executions of any Herero involved in the deaths of Germans. 
11  Drechsler, p. 148. 
12  BAB Reichs-Kolonial-Amts, Nr. 2113, p. 89-90 “Leutwein to Kolonial-abteilung” (Windhoek, February 
23, 1904). 
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“…I do not agree with the fanatics who want to see the Herero destroyed altogether. Apart from 
the fact that a people of 60,000 or 70,000 is not so easily annihilated,13 I consider it a bad 
mistake from an economic point of view. We need the Herero…especially as labourers.”14 
Leutwein had evidently concluded on the basis of unknown information that a 
mass-extermination of the Herero people was being planned. In fact, Leutwein took 
the information so seriously that he felt compelled to remind the Colonial Depart-
ment in Berlin of the labour resource constituted by the Herero. The ‘fanatics’ must 
have been people of influence and, judging from Leutwein’s reaction, it seems 
evident that a plan for the extermination of the Herero nation had been tabled in 
higher circles only months after the Herero uprising first began.15 
Having been the Governor for close to eleven years Theodor Leutwein was 
arguably the foremost German expert on matters relating to the colony and 
especially in regard to the Herero nation. Nevertheless, in May 1904, the National 
Government in Berlin decided to relieve Governor Leutwein of his military duties 
and instead appointed General Lothar von Trotha new commander; he was a 
broadsword sent to defeat the Hereros by whatever means, fair or foul.16 Ostensibly, 
Reichskanzler Bülow, Head of the Colonial Department Dr. Stübel and other high-
ranking officials in the National Government had been in favour of allowing 
colonial veteran Leutwein to retain overall command, but Head of War Cabinet Graf 
Hülsen-Haeseler with the implicit support of the Kaiser17 insisted on sending 
General von Trotha.18 
Born in Magdeburg, Adrian Dietrich Lothar von Trotha grew up in a military 
environment. His father was an officer in the Prussian Army and the military had a 
profound influence on the young Trotha to the extent that he eventually followed in 
his father’s footsteps and became a soldier. Trotha’s military career was successful 
and at the age of 45 he had risen to the rank of Lieutenant colonel. In 1894 Trotha 
signed up for military service in the colonies and in the next several years he fought 
and served in East Africa.19 In the year 1900, Trotha went to China where he took 
                                                 
13  In his letter, Leutwein made an unambiguous distinction between political death and physical annihilation. 
The term used here clearly refers to mass-eradication of a people, i.e. what is now known as genocide. 
14  BAB Reichs-Kolonial-Amts, Nr. 2113, p. 89-90 “Leutwein to Kolonial-abteilung” (Windhoek, February 
23, 1904). 
15  It should here be noted here that Leutwein had known already in 1895 that a German conflict with the 
Herero would invariably result in a ’vernichtungskampf’ [an extermination ’fight’]. Pool: 1991, p. 313. 
16  ”The Emperor only said that he expected me to crush the rebellion by fair means or foul.” Trota as quoted 
in Drechsler, p. 154. 
17  For more detailed arguments on links between Kaiser and Trotha, see Bley: 1971, pp. 158-163. 
18  According to a report in German newspaper Der Reichsbote, Von Trotha’s appointment was the brainchild 
of Head of the War Cabinet, Graf Huelsen-Haeseler, supported by the Kaiser. Pool: 1991, p.245 
19  Pool: 1991, p. 243. 
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part in the brutal suppression of the Boxer Rebellion, a campaign that caused uproar 
in Germany when it was revealed that German troops had been involved in war 
atrocities. Professionally Trotha was a hardliner, a militarist to the core. In a letter to 
Leutwein, he laid out his philosophy: 
“I know enough tribes in Africa. They all have the same mentality insofar as they yield only to 
force. It was and remains my policy to apply this force by unmitigated terrorism (translated as 
‘crass terrorism’ in Gewald) and even cruelty.”20 
On June 11, 1904 General von Trotha landed in the coastal town of Swakop-
mund ready to carry out the new strategy planned in Berlin,21 namely to surround the 
Herero and initiate an attack on their positions.22 The issue was invariably raised 
when the two leaders met in Windhoek in June 1904, yet Trotha nonetheless 
shrugged off Leutwein’s suggestions for negotiation and continued his mission.23  
Between June and August 1904, Trotha proceeded to surround the Hereros at the 
Waterberg plateau, which lies around 250 kilometres north of Windhoek. Following 
the gradual encircling of the Herero, Trotha’s forces finally attacked on August 11, 
1904. Continuous shelling by the artillery sent Herero combatants into a desperate 
offensive, awaited by the colonial troops and their machineguns. The main part of 
the battle was fought by the waterholes of Ohamakari, not far from Trotha’s 
makeshift headquarter from where the general was conducting his troops by aid of 
mirror signals. A number of heliographs had been placed strategically to inform the 
general about troop movements and to better direct the fighting.  
Smaller battles were taking place all around the Waterberg plateau, where 
German troops were posted tactically so as to prevent any Herero groups from 
escaping back into the colony. After less than a day of fighting the Herero nation 
was defeated and scattered. The large majority of the Herero nation managed to 
escape into the dry Omaheke desert, leaving behind their belongings and their cattle. 
In this exodus towards British Bechuanaland, now Botswana, many thousand Herero 
men, women and children eventually died of thirst.24 
 
 
                                                 
20  Trotha to Leutwein as quoted in Drechsler, p. 154 and Gewald: 1996, p. 208. 
21  Pool: 1991, p. 247. 
22  Unlike Leutwein, Trotha received his orders directly from the Kaiser and the military command. Pool: 
1991, p. 247-248. 
23  Pool: 1991, p. 247-248.  
24  NAN, Accession 109, ‘Major Stuhlmann’s Diary’; NAN, Accession 510, Unteroffizier Mahlzahn’s Diary; 
Generalstab, pp. 187-88. 
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Map 1.2   Military map of the Waterberg battle 
 
 
In popular histories and in popular perception the battle at the Waterberg has 
mostly been regarded a classical encounter of war, with two sides fighting for 
ultimate victory. But, contrary to this belief it is entirely questionably whether in 
fact a state of war still existed on August 11, 1904. The Herero offensive had 
essentially subsided following the fighting between German troops and Herero 
combatants at Oviumbo on April 13, 1904 – four months before the battle at 
Ohamakari.25 Although Oviumbo was nominally a victory for Samuel Maharero he 
nevertheless started the Herero retreat towards the Waterberg plateau following this 
encounter, and did not take up arms again until it was too late, i.e. after the German 
troops had surrounded their positions. There had therefore not been any major 
combat for more than a month-and-a-half prior to the arrival of General von Trotha 
and close to four months prior to the battle at the Waterberg.26 As such, Dutch 
historian Jan-Bart Gewald refers to the many months without major skirmishes or 
                                                 
25  Pool: 1991, pp. 240-241. 
26  Coincidentally the latter-day nazi leader Franz von Epp noted in his diary shortly before August 11th that 
he and other military commanders had been informed more than four month earlier that the final battle 
would take place at the Waterberg. Krumbach: 1940, p. 207. 
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encounters, prior to the Waterberg ‘battle’ as a ‘Phoney war’. Gewald argues that 
the pretence of war was kept alive to allow what was essentially a punitive 
expedition against the Hereros to take place.27 Attesting to this view is a letter sent 
by colonial soldier von Bruenneck at the Waterberg about a month prior to the 
battle. He wrote: 
“Otjoutjoudzou (sic.) 17.VII.1904, Dear Hertha and Georg! 
I’m doing well; I’m healthy. Today we received our provision, so that we will be supplied for 
the next couple of weeks. It was high time too (…) We have been lying here for some time now, 
[we will be here] until the mousetrap closes - if the Herero do us the favour of not escaping. The 
blokes seem to have lost their joy in war.”28 
Bruenneck’s letter was sent little less than a month before the battle actually took 
place and clearly refers to a ‘mousetrap’ closing in on the Herero. The letter also 
noted that the Hereros were not fighting and even mentioned that Chief Salatiel was 
eager to negotiate. Similarly a German settler was well informed about the planned 
attack on the Herero. On the same day that Bruenneck had written his letter, Helena 
Gathemann wrote in her diary that “the attack will take place in August at the 
earliest”29. She was also aware that many of the Herero chiefs were hoping for 
negotiations. According to the military sources she had access to: one-third of the 
Herero were in favour of negotiations; a third wanted to flee; and only the last third 
wished to fight in response to the gradually increasing deployment of troops around 
the Waterberg plateau.30 As it happened the entire nation was forced to fight and 
eventually to flee, albeit without provisions, cattle or other belongings.  
Following the battle at the Waterberg and the ensuing skirmishes, the Herero 
nation had suffered heavy casualties, existing only in scattered, unorganised groups 
mostly around the eastern parts of the country. Nevertheless the German soldiers 
continued their search and destroy missions against a defeated enemy. In these first 
months following the battle at the Waterberg, those who surrendered to the German 
troops faced execution or, depending on whom they surrendered to, imprisonment. 
Trotha’s troops successfully took control of all-important waterholes and thereby 
forced the Herero nation into an ultimatum. They could either stay in the colony and 
risk thirst and starvation, or they could seek exile in Bechuanaland, leaving behind 
land and cattle. On October 2nd, almost two months after the battle at the Waterberg, 
Trotha decided to make this ultimatum even clearer, reading out the so-called 
                                                 
27  Gewald: 1996, p. 205. 
28  NAN, Accession 583, Gerhardt von Bruenneck letters 1904. 
29  NAN, Accession 453, Helene Gathmann’s Diary 1903-07, p. 68. 
30  NAN, Accession 453, Helene Gathmann’s Diary 1903-07, p. 69. 
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‘Extermination Order’. The order would stand for more than two months before 
being retracted by the German Government. 
 
The extermination order 
Two months after the battle at the Waterberg, General Lothar von Trotha, emissary 
of the German Reich, issued a standing order to his troops, which essentially was a 
canonisation of murder. The Order read: 
“I, the Great General of the German troops, send this letter to the Herero people. The Herero are 
no longer German subjects. They have murdered and stolen; they have cut off the ears, noses and 
other body-parts of wounded soldiers; now out of cowardice they no longer wish to fight. I say 
to the people: Anyone who delivers a captain will receive 1000 Marks. Whoever delivers 
Samuel [Maharero] will receive 5000 Marks. The Herero people must however leave the land. If 
the populace does not do this I will force them with the Groot Rohr [Cannon]. Within the 
German borders every Herero, with or without a gun, with or without cattle, will be shot. I will 
no longer accept women and children, I will drive them back to their people or I will let them be 
shot at. These are my words to the Herero people. [Signed: The great General of the mighty 
Kaiser]”31 
Trotha’s order was a clear warning to the remnants of the Herero nation that all 
Hereros found in the colony were either to be shot or pushed into the desert – where 
an equally malevolent fate would probably await them. This has led some historians 
to claim that the so-called ‘Extermination Order’ was merely a psychological ploy 
utilised by the ‘great’ General to scare off the Herero nation.32 But, in as much as 
there certainly was a psychological factor to Trotha’s order, it is equally clear that 
the ‘extermination order’ was cynically implemented by the colonial troops under 
Trotha’s command in subsequent months. What is more, Trotha’s proclamation 
became the official policy in the colony; a policy unequivocally specifying that no 
distinction were to be made between combatants and non-combatants, as well as 
indicating that prisoners would no longer be taken. 
Notably the somewhat naïve and infantile tone of the order, using words such the 
“Groot Rohr” and describing himself as the ‘great General of the mighty Kaiser’ 
were made in a language reminiscent of 19th century western novels, where ‘white 
                                                 
31  Gewald: 1994, p. 68. 
32  Lau used this idea as her coup de grace in Uncertain Certainties and accredited this ‘truism’ to American 
scholar Karla Poewe, who had actually copied the idea from the neo-Nazi affiliate Gert sudholt. Sudholt, 
Poewe and Lau argued the word extermination to be “a successful attempt at psychological warfare, never 
followed in deed.” Pool translated the word Vernichtung as annihilate, which, although in English it is just 
as unambiguous as the word ‘extermination’, was downplayed to mean nothing more than military might 
(?). Pool argued that “Trotha’s choice of words was probably connected to his participation in the Battle of 
Sedan during the Franco-Prussian War”, where France’s hopes of victory were ‘annihilated’ by the 
Prussian tactics. Recently a German author with links to the extreme right, Claus Nordbruch, has adopted 
and is actively promoting these arguments. 
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men spoke with forked tongues’. Apart from noting the fact that western novels such 
as Karl May’s Winnetou saga were immensely popular at the time, it is perhaps 
reading too much into Trotha’s language to say that his perceptions of self and that 
of ‘the native’ were somehow influenced by such machismo fantasy – or perhaps 
not? Regardless, it is of interest that Trotha’s order contained information clearly not 
intended for a Herero audience, such as the specific ‘bounty’ awarded to people 
managing to capture and bring in Herero chiefs – in itself a concept reminiscent of 
the Western novel. Moreover, Trotha’s line “they have murdered and stolen” also 
seems to have been a justification for his extermination policy targeted more at a 
German or even international audience than the Herero. So, in spite of any 
psychological effect of the order, it was clearly issued with intent and purpose 
beyond such an effect. In fact, Trotha clearly meant what he said and to emphasise 
his point, he followed the proclamation by ordering a series of hangings.33 
 
 
 
Photo 1.1  Prisoners chained, tagged and humiliated in front of other prisoners. 
 
 
A reporter from a Cape Town-based newspaper was present following the 
announcement of the Extermination Order, which was made at the waterhole of 
‘Osombo-Windimbe’ – south-east of the Waterberg. The reporter described that a 
group of Herero “had been picked up by patrols, to be hanged” and that women were 
                                                 
33  Drechsler, pp. 164-165, 174, footnote 121; Gewald: 1994; NAN, Accession 510, Unteroffizier Malzahn. 
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forced to watch the hangings and then chased away to tell others what they had 
seen.34 German non-commissioned officer Emil Malzahn was also present, having 
accompanied General von Trotha to Owisombo-Owidimbo35 [Sic.]. Malzahn wit-
nessed the same event, and added in his unpublished memoirs: 
“since then I often saw a Herero dangling from side to side in the branch of a tree.”36  
In the paper entitled The Great General of the Kaiser, Gewald also cites 
evidence that a number of captured Herero men, women and children were forced to 
witness the executions at Osombo-Windimbe, before being sent back into the bush 
carrying copies of Trotha's Extermination Order.37 The Extermination Order was 
therefore not issued in any uncertain terms, or, considering the hangings, under 
ambiguous circumstances. Any Herero found in ‘German’ territory’ would be shot. 
As regards Women and children it was not specified, but supposedly intended that 
soldiers were to shoot over their heads, so as to scare them back into the bush38 – 
where they would likely die of thirst and starvation at any rate. However, it is not 
sure to what extent this later addendum of shooting over women’s heads was made 
clear to the many thousands of troops nor is it apparent how strictly it was enforced. 
The practise of making captured Herero watch executions of other captives 
seems to have been fairly common under Trotha. In the diary of Seaman Auer the 
above picture was captioned: “Murderers and spies sentenced to death are paraded in 
front of their tribal brothers as a warning”.39 There is also substantial oral evidence 
from Herero sources about executions at the old fort in Windhoek, which were 
carried out in front of a Herero audience forced to watch the morbid scene.40 Indeed 
under Trotha’s command, and especially in the months where the Extermination 
Order was in effect, taking prisoners was officially not a priority and executions 
seem to have been carried out as a means of annihilation. Major Stuhlmann 
remarked in his diary: 
“The motto was: extermination war on the Hereros without consideration for anything else”. 41  
 
 
                                                 
34  From The Owl, Vol 17, No. 441, 18 Nov. 1904, as quoted in Drechsler, p. 174. 
35  The same as ‘Osombo-Windimbe’. 
36  NAN, Accession 510, “Emil Malzahn’s Diary”, p.26. 
37  Gewald: 1994, p. 68. 
38  Pool: 1991, p. 272. 
39  Obermatros Auer, p. 106 
40  Lau especially refers to evidence froma number of oral sources that executions in the Windhoek Camp 
were made mandatory for other prisoner to watch. Lau: 1995, p.45. 
41  NAN, Accession 109 “Major Stuhlmann’s Diary”. 
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Photo 1.2 A different angle of the same event. 
 
 
Notably the campaign of executions was not restricted to battles in far-off 
Omaheke, but seems to have been pursued in towns and villages as well – with little 
attempt to hide it. One such episode haunted the wife of the Director of the Tsumeb 
Copper Mines, Helene Gathmann. In her diary, Gathmann shines through as an 
intelligent person, keenly following the latest events in the war that surrounded her. 
Gathemann’s diary therefore makes very interesting reading, not least because of her 
honesty. On October 29, 1904, Gathmann heard shots fired in the streets of 
Grootfontein and noted in her diary:  
“Yesterday evening Prions’42 natives got hold of a Herero who proved to be very insecure; half 
an hour later we heard the soldier’s salvos [guns] that put an end to the Herero’s life. We were 
mercilessly reminded of the state of war.”43 
Gathmann was aware of many such incidents where executions by the military 
were held swiftly and summarily. She describes an incident where a Lieutenant 
Muther whilst on patrol came across a Herero settlement and reacted by “shooting 
some of them and capturing some of them”.44 The Hereros in the settlement later 
proved to be peaceful and without any real weaponry. Gathmann’s description in her 
                                                 
42  Prion was a settler who joined the colonial army in the first months of the war. 
43  NAN, Accession 453, “Helene Gathman’s Diary”, October 29, 1904 p. 84. 
44  NAN, Accession 453, Gathmann’s Diary, December 15, 1904, p. 89. 
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diary of such events testifies that there was at least some concern in parts of the 
settler community about the extreme violence being applied by German forces. 
It is perhaps an overstatement to say that prisoners were not taken before and 
during the first half year of Trotha’s reign. But, it is safe to say that whilst the 
extermination order was in place, and possibly before, Hereros seem to have been 
executed at any pretext and without much consideration for their potential lack of 
complicity in the war. And yet, it is perhaps too simplistic to place the blame for 
atrocities entirely on Trotha’s shoulders. There is much evidence to suggest that the 
Extermination Order in fact made official a style of warfare in practise already 
before the Waterberg battle.  
Gerhardt von Brünneck was a foot soldier at Waterberg and was carrying out 
orders in the manner he perceived them. His letters from 16 July 1904 (about a 
month prior to the battle at Ohamakari) is testament to the method in which 
prisoners were dealt with in the months before Trotha officially announced the 
Extermination Order: 
“Yesterday Herero [taken] prisoners, why not just shot dead. A prisoner Herero who didn’t want 
to come along, killed.”45 
What makes Brünneck’s somewhat cynical remark so disturbing is that it seemed 
rooted in a very clear understanding that prisoners were not to be taken. The 
sentiment was not, however, atypical of general views on Herero by the colonial 
troops. Indeed, from the outset of the campaign to pacify the Herero uprising, 
German sentiments towards their adversaries were characterised by a general belief 
that the enemy was inhuman and savage. These sentiments were reflected in corres-
pondence from the Magistrate of British-controlled Walvis Bay, dating from a week 
prior to the arrival of General von Trotha: 
“The general feeling among the Germans at present partakes of an unreasoning and vindictive 
bitterness which is almost as nearly allied to barbarism as the unbridled passion of the Herero 
themselves. I have heard myself, Germans who were in action describing boastfully how their 
troopers bayoneted Herero women.” 46 
The Magistrates remarks were made in late May 1904 and it is therefore entirely 
likely that he was referring to the sailors of the HMS Habicht. The Habicht was a 
warship that had arrived in GSWA to help quell the Herero uprising in early 1904, 
sending seamen, who were unfamiliar with the territory and its people, into the 
hinterland. The perhaps most blatant of the many published diaries dealing with the 
                                                 
45  NAN, Accession 583, “Brünneck, Letters” July 16, 1904. 
46  PRO London, PRO FO 64/1645 ‘Secret Despatch’, Mag. Walvis Bay to Sec. Native Affairs, Cape Town, 
30th May, 1904.   
 
 
  15 
1904-08 wars was that of Obermatros Auer, a sailor from HMS Habicht. Auer’s 
somewhat dramatised diary was simply littered with references to gross violence, its 
gong-ho style celebrating executions, beatings and prostitution (rape). If one takes 
Auer’s words for granted, there seems to have been a tendency to shoot people on 
the spot, even in the early stages of the Herero War. In one instance Auer described 
how prisoners-of-war, who he and others from the Habicht were escorting to 
Karibib, were shot simply for the sake of conserving food. In Auer’s own words: 
“Anyone who as much as made a gesture of attack or who went too far away without being 
ordered to do so, was shot after a court-martial held on the spot. We were pleased to have one 
black less to feed, because our supply of food was diminishing.”47  
                                                
The naval soldiers started their campaign months before the arrival of Trotha, 
and judging from Auer’s descriptions, Trotha’s campaign differed little from the 
ruthlessness and violence applied by the Habicht marines in as much as neither 
conformed to existing international conventions on warfare.48 It would seem that the 
Extermination Order was but an official approval of the methods that had been 
applied from the beginning of the campaign to beat down the Herero uprising. 
Responsibility for atrocities and what appears to have been an indiscriminate 
killing of Herero could well have rested with Kaiser Wilhelm II, the head of the 
German Empire. Many soldiers felt that the Extermination Order in fact emanated 
from the Kaiser himself, whereby carrying it out would simply have been a duty.49 
South African transport riders, who in 1905 reported German war atrocities in the 
Cape Argus newspaper, said that when approached, the colonial troops would 
usually excuse their actions by saying: “The Kaiser has ordered us to do this”.50 It 
was not beyond the Kaiser to give such orders, as know from his Bremerhafen 
speech, the so-called Hunnenrede, given on July 27, 1900 to soldiers departing for 
China during the Boxer Rebellion. In this speech he said:  
“When you come upon the enemy, he will be defeated. No pardon will be granted. Prisoners will 
not be taken. Whoever falls into your hands should be destroyed [sei verfallen]…Like the Huns 
did 1000 years ago”.51 
The Kaiser was revered by the troops and what seems simple rhetoric was at the 
time inevitably taken very seriously by soldiers. Subsequently the Boxer Rebellion 
 
47  Obermatros Auer, pp. 106-112.  
48  Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II), Annex to the Convention: 
“ Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land”, (29 July 1899), Section I. Chapter II 
(Articles 4-20). 
49  In 1904 Major Stuhlmann wrote about the Extermination Order in his diary calling it the bloody decree 
emanating from Berlin. NAN, Accession 109, p. 85. See also Bley: 1971, pp. 158-163. 
50  Cape Argus, September 28, 1905. 
51  My translation from: Goertemaker, p. 357. 
 
 
 
16 
was brought down with extreme violence, a cause of much condemnation inside and 
outside Germany at the time.52Many soldiers arriving to fight the wars in GSWA had 
been fighting in China53 and on a human level these soldiers were traumatised and 
psychologically unfit for continued warfare. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
was not a known condition in 1904, but existed nonetheless.54 Coupled with PTSD 
the prevailing racist paradigm was inevitably a weighty factor in the war crimes that 
unfolded in GSWA between 1904-08. 
 
Uprising in the South 
A large-scale co-ordinated uprising in the South flared up in October 1904, little 
over a month after the Herero defeat at the Waterberg. The southern uprising was 
characterised by ardent defiance of German colonial rule, from the Bondelswartz 
uprising (which had begun already in 1903) to the rising of the Witboois, the 
Veldshoendragers, Simon Kooper’s Franzmanns and eventually also parts of the 
Bethanie community. Although the resistance consisted of several bands of fighters, 
spread across the south and south-east of the colony, there seemed to be a common 
sense of purpose in the fighting.  
Having initially stood by the Germans during the Herero uprising, the Witbooi 
rebellion was perhaps the most surprising to the Colonial Government. Witbooi 
fighters had fought alongside German forces throughout the campaign against the 
Hereros, in honouring a ten-year-old mutual treaty of protection, and were deemed 
‘loyal’ by the colonisers.55 In fact, at the battle of the Waterberg both Witbooi and 
Bethanie fighters were actively supporting the colonial army. 
 
 
                                                 
52  Hu Schong,, p. 144 and Krumbach, pp. 164-165. 
53  NAN, Accession 531, p. 9. “Diary of Schutztruppenreiter Richard Christel”: “It was of course a great joy 
to exchange experiences from the Chinese expedition here in Africa.” 
54  The condition was observed following the Boer War, dubbed ‘Combat Fatigue’ and again in WW I where 
it was called ‘Shell-Shock’. Sandler in Cock and Nathan (eds.), p. 79. 
55  Kriegsgeschichtlichen Abteilung I des Grossen Generalstabes, Chapter entitled: “The Outbreak of the 
Rebellion – the fights of Auob and in the Karas Mountains”. 
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Photo 1.3   Witbooi scout at the Waterberg 
 
 
The battle at the Waterberg and ensuing skirmishes in the Omaheke, which 
marked the decisive defeat of the Hereros, was an undertaking achieved with 
excessive and extreme use of violence if one is to believe a group of Witbooi 
fighters deserting the German ranks following the large battle.56 Frightened by the 
massacre, these fighters left German ranks, and headed back to their homes in 
Gibeon where they recounted the Waterberg atrocities to their leader, Kaptein, 
Hendrik Witbooi.57 Shortly thereafter, Hendrik Witbooi decided to end his peace 
agreement with the German colonial government. 
As is the case with the Herero uprising, there are many theories as to why 
Hendrik Witbooi chose to fight the German army and in doing so causing most of 
the South to emulate his example. The most common theory related in German 
sources contemporary to the event was that Hendrik Witbooi was under the 
influence of a South African advocate of the Ethiopian Church, the so-called 
Prophet Sturmann.58 The German historian, Horst Drechsler related an additional 
                                                 
56  NAN, Accession 507, Missionary Berger, “Witbooi Stories’, p.14. 
57  NAN, Accession 507, Missionary Berger, “Witbooi Stories’, p.14. 
58  Missions-Berichte, 1905, pp. 26-27. Sturmann was one of the more enigmatic characters of the southern 
war. Like the reward put on Witbooi’s head, Trotha also put a reward on Sturmann. He was later killed in 
the Cape, much to the relief of the GSWA administration. ZBU 2369, ‘Witbooi Geheimakten’, p. 122. See 
 
 
 
18 
reason, namely the call for Witbooi disarmament in the colony and subsequent 
Witbooi fears that they might soon share the fate of the Hereros.59  
It is hard to validate any of these theories, but there is little doubt that Hendrik 
Witbooi’s reasons must have been overwhelming. Tactically it would have made 
more sense to unite with the Hereros in the initial offensive against the colonial 
presence and fight a united front. Yet instead Hendrik Witbooi and the rest of the 
South faced an increased German military presence in the colony, mobilised and 
ready to fight. To take on the near impossible odds of such a war, there must 
therefore have been a compelling reason for the action of the Witboois. 
German sources report the Witboois’ first act of rebellion as being the 
‘assassination’ of Bezirksamtmann [local commissioner] von Burgsdorff on October 
4, 1904.60 There is little evidence that Hendrik Witbooi had actually sanctioned such 
an action, but the event did nevertheless mark the beginning of the Witbooi 
campaign. The death of Burgsdorff was soon followed by the tactical bombing of 
the Gibeon church – a building that could have been used for military purposes by 
the Germans – and from that point onwards there was no turning back.61 In the 
following months, the Witboois sacked numerous southern farms although they 
were careful not to harm women and children.62 As related in a proclamation issued 
by old Hendrik Witbooi, which warned Germans to leave the territory, it is evident 
that the Witboois, like the Hereros before them, pursued a specific target, namely 
German men. Hendrik Witbooi wrote: 
“… I leave it at your discretion to transport all women and children to Lüderitz Bay in ox 
wagons so that they may return to Germany. Men without weapons bearing the Witbooi mark 
are also free to join them. They will not be molested.”63  
Similar to the Herero war, where women and missionaries had been escorted 
through Herero territory back to German lines,64 German POWs taken by Nama in 
the southern wars were treated with care and eventually also returned unharmed to 
German lines.65 It should be added that such ‘deliveries’ of POWs were undertaken 
                                                 
 
also Tilman Dedering, “The Prophet’s War Against the Whites,” JAH, 40/1 (1999), pp. 1-20 [In Current 
Serials].  
59  Drechsler, p. 182 and echoed in Brigdman, p. 135. 
60  Missions-Berichte, 1905, pp. 41-43. 
61  Missions-Berichte, 1905, pp. 41-43. 
62  Drechsler, p. 184. 
63  Drechsler, p. 184. 
64  NAN, Accession 453, Helene Gathmann Diary, p. 59. 
65  Missions-Berichte, 1905, p. 62.  
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despite the obvious risk of being shot by German soldiers while returning the POWs 
to German lines. 
Meanwhile the German propaganda machine was busy validating the war efforts 
and conjuring support at home.66 Even though Nama fighters were relatively few in 
numbers, the war was dragging on because essentially the German army was 
unaccustomed to fighting guerrilla warfare, a cause of embarrassment for the Kaiser. 
The situation changed dramatically, however, following October 29, 1905 when 
Witbooi fighters attacked a German food transport near the station of Vaalgras. The 
attack was repelled by German troops and in the course of the battle Hendrik 
Witbooi was wounded in the thigh, eventually bleeding to death. 
Two weeks after the death of Hendrik Witbooi, General von Trotha received the 
news in the harbour town of Lüderitzbucht. He was on his way home to Germany 
and had just finished a long dinner with the new Governor, Friedrich von 
Lindequist, who was passing through on his way to Swakopmund.67 The news was 
relayed in a telegram from the German ‘ally’, Kaptein Christian Goliath of Berseba, 
who recounted the outcome of the Vaalgras shooting. Von Trotha was reportedly 
overjoyed at the news.68 
In late 1905 resistance in the South gradually started to cave in to exceeding 
pressure exerted by the superior force of the German Empire. Hendrik Witbooi’s 
death directly resulted in the surrender of the Witbooi community, yet other 
communities such as parts of the Bethanie under Cornelius Fredericks and the 
Bondels under the elusive Jacob Marinka69 still continued to fight. Ultimately the 
last southern community was defeated in 1908 following the expedition against 
Simon Kooper into British Bechuanaland.  
 
Concentration camps 
A new strategy 
In late November 1904, Prime Minster Bülow put pressures on the Kaiser to retract 
the Extermination Order. The Kaiser pondered the issue for over a week yet finally 
agreed to soften the approach in the colony. Two weeks prior, the Kaiser had 
secretly asked fellow nobleman Count Georg von Stillfried and Rattowitz, who held 
the rank of Lieutenant-colonel with the Schutztruppe in GSWA, to draft a report on 
                                                 
66  Drechsler, p. 184. 
67  Nuhn: 2000, p.176. The two shared the voyage to Swakopmund, which according to Lindequist’s own 
notes was very pleasant and Trotha was considered ‘lovely’ company. BAK, Kl. Erw. 275, pp. 79-80. 
68  Nuhn: 2000, p. 176. 
69  AKA Morenga. According to the missionaries, he signed his letters ‘Marinka’. Missions-Berichte, 1905, 
p. 25. 
 
 
 
20 
his “opinions in relation to the native question and the military situation in South 
West Africa”.70 
In the subsequent 55-page report, von Stillfried wrote that any ‘native’ found 
with a gun should be summarily executed and all others be rounded up and “hired 
out in large or small numbers to individual farmers, merchants, etc., to perform 
labour for food.”71 Stillfried went on: 
“All headmen will have to be executed and their families, even if innocent, deported to another 
colony… all natives … who have been condemned to a term of imprisonment will have to carry 
a numbered identification tag… Natives who are not free will be placed in closed settlements 
near their place of work…”72 
The Kaiser evidently took these suggestions to heart. When he therefore finally 
conceded to retracting the Extermination Order in early December 1904, a new 
strategy, relying heavily on Stillfried’s suggestions, was ready to replace it. From 
continued use of deportation of prisoners to other German colonies, to fixing of 
identification tags and renting out of prisoners, most of the malice described in von 
Stillfried’s report actually came to pass. It is not unlikely that the ‘fanatics’ men-
tioned by Leutwein in February1904 included Count von Stillfried.  
The effects of the flight into the Omaheke Desert following Waterberg and the 
subsequent Extermination Order soon became evident as hundreds and later 
thousands of Hereros were arriving at the German stations and towns, starved, ex-
hausted and essentially dying.73 These were the remnants of the Herero communities 
that had escaped Trotha at the Waterberg and had managed to evade German 
punitive patrols during the time of the Extermination Order.  
Conditions in the bush must have been severe for the Herero to walk into the 
arms of German forces that had until recently conducted an extermination campaign 
against them. Helena Gathmann wrote that Hereros were coming to Omaruru in 
large numbers, but only because, as she said, “there is no longer anything to loose 
out there [in the bush].”74 Gathmann had spoken to prisoner, who told her that many 
of the Hereros still hiding would surrender if their security were guaranteed by the 
                                                 
70  BAB, Reichs-kolonil-Amt, File 2117, p 59b (pp. 1-57). 
71  Drechsler, p. 145. 
72  Drechsler, p. 145. 
73  Accession 569, “Memoirs of Pastor Elger” (RMS) in Karibib, 1904-06. “For our field hospital the worst 
came in 1905 when the suffering Herero were returning from the Omaheke, where more than half of their 
people had died of thirst and other causes. In one day we received as many as 24 of these people, of whom 
two died on the same day. In the following week another 10 would die – in spite of our efforts to save 
them. Nothing could be done; their internal organs had already died. The remaining ten would eventually 
survive.”  
74  NAN, Accession 453, Gathmann’s Diary, March 9, 1905, p. 90. 
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German military.75 In Gathmann’s estimation there were 1900 Herero in Omaruru 
around March 1905, most of them entirely starved. Local missionary Dannert 
suggested a similar number in a letter to missionary Vedder on February 14, 1905.76  
 
 
 
Photo 1.4 Hereros arriving out of the bush and into captivity.  
 Picture taken by Atelier Ziegler at Karibib ca. 1905 
 
 
Unbeknownst to the emaciated Hereros in the bush, Trotha’s Extermination 
Order was rescinded little over two months after the General had first announced it 
at Osombo-Windimbe. On December 9, 1904 instructions to retract the Extermi-
nation Order were relayed from Prime Minister Bülow to General Trotha, who 
backed down, albeit reluctantly, stating that he had ordered the high ranking and 
very experienced officer Ludwig von Estorff to negotiate with the Hereros. The 
Military Command in Germany was not altogether in favour of Bülow’s ‘soft’ 
approach and therefore informed Trotha that negotiations were still out of the 
question, although adding that the practise of shooting Hereros on sight had to be 
                                                 
75  NAN, Accession 453, Gathmann’s Diary, p. 90. 
76  ELCRN, Correspondance VII 31, Swakopmund 1-7, Dannert to Vedder, February 14, 1905. 
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rethought.77 The Extermination Order was therefore no longer officially in effect 
from this point onwards.  
Trotha followed his orders from Berlin by immediately making provisions for 
the capture and keeping of Herero prisoners, ordering all captured Hereros to be put 
in chains.78 On January 14, 1905, following consultations with the Kaiser,79 German 
Reichskanzler Bülow again sent a telegram to Trotha ordered the General to stop 
enchaining the Hereros. The main concern of Bülow, however, was not humanita-
rian; rather he was explicitly afraid that the enchainment would be a deterrent for the 
voluntary surrender of other potential prisoners-of-war.80 The Reichskanzler’s orders 
for dealing with the Hereros read: 
“I am of the opinion that the surrendering Herero should be placed in Konzentrationslager 
[concentration camps] in various locations in the territory, there to be put under guard and 
required to work… In order to do this we need to take up the offer of the Mission, as ordered by 
His Majesty. This arrangement appears not to be done without, especially in regard to the 
women and children.”81 
Two days later Trotha issued a memorandum to all districts relaying the orders, 
which spelled out the modus operandi for the erection of concentration camps.82 The 
General’s memorandum marked the beginning of the formal concentration camp 
policy, which as the immediate successor to the Extermination Order was applied to 
all Hereros caught in German territory, regardless of gender, age or complicity in the 
war.  
According to Trotha’s memo, chains were to come off the prisoners, who were 
instead contained in restricted and secured concentration camps at existing military 
installations in Windhoek, Okahandja and Karibib – as well as in Swakopmund and 
Omaruru. Food was to be provided for the prisoners as long as this did not affect the 
soldiers’ supply,83 and in case of possible outbreaks of disease in the camps – known 
to have been a major problem in South African camps during the Boer War – the 
sick would be moved several kilometres away from white settlements and the 
original camp burned.84  
As an added measure of control, Trotha put it to the districts that metal tags 
carrying the inscription G.H. for ‘Gefangener [prisoner] Herero’ should be fixed to 
                                                 
77  Drechsler, p.164. 
78  ZBU 454, D.IV.l.3. Vol 1. p. 12. “Telegramm des Reichskanzlers an das Gouvernement, January 14, 1905  
79  ZBU 454, D.IV.l.3. Vol 1. p. 12.  
80  ZBU 454, D.IV.l.3. Vol 1. p. 12. “I do not approve of your Excellency’s order that all surrendering Herero 
should be enchained, since this would prevent further voluntary surrenders…”  
81  ZBU 454, D.IV.l.3. Vol 1. p. 12. 
82  BKE 221, B.II.74.c, pp. 33-34. 
83  BKE 221, B.II.74.c, pp. 33-34. 
84  BKE 221, B.II.74.c, pp. 33-34. 
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prisoners of both sexes – he added that suggestions on how to permanently apply 
these were to be forwarded to him. Subsequent to Trotha’s orders such identification 
tags were worn by all Prisoners-of-war in the colony. The idea for this practise did 
not come from Trotha himself, however, but most likely emanated from the mind of 
von Stillfried, whose suggestions included the notion that all ‘natives’ should wear 
“a numbered identification tag”. It could also be that von Stillfried got his idea from 
Swakopmund where in fact as early as August 1904 such tags were already being 
made. In Swakopmund these tags were introduced to control the large resident 
populations of ‘natives’ and to appease fears that local ‘natives’ might abandon their 
employment in order to join the rebellion.85 Although these early Swakopmund tags 
differed slightly from Trotha’s tags in appearance they were nevertheless the earliest 
prototype.  
The tags were not the only example of an existing practise made official under 
Trotha. Although the first official concentration camps were set up between January 
and February 1905, already in January 1904 following the outbreak of the war 
Hereros working in Swakopmund had been rounded up and interned on two 
Woermann line ‘steamers’ anchored off the coastal town’s shores.86 Another early 
concentration camp prototype made from barbed wire and thorn-bush was set up in 
Okahandja on Trotha’s orders before he moved on the Waterberg.87 The reason 
behind these early camps would have related closely to the need for labour. With a 
war going on, Hereros employed by german settlers would have felt compelled to 
leave their places of work for a number of obvious reasons, including the risk of 
being shot or hung. 
Incarceration not only applied to what would normally be considered prisoners-
of- war, but also to those who had not taken part in the anti-colonial wars. In the 
southern town of Gibeon settler paranoia was such that every night even the so-
called ‘free natives’ were kept under lock and key, a practise brought on by the 
outbreak of war in the South during the last months of 1904.88 The practise was 
continued for several years, as seen in Bethanie where as late as 1906 the local 
community was also rounded up every night and locked away till morning. 89  
                                                 
85  BSW 48, August 29, 1904 
86  KAB, 732: 86, Resident Magistrate, Walvis Bay to Minister, January 20, 1904. 
87  Pool 1991, p. 251. Pool argues that this camp was proof that Throtha did not intent to exterminate the 
Herero, but also mentions that the camps could hold only a few thousand; there were around 50,000 
Hereros at the Waterberg – what would happen to the rest? This reason for erecting this camp was 
probably related to settler needs for labour. The later-day official camp at Osona in Okahandja was 
primarily used as a labour pool for settlers in the town. 
88  Missions-Berichte, 1905, p. 44. 
89  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 34. 
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Deimling’s birthday 
 
Following January 1905 when the Colonial Army once again took prisoners, Hereros were 
taken south as part of a strategy to reduce security risks. In March 1905, therefore, a large 
number of Herero prisoners were interned in the southern town of Keetmanshoop. A couple of 
months later Head of the Schutztruppe, Colonel Deimling, arrived in the southern town where 
he paid a visit to the local Nama community that had not taken part in the wars. Deimling, who 
had just celebrated his birthday the previous day, took the opportunity to round up a group of 
female Herero prisoners from the local camp and told them: “Go and tell your men that they 
should come here and put down their guns. It is not our intention to shot you all dead 
[totzushiessen]. I would like to make peace; whoever comes, now that we have defeated and 
scattered [zersprengt] you, will receive a pardon.” He then released the women into the bush. 
Interestingly, the message given to the women indicated that although the Extermination 
Order had officially been rescinded in December 1904, Hereros were somehow still not taking 
any chances with German troops. Deimling also made the specific point that troops did not 
intend to shooting all Herero dead, a announcement that the Extermination Order was no longer 
in effect. 
Symptomatic of the post Extermination Order era, however, Deimling’s freeing of female 
Herero POWs was also little more than a token gesture. Firstly, Keetmanshoop was miles away 
from traditional Herero territory and without supplies such a long journey was ill conceived. 
Secondly, the women would most likely be picked up by the next German patrol and sent back 
to Keetmanshoop or to another military installation in the South. 
 
 
 
Source: Missions-Berichte, 1905, p. 137 
Photo: German postcard. 
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Figure 1.1  Outline of a Swakopmund tag from 1904 
 
 
The concept of concentration camps was borrowed from South Africa where 
only four years prior to the Herero uprising, British Commander-in-Chief, Lord 
Kitchener, had ordered the internment of thousands of Boer women and children as 
well as several thousand Africans in camps, with morbid consequences. Kitchener’s 
policy had been designed to “flush out guerrillas in a series of systematic drives, 
organised like a sporting shoot, with success defined in a weekly 'bag' of killed, 
captured and wounded.” Kitchener’s camps were primarily designed “to sweep the 
country bare of everything that could give sustenance to the guerrillas, including 
women and children”.90 Eventually, however, Kitchener had been forced to revise 
this ‘scorched earth’ policy because of growing opposition in England where Liberal 
members of Parliament C.P Scott and John Ellis laid down protests and, inciden-
tally, first used the term “concentration camp”.91 
                                                 
90  “Concentration Camps during the Boer War”, Stanford University Library Collection: http://www-
sul.stanford.edu/depts/ssrg/africa/boers.html 
91  Stanford University Library. 
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Although the ‘sporting shoot’ simile was perhaps not entirely misapplied on 
GSWA92, the reason for and utilisation of concentration camps under Trotha were 
not the same as in South Africa. Under Trotha, guerrillas, or mostly just unarmed 
Hereros, were first driven out of the veld and then interned in camps, women and 
men, aged or infant. Another difference was that when Kitchener introduced con-
centration camps in South Africa he was still fighting a war, whereas Trotha had 
already defeated his enemy and now used concentration camps as containment 
centres for those who had survived his campaign.  
Whereas the application of concentration camps varied in South Africa and 
GSWA the outcome of the camps was effectively the same, considering that 
thousands lost their lives while under internment and being forced to labour. So even 
though Prime Minister Bülow’s January 14 telegram effectively marked the end of 
von Trotha’s official and unofficial no-prisoners policy it did not necessarily mark 
the end of the extermination campaign. In reality the Kaiser and Bülow’s internment 
and forced labour policy was to prove equally deadly for the Nama and Herero 
communities and to some extent also for San, Owambo and other indigenous 
communities, who were either caught up in the war or used for labour purposes by 
the colonial state.  
According to mortality statistics for the camps under von Trotha little had 
changed since the Extermination Order was rescinded in December 1904. At the end 
of 1905 Rhenish missionary Heinrich Vedder counted as many as 800 deceased 
prisoners in the Swakopmund camp93 where on average there had been around 1000 
Herero prisoners during that year.94 The Swakopmund District Commissioner, who 
in a mid-1905 report stated that 400 Herero prisoners had died between February 
and May, inadvertently backed up Vedder’s figures.95 Moreover, according to an 
official report on overall mortality in the concentration camps, the Swakopmund 
camp claimed 165 victims in June 1905 out of 967 prisoners in total.96 The June 
mortality consequently constituted just fewer than 20% of the entire population of 
the camp in one moth! 
From the beginning of the concentration camps policy in early 1905 until 
November 1905 when Trotha left the colony, the General’s forces were busy cap-
turing Hereros in the bush and sending them to the concentration camps as prisoners 
                                                 
92  The collection raids (see below) under Trotha were, for example, undertaken with a very similar brutality. 
93  Gewald: 1996, p. 247. 
94  Lau: 1996, p. 45. 
95  ZBU 454, D.IV.l.3, Vol.1, pp. 58-59. 
96  In Swakopmund the highest monthly number of deaths was in June 1905 with 165 out of 967 prisoners. 
BAB, Reichs-Kolonial-Amt, KAII 1181, Eing. 24 March 1908, p. 161. 
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and labourers. These collection raids were carried out by the same troops that only 
months before had implemented the Extermination Order. Needless to say, such 
raids were carried out with brute force.97 Nevertheless Trotha’s collection campaigns 
were very ‘successful’ in as much as the troops managed to capture and imprison at 
least 13,000 Hereros in a period of 10 months. 
 
 
 
Photo 1.5  German patrol shows ‛catch’ of around a hundred people to the camera.  
 Probably 1905, when the military was still hunting down Hereros. 
 
 
According to Oskar Hintrager, the Deputy Governor under subsequent Governor 
Friedrich von Lindequist (Nov. 1905 to May 1907), the last of such ‘sweeping’ 
collection missions was carried out in September 1905 and tallied 810 Hereros.98 
The German historian Horst Drechsler noted on this period that the “number of 
Herero taken captive – men, women and children – swelled rapidly, attaining 4,100 
by early March 1905 and 8,040 by late May.”99 Accordingly, there were 13,216 
Hereros in custody by the end of 1905.100 These 13,216 were necessarily the 
prisoners Trotha had managed to gather since the formal end of the Extermination 
Order – in other words those that had survived the Waterberg, the Omaheke escape, 
the Extermination Order, starvation as well as the violent collection raids. Of these 
13,216 Herero prisoners, 8478 were held by the military and incarcerated in camps. 
The rest were put to work on various projects around the colony, or sent to smaller 
camps such as, for example, Keetmanshoop.101 If the mortality figures from Swakop-
mund were in any way indicative of a general trend, many thousands more Herero 
                                                 
97  NAN, Accession 453, Gathmann’s Diary, March 9, 1905, p. 90 and RMS Chronicle 23.1, Omaruru, 1906. 
98  Hintrager: 1955, p. 81. 
99  Drechsler, p. 207. 
100  ZBU 454, D.VI.l.3, Vol. 1. pp. 187-188. 
101  See text box entitled “Deimling’s Birthday”. 
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and Nama prisoners inevitably died in Trotha’s concentration camps, making overall 
numbers of prisoners collected in this period much higher. 
Trotha left the colony in November 1905. Control of the colony was instead 
passed on to newly appointed Governor Friedrich von Lindequist; a civil servant 
who had until that point had been serving as Consul to the Cape and prior to that 
appointment had been the Deputy Governor in GSWA under Leutwein. It is often 
held that the Herero and Nama genocides were a direct result of the regime of 
General von Trotha.102 This notion falsely negates any direct complicity at the hands 
of Central Government and the Kaiser in Germany. Indeed the only difference 
between Trotha’s regime and that of his successor, von Lindequist, was a deliberate 
and significant escalation of the camps policy and related mortalities under the 
latter’s regime, as will be explored later in the chapter. 
 
The Devils Advocate: Mission and government collaboration 
“… Father forgive them for they know not what they have done. Our [German] compatriots have 
evoked certain and plentiful harm on these people, which is so painful because they do not 
realise it.” 103 
From early on in the War Rhenish missionaries had been eager to mediate between 
the colonial army and Herero forces. Subsequently the Rhenish Mission Society 
(RMS) appealed to the Reichskanzler in late 1904 that it be consulted as “a go-
between for the sake of restoring peace”.104 In December 1904, Reichskanzler  
Bülow and Kaiser Wilhelm105 agreed that the mission should play a larger role in the 
pacification of the Hereros and more specifically in the care for women and 
children.106  
     Reichskanzler Bülow’s acceptance of this continuous offer was expressly linked 
to the fact that it would be easier for the Mission than for any other German 
institution to gain access to the widely dispersed Herero communities. In Bülow’s 
correspondence with the mission he thanked the institution for its willingness to 
assist government, adding that because of its long experience with the ‘natives’, the 
Rhenish mission would be in an ideal position to bring about their subjugation.107  
                                                 
102  The German ambassador in Namibia put this idea forward in a 2004 interview with David Olusoga of the 
BBC. Brigitte Lau claimed that no atrocities took place in GSWA, but nevertheless still pointed her finger 
at Trotha’s intent. Lau:1995, p.46 (footnote 10). 
103  Missions-Berichte, 1905, p.47. 
104  Missions-Berichte, 1905, p.22. 
105  ZBU 454, D.IV.l.3. Vol 1. p. 12. 
106  Missions-Berichte, 1905, pp. 22-23. 
107  Missions-Berichte, 1905, p. 23. 
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Orion the warrior 
 
 
 
Lord Kitchener in his most famous pose 
 
The orders to set up concentration camps would in all probability have been welcomed by 
General von Trotha, who was a professed admirer of the man behind the Boer War 
concentration camps, namely the infamous Lord Kitchener. 
 The day before the battle at the Waterberg on August 11, 1904 Trotha’s esoteric diary note 
read: “My responsibility is indeed great, but we are marching towards the Orion and I must trust 
my star.” Ostensibly Trotha was referring to a meeting with Lord Kitchener where he had asked 
the British military phenomenon what the secret behind his military success was. Kitchener told 
him: “Be consequent, reckless and trust your star.” Kitchener had then supposedly pointed to 
the constellation of Orion and said to von Trotha: “That is your star.”  
 According to Trotha’s diary, Kitchener’s advice had proven to be very valuable. Trotha 
noted that he had been in a state of confusion after the Waterberg battle, which at the time was 
regarded a failure because the Herero had managed to flee in to the Omaheke Desert. Trotha 
then remembered the words of Kitchener and at “precisely that moment, almost as though it had 
been ordained, the clear image of Orion appeared above the horizon of the bush landscape.” 
Trotha was again calm, feeling a new sense of determination in his task.  
 Trotha’s inner monologue draws a picture of a psychologically unstable person, seeking 
refuge in mystical advice offered to him by a man whose infamy was rooted in ruthlessness and 
brutality.  
 
 
Source: Pool: 1991, p. 257 and 262.  
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This collaboration would essentially facilitate both church and government 
interests. With the stamp of approval from Bülow, the mission would be able to 
appease hostile settlers who saw the mission as a lackey of the ‘natives’,108 yet, more 
importantly, it would also be able to revive its missionary efforts: its very reason for 
being in the colony. The government, on the other hand, had a much different 
agenda that included an increased supply of labour and control over the colony.  
Even though the collaboration between Government and mission was mutually 
beneficial, Trotha was still reluctant to comply with the Reichskanzler’s wishes. 
Trotha did not favour any missionary involvement in his war efforts.109 As such, the 
mission only had limited involvement during Trotha’s reign, relating mostly to 
medical care and conversion of souls. However, there are a couple of grim examples 
of missionary involvement in Trotha’s war. After mid January 1905, when Trotha’s 
troops were again taking prisoners, the army called on selected missionaries to act as 
interpreters and mediators between colonial troops and Hereros in the veld. 
Missionary Dannert of Omaruru recounted an expedition to the Omatako Mountains 
that ostensibly sought out Herero villages in order to give them Trotha’s ‘message of 
peace’.110 In the course of the excursion suspicious Hereros shot two of Dannert’s 
messengers, one of whom was a Herero by the name of Daniel. In spite of these 
human losses, Dannert still considered the expedition a success because he had 
managed to persuade a number of Hereros to give up their arms. According to 
Dannert the expedition’s success rested on the fact that he was a missionary. He 
quoted a Herero elder, who was trying to calm down his more suspicious colleagues, 
as saying: “We know our Omuhonge [teacher]; he does not engage in trickery. If he 
has come looking for us, then we have nothing to fear.”111 As it were, the Herero 
elder was wrong. Following their trek with Dannert to Omaruru, the Hereros were 
sent to directly to the Karibib and Swakopmund concentration camps.112 
Helene Gathmann, who at the time was also residing in Dannert’s Omaruru, 
wrote about the same incident. According to her, Dannert and his men had been in 
the bush to recruit Hereros, but the expidition had failed because German troops 
took the opportunity to “shoot every single Herero down”.113 The same account was 
relayed in the Rhenish Mission Chronicle for Omaruru; here it was stated that 
                                                 
108  Oermann, pp. 107-109. 
109  Drechsler, p. 165. 
110  Missions-Berichte, 1905, p. 80. 
111  Missions-Berichte, 1905, p. 80. 
112  Missions-Berichte, 1905, p. 80. 
113  NAN, Accession 453, Gathmann’s Diary, March 9, 1905, p. 90. 
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Dannert was involved when a military patrol shot down Hereros at Omatako.114 
Remarkably, the story of Dannert’s involvement even reached the Hereros working 
on the mines in Johannesburg, who recited the incident to an incredulous Missionary 
Bernsmann.115 The source of the information was likely to have been ‘School 
Master’ Asser from Omaruru, who had left the mines when he heard of the outbreak 
of war to join the fighting Hereros in GSWA, and who, according to Missionary 
Bernsmann, wrote letters to his friends in the mines.116  
The Omatako incident was not unique. A very similar massacre took place at 
Ombahaka where Joel Kavezeri and his people as well as other groups were shot 
down by German troops even though the Hereros had come in the belief that it was a 
peace negotiation.117 These ‘missions of peace’, should have been a forewarning to 
the Herero not to trust missionaries such as Dannert who clearly prioritised German 
allegiance before their Christian morals.  
The violent collection raids that had at times resulted in wholesale massacres 
were finally discontinued when Lindequist arrived in the colony. In place of the 
raids, Lindequist had come to the colony with a ready-made plan that would allow 
for a more peaceful collection of the Hereros in the bush, a strategy in which the 
mission would play a vital role. Upon landing in Swakopmund on November 22nd, 
1905 the new Governor took the first step towards implementing his new collection 
plan. He had the local concentration camp prisoners rounded up and made an 
announcement to them about their future plight. He said: 
“… I am not inclined to always treat you as prisoners. You shall again be free, except for those 
who took part in the murder of farmers and traders. Those people will receive a just punishment. 
But, I cannot make your fate easier until the your fellow Hereros who are still in the bush give 
up their resistance and hand themselves over… Fair treatment is guaranteed to them. The sooner 
they produce themselves, the sooner your imprisonment will be ended. I cannot make specific 
promises, I can, however, tell you that anyone who shows good conduct shall also be treated 
well.” 118  
The new governor’s speech must have been a beacon of hope for the many 
Herero prisoners languishing in the concentration camps. The promise that fair 
treatment would be meted out to all those who would show ‘good conduct’ must 
have been especially promising, considering the harsh conditions in the camps under 
Trotha. Yet, no such special treatment would materialise under Lindequist’s reign, 
                                                 
114  RMS Chronicle 23.1, Omaruru, 1906. 
115  Mission-Berichte, 1905, pp. 66-67. 
116  Mission-Berichte, 1905, pp. 66-67. 
117  Drechsler, p. 159. On the body of Kavezeri was found a letter mentioning a group of 300 people that had 
died of thirst in the Omaheke following the Waterberg battle. Pool: 1991, p. 271. 
118  Von Lindequist’s proclamation to the Hereros, cited in Missions-Berichte, 1906, pp. 35-36. 
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on the contrary mortality rates in the camps stayed steadily high and at places such 
as Lüderitz they increased dramatically. 
The supposed link between sustained Herero captivity in the concentration 
camps and the voluntary surrender of free Hereros in the bush was very similar to 
the tactics of human blackmail applied by Lord Kitchener during the South African 
Boer War. Kitchener’s tactic had been to hold Boer women and children hostage in 
concentration camps in an attempt to ‘flush out’ Boer combatants from the bush. 
Lindequist had been the German Consul to Cape Town during the Boer War, which 
provided him with ample insights into Kitchener’s application of concentration 
camps. Moreover, Lindequist like Trotha before him had met and respected 
Kitchener.119 It is not an overstatement to say that the new governor’s promised 
freedom and good treatment, which clearly did not did not materialise, rather served 
to lure Herero out of the bush and into the concentration camps. 
The Rhenish mission was to play an essential part in the governor’s new 
collection plans. En route between Swakopmund and Windhoek, Lindequist made a 
point of visiting the Rhenish missionaries one by one. The governor was presenting 
the mission with his new vision and at the same time declaring that the church was 
to be the foundation of the colony’s “Deutschtum”, i.e. ‘Germanity’.120 Moreover, 
Lindequist declared that his own mission was to bring peace to the colony, a task he 
needed the missionaries help to fulfil.121 To replace the military patrols that had been 
hunting down Hereros in the bush for close to a year, collection was now instead 
entirely being handed over to the mission. The mission was essentially led to believe 
that the war was over and in order to win peace for the territory, missionaries would 
first have to actively collect and pacify the Hereros remaining in the bush.  
To implement the governor’s wishes the former mission stations at Omburo and 
Otjihaenena were turned into collection centres. On December 21, 1905 Missionary 
Kuhlmann arrived at the former mission station at Omburo, which lies north-east of 
Omaruru, with 20 ‘loyal’ Hereros to help him in his task.122 Three days later on 
December 23rd, Missionary Diehl arrived at the former mission station at 
Otjihaenena, about 100 Kilometres east of Windhoek, with a large group of loyal 
Hereros and their families, altogether 93 people.123 Accordingly the Otjihaenena and 
Omburo collection camps were active from the end of 1905. Half a year later on 
June 29, 1906 an additional camp at Otjozongombe was added. Missionary Olpp 
                                                 
119  BAK, Lindequist memoirs, KL. Erw. File 275, pp. 121–125.  
120  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 35. 
121  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 35. 
122  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 71. 
123  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 89. 
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and 50 militia opened up this new collection camp,124 which was situated about 8 
kilometres from the present day Waterberg Resort Office.125  
While the missionaries mostly stayed at the collection camps, the actual 
collection work was done by a number of ‘loyal’ Hereros, who were provided with 
guns and organised into collection militias before being sent on mission in the bush. 
These militiamen were paid in food – a very attractive wage considering that all 
other Hereros in the colony were either starving in the bush or forced to labour in the 
concentration camps. There would typically be ten men to a militia, which would be 
led by a particularly ‘trusted’ Herero.126  
The collection militias were armed with a couple of guns for self-defence and 
provisions to last them the time (often many weeks) their expeditions into the bush 
would take. Being the devil’s advocate their task would be to locate settlements in 
the bush, to approach the inhabitants and to explain that the war was over and that 
they would be free to return unharmed to their former lands. Paradoxically the 
missionaries dubbed these Herero collection militias: ‘peace patrols’. However, not 
everyone was convinced about the integrity of the militia and it was not uncommon 
for shots to be fired against them.127 Later Governor von Lindequist would boast the 
ingenuity of a scheme that staked Hereros against Hereros and thus saved German 
blood.128  
Apart from their guns, the militiamen were armed with translated versions of a 
proclamation Governor Lindequist had made on December 1st.129 The proclamation 
was an offer of peace to the Hereros in the bush, promising freedom, peace and that 
the concentration camps would be closed provided they come peacefully to Omburo 
or Otjihaenena collection camps. Lindequist also promised the end of Trotha’s 
violent raids as well as food, cattle and paid labour for ‘surrendering’ Hereros. The 
proclamation read: 
“Hereros! Thousands of your tribal peers have already surrender and are now being fed and 
clothed by the Government. Every measure is being taken by me to ensure that they are treated 
justly. I promise the same to you…Come to Omburo and Otjihaenena! Missionaries will be sent 
there. They will bring provisions with them so that you can satisfy your great hunger. If you 
have any cattle, you will also be temporarily allowed to keep some of them to provide for your 
women and children. Those of you, who are strong and able to work, will also receive a small 
reward, provided you are skilful. There will be no white soldiers stationed at Omburo and 
Otjihaenena, so that you will have no reason to fear or to think that there will once again be shots 
                                                 
124  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 249. 
125  Missions-Berichte, 1907, p. 35. 
126  ZBU 454, D.IV.l.3. Vol 2, pp. 120-124. 
127  ZBU 454, D.IV,l.3, Vol 2, pp. 120-124 
128  Deutsches Kolonialblatt no. 12, 1906, p. 402. 
129  Missions-Berichte, 1906, pp. 35-36. 
 
 
 
34 
fired. The sooner you put your weapons down and come to us, the sooner can be considered to 
ease conditions for your tribal peers who are prisoners and perhaps later to give them back their 
freedom … So come therefore quickly Hereros, before it is too late! … The Imperial Governor. 
v. Lindequist”130 
The recruitment militia read this proclamation to the Hereros in the Veld in order 
to facilitate what the governor and the missionaries had termed ‘the work of peace’ 
[Friedensarbeit].131 However, the unspoken reality was that those who presented 
themselves to the collection camps, and thereby to the Colonial Government, were 
to become prisoners-of-war and would eventually be sent directly to one of the 
many concentration camps. It was therefore a betrayal of trust as missionaries and 
their Herero assistants went into the Omaheke and the central bush-lands to locate 
and convince or “lure”132 surviving Hereros into surrendering to them. Hereros in the 
bush were promised peace, freedom, food, blankets and the like in exchange for 
their ‘surrender,’133 but would eventually be ushered from collection points to the 
many concentration camps emerging in Windhoek, Okahandja, Karibib, Swakop-
mund and Lüderitz. The ‘surrendering’ Hereros would probably only have realised 
the extent of the trickery when German patrols arrived at the collection camps to 
transport the collected Hereros off to meet their new fate.134 
It was not a fact unbeknownst to the missionaries that their ‘work of peace’ 
meant that collected Hereros would be sent to the concentration camps and that they 
would there be forced to labour for the military and/or the Colonial Government. 
Remarking on his early collection successes, Kuhlmann in Omburo noted that it was 
fortunate prisoner did not have to proceed directly to the concentration camps to 
perform hard labour, considering that they were still too malnourished to work when 
arriving in the collection camp.135 
 
 
                                                 
130  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 36. 
131  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 165. 
132  Gewald: 1996, p. 221. 
133  Although the term ‘surrender’ that is applied in the sources is echoed here, the suggestion that all Herero 
in the ‘veld’ were in some way fugitives is inherently flawed, regardless of the state of war. Neville 
Alexander in Wood (ed.), argued that the term ‘rebellion’ was erroneous because it implied that the 
German regime in GSWA was lawful, whereas there was no real legal basis for the German subjugation of 
the Hereros. The term ‘surrender’ is therefore misleading as Germany was not a legal representative of the 
Hereros, and therefore could not impose any valid political or legal powers on them. Also, as has been 
explored by Gewald, the on-going ‘Phoney War’ was one-sided in as much as the Hereros were not 
actively part to it, making the word ‘surrender’ even more arbitrary.  
134  RMS Chronicle 23.1, Omaruru, 1906. See also Drechsler, pp. 208-209. 
135  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 72; see also Oermann, pp. 109-112. 
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Photo 1.6  Drawing of POW transport from Deutsche Reiter in Suedwest 
 
 
Despite the relative isolation of the many Herero communities living in the 
desolate areas of eastern ‘Hereroland’ and to the north and west of Omaruru, 
information about the concentration camps and the trickery applied by the mission 
amazingly still filtered through to the scattered Herero communities. The source of 
the information was prisoners who had managed to escape the camps and return 
home.136 According to Missionary Diehl, suspicion and fear towards the Germans 
was soon rife among Hereros in the field.137 Stories of a conspiracy between the 
colonial government and the mission were spreading, making collection work very 
difficult.138 The stories were specific, describing both the concentration camps and 
the labour that people were forced into. Diehl mentioned an incident when newly 
arrived Hereros had come to the camp ‘shaking with fear’139 allegedly believing the 
Otjihaenena camp to be a trap where soldiers would be on hand to shoot the 
‘surrendering’ Herero.  
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137  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 91 
138  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 91. 
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There were also stories in the bush about the concentration camps that described 
how all men, who were deemed fit enough to fight, were hung by the neck and even 
how some people were burned alive. There were also stories about old people being 
put to work and severely beaten.140 Diehl summarily dismissed these stories as pure 
lies, exaggerated as they surely where to him. Yet Diehl’s relative isolation would 
have played a part in the formation of his opinion. He had probably not been to the 
camps in Swakopmund and Lüderitz and might not even have been aware of the 
many reports in the mission’s newsletter, describing the severe conditions suffered 
there.141 Unlikely as this may be Diehl chose to describe these stories as “lies”.142 The 
stories were not false however. In fact, old people were put to work and prisoners 
were beaten, often severely (see later). Indeed the accuracy of such stories being 
passed on in the Veld attests that some prisoners managed to escape and report to 
their communities on conditions suffered in the concentration camps.  
The spread of information about the collection and concentration camps 
motivated organised resistance to the collection militia. A certain Andreas of 
Otjimbingwe143 vehemently resisted the militia and travelled to numerous other 
Herero communities to discourage them, if not force them, not to give in to the 
promises made by the militia. Eventually resistance and suspicion was of such 
magnitude that militia kept the surrendering Hereros under heavy guard whilst 
returning them to the collection camps, an indication that collections were at times 
still conducted with the use of force.144 Indeed, the Rhenish Mission acknowledged 
that only few Herero actually came to the collection camps out of their own free 
will, remarking: “As good as all had to be taken from the bush, many through use of 
violence.”145  
The colonial government ironically saw resistance against the collection militia 
as acts of Herero aggression. An official report from April 1906 described resistance 
as the result of gangs of lawless Hereros with murders on their conscience.146 The 
tone and message of the report and others like it were typical of the general attitude 
among German troops towards the Hereros; soldiers were often consumed by hatred 
sparked by contemporary concepts of race and were therefore not very sympathetic 
                                                 
140  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 91. 
141  See for example Missions-Berichte, 1905 pp. 139-141. 
142  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 91. 
143  Missions-Berichte, 1906, pp. 91-92 as well as p. 121. It has not been determined if it is the same ‘Herero 
Andreas’ who in 1905 was fighting with the Nama in the South.  
144  Missions-Berichte, 1906, pp. 91-92. 
145  Missions-Berichte, 1907, p. 131. 
146  ZBU 454, D.IV.l.3, Vol 2., pp. 120-124. 
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of Herero sentiment.147 Fear was regarded as highly suspicious and resistance as 
tantamount to guilt. Fear was nevertheless not unwarranted as noted by Inspector 
Spiecker of the RMS who in May 1906 visited Otjihaenena on his tour of the 
colony. Spiecker had already been at the coast and had seen the concentration camps 
and the horror that was in store for the Hereros in Otjihaenena. He wrote: 
“I enjoyed myself in so many ways with these Herero; but again and again my heart was 
rendered heavy, when I thought about what awaited these people. Admittedly, it is my 
impression that a hard school will be necessary to bring about the rebirth of these people.”148  
Ironically the success of Lindequist’s collection efforts hinged on the mission’s 
ability to alleviate Herero fears. It was therefore important that the collection camps 
had the appearance of safe-havens to those entering the collection camps, as 
expressly stated by the governor in his proclamation to the Herero: “Don’t be 
afraid”. The collection camps had food, water, tobacco and blankets which all 
formed part of a scheme to lure Hereros back into the German realm. People were to 
feel safe and welcome as they ventured back into the hands of the colony – a fact 
also evident in Spiecker’s above soliloquy. The plan evidently worked as thousands 
of Hereros ultimately gave into the ‘peace’ offering and the prospects of food and 
blankets.149 
An indication that the collection camps were run with less vigilance is the 
surprising revelation that some prisoners actually returned to Otjihaenena and 
Omburo after having escaped the concentration camps. A 1907 report confirms that 
out of a hundred prisoners to have been collected in a period of four months, thirty-
six were former prisoners in concentration camps.150 Although it would seem 
illogical for someone who had experienced the initial deceit of the mission, and who 
had managed to escape the concentration camps or work camps to return back to the 
mission, this was nevertheless the case.151 An example of such returnees was 
referenced in a letter from Missionary Kuhlmann to Government. The former 
explained that three Hereros who had recently fled with their families from assigned 
workplaces in Okazize, were now back in Omburo camp. The Hereros had explained 
to Kuhlmann how their female partners had been forced to ‘be’ with the soldiers and 
                                                 
147  ZBU 454, D.IV.l.3, Vol 2., pp.120-124 or Emil Malzahn’s diary, NAN, Accession 510. 
148  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p.167. A more sinister view along the same lines was expressed by von Trotha: 
“I destroy the African tribes with streams of blood and streams of money. Only following this cleansing 
can something new emerge, which will remain.” As quoted in Gewald: 1996, p. 208. 
149  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 165. 
150  ZBU 455, D.IV.l.3. Vol 3, pp. 128-129. 
151  Missionaries were known to be accommodating and generally treated prisoners well; in fact they were 
treated too well for Governor Lindequist’s liking, who therefore sent a warning to Kuhlmann about his lax 
attitude towards the prisoners. Pool: 1979, pp. 271-272. 
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that they had been generally mistreated.152 Whether these escapees were seeking 
Christian sanctuary or whether conditions left them no alternative can only be 
speculated upon.  
Apart from helping to lure Hereros out of the bush, there was also another 
motive for providing prisoners with ‘peace’ and provisions. Many of the people who 
surrendered to the militia were sick or starved when they arrived in the collection 
camps and were as such allowed to stay in situ for a while. The reason for this 
generous act, as Lindequist cynically put it, was that “[their] immediate use for 
labour was [rendered] impossible” when arriving in the collection camps.153 In other 
words the prisoners were fed and allowed recuperation, simply for the sake of 
making them better able to perform physical labour.  
The false sense of security in the collection camps was short lived. Once out of 
Otjihaenena or Omburo a much different reality awaited the prisoners. By 
surrendering to missionaries in the collection camps, the Hereros were inadvertently 
surrendering their freedom and for many eventually their lives too. In some cases, 
prisoners were not even allowed respite in the collection camps, before being 
ushered off to the concentration camps. At Omburo, for example, a missionary 
source describes how a certain Lt. Helmich and his troops came riding in to the 
camp at night, rounding up all the collected Hereros and forced them off to Karibib 
by foot – a journey of almost 100 kilometres.154 Similarly when the railway between 
Lüderitz and Kubub/Aus was begun in early 1906, Government informed 
Missionary Kuhlmann in Omburo to send as many prisoners as possible straight to 
the southern line; sick, healthy, young and old, it made no difference.155 These were 
people, who had surrendered to the militia, by gun or trickery, and now were 
transported directly to the railway works in the far south of the colony to do hard 
labour in spite of their condition. Notably it seems that the practise of delivering 
collected Herero straight to the government or private construction projects was the 
rule rather than the exception at Omburo. Missionary Kuhlmann also delivered his 
human ‘stock’ directly from the bush to the geographically much closer 
Swakopmund-Otavi railway line also under construction at the time.156 
                                                 
152  ZBU 454, D.IV.l.3, Vol. 1, p. 197. February 28, 1906. 
153  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 165. 
154  RMS Chronicle 23.1, Omaruru, 1906. Also cited in Drechsler, pp. 208-209. 
155  Pool: 1979, p. 270. “Die owerheid wou soveel arbeiders as moontlik vir die werk aan die Lüderitzbucht-
spoorweg hê. Die gewolg was dat die Distriktsamt van Omaruru alle nuwe inkomelinge by Omburo, selfs 
die boodskappers, siekes en oues, na Omaruru ontbied het vir versending na Lüderitzbucht.” 
156  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p.71. Arthur Koppel also spoke of a very large number of workers having been 
delivered to the Unterbau by the Schutzwache –the protection guards. ZBU 454, D.IV.l.3, Vol. 2, p. 337. 
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The relative respite allowed prisoner in the collection camps was not popular 
with the Colonial Government. The author of a 1907 report about conditions at 
Otjihaenena was clearly angered at the high amount of rations157 given to prisoners 
as well as the casual atmosphere in the camp.158 He was particularly concerned about 
the fact that full rations were provided to former escapees and made special 
reference to the lack of punishment meted out to those that returned to the 
missionary camps after managing escapes from Government concentration camps. 
His report stated: 
“According to the impressions I have gathered here, it is high time the collection work in 
Otjihaenena takes another shape. I mean, a native that runs away from work deserves a full 
punishment, not [to be rewarded with] good rations and laziness.”159 
The comments in the report were directed at the mission in charge of the 
‘collection work’. It is not difficult to imagine that missionaries were less adept at 
enforcing disciplinary measures than the army. Subsequent to the strong criticism of 
the collection camps they were eventually shut down. Otjihaenena was formally 
closed on September 11, 1906, having been in operation for 9½ months. However, 
Otjihaenena’s infrastructure and militias were eventually moved to Okomitombe 
close to Gobabis in a final attempt to sweep the country bare of free Hereros. At 
Okomitombe collection was continued until March 1907.160 In part the closing was 
due to the low number of people recruited, e.g. one hundred in four months.161  
In place of the collection camps, the military again began launching raids into the 
bush whereby no attempts were made to persuade Hereros to come back into the 
German realm, they were simply taken by force.162 Already in late July 1906 settlers 
and parts of the military were getting anxious to resume the raids. A letter from the 
Outjo district to Government pleaded that mop-up patrols [Aufklaerungspatrouillen] 
should be sent out as soon as the ‘time of dying’ was over. The ‘time of dying’ can 
only be interpreted to mean the cold winter months, which would invariably account 
for many deaths among starving Hereros in the bush, i.e. implying that the cold 
conditions would do the patrol’s work for them in the months to come.163 According 
to the author of the letter, Commander von Wangenheim, communities still resisting 
                                                 
157  Hereros in collection camps received flour and rice, with the addition of tobacco. Missions-Berichte, 1906, 
p. 166.  
158  ZBU 455, D.IV.l.3. Vol 3, pp. 128-129. 
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160  Missions-Berichte, 1907, pp. 34-35. 
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162  Missions-Berichte, 1907, p. 35. 
163  ZBU 454, D.IV.l.3, Vol. 2, pp. 240a-b. 
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should be rounded up by the patrols and their settlements burned.164 The commander 
added that in case communities were ‘stubborn’ [ganz Hartnaeckige], people should 
be burnt along with their settlements. The military raids were resumed at the 
beginning of 1907 and continued unabated until Germany lost the colony to the 
Union forces in 1915.165  
Overall the collection militias were very successful. In Omburo alone a total of 
4,497 people had been collected by September 1906 and in Otjihaenena an estimated 
4,200 had arrived in the camp in the same space of time.166 By the end of 1906, 
missionaries and their militia had collected approximately 8,700 in these two camps 
alone. Otjozongombe, the third collection camp, was closed by the end of October 
1906 and was estimated to have produced 1824 new prisoners.167 Okomitombe by 
Gobabis, the fourth collection camp that sprung up in place of Otjihaenena, was 
closed end of March 1907 and had tallied 1103 collections.168 Therefore collection 
numbers for the four camps totalled 11,624 Herero women, children and men. 
The mission remained confident that it had done ‘work of peace’, arguing that 
the efforts in the collection camps served to secure peace in the colony.169 Yet, if one 
does not consider the missionary involvement in Trotha’s patrols, e.g. Dannert, close 
to12,000 Herero were recruited or forced into collection camps and eventually to the 
concentration camps as a result of collaboration between Rhenish mission and 
Colonial Government. The thoroughness of collection and the mission’s efficiency 
impressed Governor Lindequist. Following a very thorough trip through ‘Herero-
land’ in June 1906, he noted: 
“… the northern and central parts of the territory, especially what is properly-speaking Herero-
land, is as well as denude of Hereros.”170 
Seemingly no Hereros were spared; even the Hereros who had worked with and 
for the German colonial enterprise in the militias were themselves eventually sent to 
work on the many construction projects in the colony. In June 1907 ten Hereros, 
who had been part of the militia, were as such handed over to the Department of 
Works [Bauverwaltung].171  
Missionary involvement in the collection of Herero POWs was a betrayal of 
trust, but just how conscious this betrayal was, is less certain. The general perception 
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among the missionary was that they were doing the ‘work of peace’.172 This was a 
misconception, which rested mainly on an understanding that the colonial 
government, i.e. Lindequist, intended the colony to return to pre-war relations. This 
was not the case as prisoners were eventually hauled off to the concentration camps 
were many thousands would eventually die.  
The church could not have been completely surprised by the eventual outcome of 
the joint venture between mission and colonial government, however. Many of the 
practises employed in the later-day concentration camps were already in use at the 
outset of collections in late December 1905, as seen by Vedder’s sharp criticism of 
the camps already in 1905 – i.e. before the collection camps.173 Also indicating 
missionary knowledge was the fact that as early as mid-1905 the Mission had 
drafted a report for it’s Annual General Meeting, wherein it was mentioned that 
“they [the Hereros] have given up their cattle and their guns yet now have to 
perform forced labour.”174 Indeed one missionary exclaimed: “Ne bis in idem!” 
(Don’t punish them twice).175 Missionaries were well aware of the atrocities 
committed by the German forces under Trotha and would surely also have known 
the high likelihood that this behaviour would continue. Furthermore, the Mission did 
not discontinue its involvement in collection, even after it was evident that atrocities 
were still taking place and that incredibly high mortality rates were reported from all 
corners of the colony where prisoners were in the hands of the military.176 It was 
therefore surely not an issue of knowledge, or rather the lack of knowledge, that led 
to the continued assistance given to Government.  
Loyalty was an important factor behind the assistance extended to the Colonial 
Administration by the RMS. The mission was evidently suffering a great dilemma. 
On the one hand, the mission was a German institution and was obliged to lend help 
to its government in a state of war; but, on the other hand, missionaries were not 
blind to injustices perpetrated by the colonial government and understood the 
reasons behind both the Herero and Nama uprisings against the settlers and the 
colonial authority.177 Even though the mission had initially asked to fulfil the role of 
go-between for the sake of peace, the role of ‘bait’ that was instead bestowed upon 
the mission could not be turned down. As it were, the role of collecting ‘free’ 
                                                 
172  This is reflected so strongly in missionary sources that Oermann described the collection as a “large-scale 
humanitarian operation” of ‘great success.’ Oermann, p. 109. 
173  Missions-Berichte, 1905 pp. 139-141. 
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Hereros and invariably also populating the concentration camps had been bestowed 
on missionaries by the highest German authority and refusal to co-operate would not 
have been taken lightly by government or by an already antipathetic settler 
community.178  
There was also another reason for the mission’s collaboration with Government. 
Intense rivalry between the Catholic mission and the Rhenish Lutheran mission 
meant that both these German institutions were essentially fighting over access to 
Hereros and Nama in the concentration camps.179 There was therefore a more 
calculated element to mission’s collaboration with Government, as in fact it was up 
to the colonial government to decide which mission was to be allowed access to 
camp prisoners. In the end, Government’s solution to this convert conflict was a 
decree by the colonial administration that access to Herero and now also Nama 
POWs was to be split down the middle – a Solomonic decision that nevertheless 
rendered the Rhenish mission somewhat disappointed, considering its efforts in the 
collection of remnants of the Herero nation.180  
 
The Windhoek concentration camps 
Once Hereros had been taken from the collection camp in Otjihaenena, most would 
soon find themselves in one of Windhoek’s two concentration camps. The first of 
two camps in Windhoek was also the largest of the colony’s concentration camps. It 
was located in the centre of the capital, roughly where the Rider Statue and the 
Kristuskirche are situated today – ironically these are both monuments to German 
losses during the War. The other camp lay on “the hills north-west of the railway 
station”181 or as Werner Hillebrecht described it: “roughly at the site of the empty … 
space at the intersection of Okahandja Street and Harvey Street”.182 Hillebrecht 
added that many prisoners were buried there and that in 1919 the Herero community 
had tried to get the site fenced in and protected, albeit in vain.183  
Added together, the two Windhoek camps comprised by far the largest 
population of concentration camp prisoners in one locality. In mid August 1906, 
there were precisely 5,183 prisoners in Windhoek184 and that same year in April 
                                                 
178  Especially farmer Schlettwein was a nemesis of the mission, lobbying against their involvement in ‘native 
affairs’. See Secret minutes of Government Council, BKE 305, G.A. 8, pp. 30-36. 
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there had been approximately 7,000 prisoners.185 Part of the camps’ prisoners 
constituted an ephemeral population that risked being ushered on to other camps or 
to work in the mines, on the railway, for the military and for settlers at any given 
moment. Apart from high death rates, this largely explains the relatively high 
fluctuation in figures in Windhoek. 
Below is seen an early view of the first of Windhoek’s concentration camps that 
was placed on the site where the Rider Statue stands today. In the background of the 
picture one can see the German flag flying over the ‘Alte’ Feste. The huts appear 
cramped and feeble. The camp itself looks to have been broken into sections and in 
the bottom right-hand corner a person appears to be walking away, out of the frozen 
frame, next to one of these partitions. 
 
 
 
Photo 1.7  The first of Windhoek’s concentration camps, probably 1905 
 
 
A better overview of the camp is found in a later picture, taken from the same 
angle but from a higher vantage-point. The second picture gives a better idea of the 
magnitude of the camp yet still underscores the word concentration in concentration 
camp, as tents and huts appear squashed together behind the think thorn-bush fence. 
In the background on the right side a very large white military tent is seen, the kind 
used to accommodate hundreds of prisoners at a time in the respective concentration 
                                                 
185  Kommando der Schutztruppen im Reichskolonialamt, Sanitaets-Bericht, p. 129 
 
 
 
44 
camps. Round-huts or Pontoks in the right-hand foreground are curious, in being 
unguarded yet in proximity to the concentration camp. An explanation could be that 
they belonged to some of the 4000-strong indigenous population in the town. It 
could also be that they belonged to African camp guards, however. 
 
 
 
Photo 1.8  The Windhoek camp around 1906/07 
 
 
The below over-exposed image either shows the Alte Feste Camp from yet 
another angle, or it is a picture of Windhoek’s second camp found close to today’s 
Windhoek Central Hospital.186 Like the Alte Feste Camp, a thick belt of thorn-bushes 
surrounded the camp. In the foreground was an almost vertical Windhoek aloe tree, 
indicating that the camp was placed on a slanted hillside, although this does not give 
any further clues as to which camp this might possibly have been, seeing as both 
locations are hilly.187 To the right of the camp appears to have been an open space, 
which could have been used for assemblies and the like. The thorn-bush continued 
out of the image and it is therefore assumed that the open space where are seen 
women and children was part of the closed camp and as such the entire camp is a lot 
bigger than the section depicted in the image. In the background is seen an entrance 
with a square structure next to it, which presumably is the structure that housed the 
camps guards.  
                                                 
186  As relayed by the father of present Herero Paramount Riruako in an interview with the author. 
187  Had the photographer merely framed the picture skewly, the aloe tree would also have tilted to the left. 
 
 
  45 
 
 
Photo 1.9  A Windhoek concentration camp, ca. 1906/07 
 
 
Another interesting aspect of the picture is the fact that apart from the soldier, 
only one other man is present; the rest of the image portrays women and children. 
Suggesting this to have been Windhoek is only the topography and a solid iron spike 
that is drilled into the ground (bottom right). Such spikes were used as large pegs for 
military tents like the ones seen on the larger pictures of the Alte Feste Camp (photo 
1.8). 
At its peak, the Windhoek concentration camps housed as many as 7000 
prisoners,188 which was an incredibly high number in a town with infrastructure built 
to cater for a civilian population of around 2,500 people. The concentration camp 
population, estimated at an average of 5,000 people,189 therefore outnumbered the 
German population in Windhoek by 100 percent and at times more. It would be fair 
to assume that the infrastructure in Windhoek, especially in term of sanitation, 
availability of medical facilities and foodstuff, would have struggled to cope with 
the large amount of people in the colonial capital. It would be equally likely that the 
local community and military would go to no extra lengths to cater for prisoners – as 
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already indicated in Trotha’s initial memo about the camps. 190 Similarly in the Osona 
camp at Okahandja, a commander told Missionary Eich that nothing would be done 
for the bulk of sick prisoners. According to the commander only those strong 
enough to survive were deemed useful, a form of social Darwinism. Eich wrote: “ 
[the commander] recently told me that he is under orders only to seek out strong 
people for His Majesty.”191 Assuming a similar philosophy was applied in other 
camps, the facilities in Windhoek would therefore at best have been rudimentary 
with little or no sanitary facilities or, presumably, any other facilities of mention.  
Lack of sanitary facilities, generally miserable living conditions (see photo 1.10) 
and the large concentration of people in a confined area were among the main causes 
of the rapid spread of disease in windhoek’s camps – as indeed it were in the other 
camps around the colony as well. Yet although it is obvious that the spread of 
disease in the camps could be stemmed, if not averted, by improving conditions and 
facilities this did largely not happen. Concerns were exclusively directed at the 
potential health risk posed by the camps for the town’s white population.192 Rather 
than improving camp facilities to keep prisoners healthy, Government spent its 
resources trying to reduce contact between the prisoners and Windhoek’s white 
population in order to minimise the latter’s risk of infection with contagious 
diseases.193  
The initial approaches for trying to stem the flow of disease into white quarters 
was to further fence in and guard prisoners. This containment policy restricted 
mobility to and from the camp in order to prevent white infections but at the same 
time kept sick prisoners in the same compounds as healthy prisoners, causing 
disease to spread like wildfire. Moreover, the strategy of fencing in sick prisoners 
did not pay off in terms of preventing white infections. During the day, a number of 
prisoners were taken in to town, where they were used as washing ladies, domestic 
helpers and labourers in general.194 During such interactions it was not uncommon 
for prisoners to be forced into sexual intercourse with soldiers and settlers,195 as note 
by a concentration camp survivor: 
“Many of our in this way deported wives and daughters later returned either pregnant or with a 
child from a white man. This obligation to go and work for the white man was not a government 
                                                 
190  BKE 221, B.II.74.c, pp.33-34. 
191  RMS Correspondence VII 31.1, Swakopmund 1-7, Eich to Vedder, June 19, 1905. 
192 The Colonial Government was seated within immediate proximity of the main camp, which may have 
influenced this fear. 
193  Sanitaets-Bericht. p. 139. 
194  Sanitaets-Bericht. p. 139. 
195  Sanitaets-Bericht. p. 140. 
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ordinance but white men came to the kraals [Camps] and just gave the order – take you blanket 
and come; and we had no choice.” 196 
It should be noted that although it was not initially a government ‘ordinance’ for 
prisoners to work for the local community, in mid June 1905 it became legal for 
government and the military to rent out prisoners to local persons and businesses.197 
The casual use of prisoners for purposes of sex, however, was so rife that the official 
medical report of the war, the so-called Sanitaets-Berich, described sexually trans-
mitted diseases as a major threat to Windhoek’s white population. The exhaustive 
report, which was compiled by the military wing of the Colonial Department, stated 
that: 
“The frequent [occurrence] of sexually transmitted diseases among the ‘natives’ constituted a 
continuous danger for the troops and consequently numerous victims were claimed by the 
sexually transmitted diseases in the larger localities with many troops such as, for example, 
Windhuk [sic.] in spite of the many precautions taken against this [happening].”198 
 
 
 
 
Photo 1.10    Life inside a concentration camp 
 
 
                                                 
196  Steenkamp, p. 12. 
197  BKE 224, B.II.74.d, Spec. I, Vol. 2, pp. 18 and 26. 
198  Sanitaets-Bericht. p. 140. 
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Okahandja’s Osona camp 
 
The Osona camp in Okahandja had initially been set up by General von Trotha before the battle at 
Ohamakari on August 11, 1904 and remained a major camp throughout the war years. Osona camp 
was actually comprised of a number of separate camps, all of which were out of bounds for non-
military or otherwise essential personnel. In all there were around 2000 Herero prisoners and five 
different camps in Okahandja around July 1905.  
Between January 18 and 29, 1906 Inspector Spiecker of the Rhenish Mission was given access 
to the Osona camp as part of his tour of the colony. According to Spiecker, Osona camp was now 
composed of only four different camps, or Kraals as he termed them – a word usually relating to 
enclosures for cattle. The number of prisoners must therefore have gone down between July 1905 
and January 1906, thereby also reducing the number of smaller camps from five to four. The most 
likely reason for the reduction was, like other camps, linked to labour needs on the railway projects 
in the colony.  
Spiecker described the four camps in the following manner: 
Camp 1: was run by the Rhenish Mission and was erected for the Unfaehige [the ‘unworkable’].  
This camp contained mainly young children. 
Camp 2: was the main POW camp and as such was heavily guarded by the military. The camp 
had between 800 and 900 prisoners. 
Camp 3: was the so-called Lazarett Camp, which held sick or dying prisoners. The prisoners  
were miserable according to Spiecker, who did not mention the presence of any medical staff or 
doctors. 
Camp 4: was the Police Camp and housed a couple of hundred free ‘natives’, mostly Damara. 
 
 
 
Source:  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 73, Missions-Berichte, 1905, p. 189. 
  Photo: German postcard. 
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There was invariably continuous contact between the German population and the 
prisoners, which eventually had the much-feared result of diseases spreading – 
presumably both ways, i.e. soldiers would surely also pass on sexually transmitted 
diseases to prisoners. Following the predictable failure of the containment policy, 
the strategy was eventually abandoned in favour of a so-called ‘native hospital’.199 
This quasi-medical facility consisted of a number of kraals that were organised so as 
to separate prisoners with different types of diseases. It was assembled in Novem-
ber/December 1905 next to Windhoek’s second camp (close to today’s Windhoek 
Central Hospital).200 The medical facilities comprised mainly of open military tents 
as well as huts made from wood, sacks or corrugated iron. The entire facility was 
surrounded with thorn-bush fencing. According to the plan of the ‘native field 
hospital’, the largest section of the compound was devoted to free ‘native’ women 
and as such the facility had to be shared with the 4000 strong population of Damara 
and Owambo workers residing in the town.201 
In spite of the new medical facilities for the African communities in Windhoek, 
deaths were still a daily phenomenon. A 1907 mortality statistic pointed out that the 
highest number of deaths in the Windhoek camps occurred in September 1906, with 
a human tally of 252.202 In other words, more than eight people would die on a given 
day in September 1906 in the Windhoek camps. 
 
General conditions in the concentration camps 
There were numerous smaller and lesser concentration camps in the colony. Some 
pertained to private businesses such as the Woermann company and others to 
government related projects such as railway construction, which saw several 
thousands of Herero ‘accommodated’ in “Railway Concentration Labour Camps”.203 
The biggest, however, were the military-run government camps that had been placed 
strategically in the colony, relative to labour needs in five main localities: Wind-
hoek, Okahandja and Karibib in the interior, as well as Swakopmund and Lüderitz at 
the coast.  
Prisoners in concentration camps would typically be fenced in, either by thorn-
bush fences or by barbed wire. Just like the word concentration implies, thousands 
of people were cramped into small areas where they were encouraged to build so-
                                                 
199  Sanitaets-Bericht. p. 140. 
200  Sanitaets-Bericht. pp. 140-141. 
201  Sanitaets-Bericht. p. 142. 
202  Reichs-Kolonial-Amt, File 2140, KAII 1181, Eing. 24 March 1908, p. 161. “In the Windhoek prisoner 
camp the largest number of deaths occurred in September 1906, with 252 dead in that month.” 
203  South Africa, Union of, p. 103. 
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called ‘Pontoks’, or round huts, if the material was available; as already seen in the 
Windhoek Camps, large numbers of prisoners were also accommodated in sizeable 
military tents.  
The German Sanitaets-Bericht, which, inter alia, dealt with prisoner mortality, 
noted that scurvy, pneumonia, influenza, syphilis and other STDs were the main 
causes of death in the camps. The report did not offer any in-depth explanation for 
this rapid and continuous increase in deadly diseases and, moreover, did not engage 
with the issue of potential government culpability in the many deaths. Instead the 
Sanitaets-Bericht and other reports often repeated that high death rates were a result 
of prisoners’ already weakened state, usually caused by disease acquired before 
entering the camps.204 
There is a lot of truth to the claim that people entered the camp in a weakened 
state. Many months of war, suffering both mental and physical trauma as well as 
enduring time-consuming and strenuous transportation through dense, arid country 
would invariably have taken it toll on prisoners.205 Missionary Dannert in Omaruru 
was clearly shaken at the state of the POWs arriving in the town in mid 1905. In a 
letter to the monthly newsletter of the Rhenish Mission, he described prisoners 
arriving as being skeletons covered only by thin film of skin and he wondered how 
in fact they had ever made it as far as Omaruru.206 Dannert described the misery to 
unlike anything he had ever experienced and was deeply moved by dying mothers 
trying to keep their children alive.207  
Notwithstanding the fact that people were in a poor state upon arrival in the 
camps, the conditions that awaited them were dire to the extent that few would 
actually recuperate. Moreover, rations were of such insufficient nutritious value that 
basic self-sustenance, even for healthy prisoners, was difficult. According to an 
official rations list issued February 1906,208 prisoners were to be given ½ kg of 
canned meat or flour, ½ kg of rice or flour and 0,030 kg of salt per day – with the 
addition that meat should only be given twice a week at most, insofar as it was given 
at all. This meant that POWs, who incidentally were listed just above mules and 
horse on the ration list, could risk receiving a solid kilogram of flour and 30 grams 
of salt as their daily sustenance. 
Rice was the most common foodstuff provided to prisoners, a fact accountable 
for a large percentage of overall deaths in the camps. In missionary correspondence 
                                                 
204  Sanitaets-Bericht, p. 144 
205  Sanitaets-Bericht, p. 140. 
206  Missions-Berichte, 1905, p. 138. 
207  Missions-Berichte, 1905, p. 138. 
208  ZBU 455, D.IC.l.3, Vol. 3, pp. 44-45. 
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and the mission newsletter rice was repeatedly singled out as one of the main causes 
of ‘scurvy’209 among prisoners.210 The cause and cure of scurvy where not yet known 
in 1906, and many of the symptoms described, could well have been simple mal-
nutrition. This would correspond well with the fact that rice was a complete enigma 
to the prisoners, who had no knowledge of how to prepare the foodstuff. The high 
fibre content of rice was surely also too much for the stomachs of the Hereros who 
had been starving in the Omaheke and who were accustomed to a diet of milk and 
meat. To make matters worse, rice was delivered raw and uncooked to prisoners, 
who, in the case of Swakopmund, had only few pots to cook their rations in -an 
insufficient amount for the more than 1000 prisoners. 211 In Karibib Missionary Elger 
reflected on the diet of the POWs, writing: 
“… In Karibib [1905]…accommodation was very primitive and the food was also very insuf-
ficient… Rice and flour was in abundance, but nothing lighter than that.212  
In Swakopmund, Missionary Vedder wrote to his colleagues that prisoners were 
unable to cope with the provisions provided to them, stating: 
“… people suffer their daily meal of rice, which due to the lack of pots is very difficult to 
prepare… hundreds are breaking down due to the lack of nutrition and are dying.”213 
From the very beginning of the concentration camps strategy, missionary Vedder 
and his colleagues were actively trying to lobby government for better rations to the 
prisoners. Although many took the attitude that what can be done is being done, 
missionary Vedder was more proactive in his approach. He wrote a long letter to the 
mission headquarters spelling out conditions in the Swakopmund camp, asking for 
food and clothes to be sent from Germany.214 Vedder and his colleagues did, how-
ever, not manage to convince government to change provisions for prisoners.  
The camps would have been, and according to the statistics they were, the last 
stop for prisoners who had endured: a) war against a superior colonial force; b) 
escape and starvation; c) internment in a range of collection or other concentration 
camps; d) weeks of transport through rough country; e) insufficient provisions; f) 
and psychological if not physical violence exerted on them by the colonial force. 
There is therefore every reason to assume that many if not most prisoners arriving in 
the camps were already in a suppressed physical state. 
                                                 
209  It is not certain that scurvy was the actual cause of death for prisoners, although the Colonial Government 
often blamed the disease. 
210  NAN, Accession 569, ‘Memoirs of Pastor Elger’. 
211  Missions-Berichte, 1905, p. 140. 
212  NAN, Accession 569, ‘Memoirs of Pastor Elger’. 
213  Missions-Berichte, 1905, p. 140. 
214  Missions-Berichte, 1905, p. 86. 
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Once in the camps, the chances of being infected by new diseases or succumbing 
to already acquired ones was multiplied manifold. An almost total lack of medical 
attention, unhygienic living quarters, insufficient clothing and high concentration of 
people meant that these diseases were given optimal conditions for spreading. 
 
 
 
 
Photo 1.11   San and/or Nama prisoners severely abused and lined up for the camera 
 
 
The worst cases were the camps in the two coastal towns of Lüderitz and 
Swakopmund where climatic conditions played an added part in the spread of 
disease. The southern part of the Atlantic Ocean is known for its rough seas, icy 
temperatures and strong winds. Even if the wind were to shift and blow from the 
east it could result in an equally taxing sandstorm and should the wind die down, a 
humid mist would descend on the coastal towns. Climatic factors could therefore 
easily have contributed to prisoner mortality. 
Climatic conditions were shared with the local German population, but, there 
was a distinct difference in as much as the prisoners had no access to proper 
housing, food nor clothing to shelter them from the elements and save them from 
sickness. Moreover, local Germans were accustomed to the severe conditions that 
generally were a lot milder than German weather. The vast majority, if not all, of the 
 
 
  53 
Herero, Nama, and San prisoners215 had never set foot on the coast before and were 
simply not used to the cold climate and the high humidity. The average humidity in 
Windhoek was measured at 30%, which, when compared to Swakopmund’s annual 
average of 80%, would seem significant.216 To make things even worse, the coast at 
Swakopmund was infested with flies in the years of the camps, making life even 
more unpleasant and spreading of disease that much more likely.217 
The in-land camps were also prone to disease. Temperatures in the Namibian 
hinterland are generally higher than at the coast, but even Windhoek experiences 
temperatures below freezing during the winter. At the time of the camps the average 
low for the month of June was estimated to be -2.5218. This means that temperatures 
could well have been responsible for deaths in the hinterland too. Overall, however, 
climatic conditions were a minor contributing factor to the high death rates, as 
evident in the fact that Africans living and working at the coast before the wars were 
not in the same way prone terminal illness.  
As was the case in the South African camps during the Boer War,219 the rapid 
spread of contagious diseases in the concentration camps was a result of the close 
contact with fellow prisoners. The fact that prisoners would have brought viral 
infections with them into the camps meant that those incarcerated were at high risk. 
Another factor in towns with concentration camps were the ephemeral populations, 
i.e. the high influx of soldiers, traders and settlers passing through or staying for 
only short periods of time, who inevitably brought various viral and other diseases 
with them, a number of these sexually transmittable.  
According to most sources dealing with disease in the colony, sexually trans-
mitted diseases (STDs) were a major problem. The high number of single men, 
constituted by soldiers, seamen, and traders were inevitably the main catalysts of the 
spread of STDs. In Karibib, Missionary Elger described the occurrence of a mystery 
illness first thought to have been malaria. After numerous laboratory tests, however, 
it was established that this was a disease of a much different nature, namely venereal 
                                                 
215  There is photographic evidence to suggest that a number of San where also being held in the camps. See 
Zeller in Zeller and Zimmerer (eds.), p. 51. See also photo 1.11 in this chapter. There is evidence that a 
number of Oshiwambo-speaking migrant workers from the North were also employed in Swakopmund at 
the time. Eriola, pp. 213-215. 
216  Having been measured between 1899 and 1905, these figures are contemporary to the camps. Sanitaets-
Bericht, pp. 48-49. 
217  Sanitaets-Bericht, p. 49. 
218  Sanitaets-Bericht, p. 49. 
219  Oakes, p. 256. 
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typhoid.220 Attesting the sexual interaction between soldiers and prisoners, Elger 
related that ‘whites’ were at great risk of infection: 
“Then the infamous Army Doctor Kuhn came to tell us – as did others – that it wasn’t malaria, 
but rather the nasty STD venereal typhoid. Sadly, the epidemic soon grew worse and claimed 
more victims. The situation was very serious. It wasn’t only the native locations that were 
affected. The whites and the troops passing by were also at great risk of infection… We 
therefore built Pontoken close to our own quarters and took the sick [prisoners] there… At that 
time we didn’t think that this work fighting against typhoid, dysentery, scurvy, TB, smallpox 
and other diseases would continue for another three years. Sometimes we had more than forty 
people to look after at a time. Up to 20 people at a time were placed in the ever-expanding 
Pontoken. Of course the accommodation was very primitive and the food was also very 
insufficient.”221 
According to Elger there was no hospital for the prisoners to be taken to and as 
such the onus was passed on to the missionaries. Initially missionaries Vedder and 
Elger worked together in Karibib to help treat and care for the many sick, but 
Vedder eventually went on to Swakopmund, where he continued his work among 
the prisoners. As indicated by Elger, conditions in the improvised hospital were far 
from ideal and subsequently the missionary was fighting a loosing battle. 
Both Swakopmund and Windhoek222 had so called ‘native field hospitals’ [Ein-
geborene Lazarett], which served local native populations, including concentration 
camp prisoners. These facilities were only introduced in late 1905, i.e. a year after 
the introduction of the concentration camp system, and as already seen in the 
Windhoek ‘native hospital’, they were not adequately equipped to deal with the 
health crises resulting from camp internment and related health risks. In the camps at 
Okahandja and Karibib, like in the above example, medical facilities usually 
consisted of makeshift structures and were manned by missionaries with their local 
assistants. Both would not have had much if any medical knowledge, and would in 
all fairness probably have been stretched to cope with the severity of the situation 
(Map 1.3).223  
Unlike the Windhoek arrangement, where the white hospital and the ‘native’ 
Lazarett sickbay were kept separate, the ‘white’ and ‘black’ hospitals in Swakop-
mund had shared premises – not facilities. A map of the Swakopmund Field 
                                                 
220  NAN, Accession 569, ‘Memoirs of Pastor Elger’. 
221  NAN, Accession 569, ‘Memoirs of Pastor Elger’. 
222  The Shark Island camp in Lüderitz had its own medical facility, which will be dealt with in detail in 
Chapter 2. 
223  “Who would take over the hard work of controlling the epidemic and providing treatment and care for the 
natives? The missionary of course!” NAN, Accession 569, ”Memoirs of Pastor Elger (RMS) in Karibib, 
1904-06”. 
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Hospital illustrates the rudimentary facilities provided for Africans in the Swakop-
mund (Map 1.3).  
 
 
 
 
Map 1.3   Map of the Swakopmund field hospital 
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Notwithstanding that a minute part of the entire compound was allocated to 
‘natives’, which would seem consistent with the overall distribution of resources 
during and after the war, the placement of the allotted section was highly proble-
matic. First of all, African patients were placed immediately next to the horse stables 
with no fence to separate the two. Secondly, a sewerage line [Abwasserleitung] also 
flanked this section of the compound. Ironically, the Swakopmund Lazarett would 
probably have posed a high risk of bacterial or viral infections for patients in the 
‘native’ section. 
In fact prisoners’ health seems not to have had a very high priority altogether. At 
the coastal towns of Swakopmund and Lüderitz, bacteriological laboratories, whose 
main purpose was to determine the cause, type and possible cure of the many viruses 
in the colony, were set up. As Brigitte Lau points out, the German army suffered 
greatly from typhoid and other viruses,224 a fact that resulted in increased research of 
these diseases. Seeking to stem rapid infection of the German troops, colonial 
authorities imported specialist doctors and medication to research the disease and 
heal the troops.225 In Swakopmund the drainpipe of the bacteriological laboratory, 
which was placed inside the field hospital, led bacteriological waste straight through 
the ‘native’ section, adding a further source of possible infection to a growing list of 
contaminants. 
In view of the mortalities in the Swakopmund and Windhoek camps,226 medical 
facilities for prisoners, to the extent that there were any, were inadequate and 
prisoners’ health on the whole was evidently not highly prioritised. 
 
Women and children 
Neither the Herero nor the Nama wars can be categorised as actual confrontations 
between conventional armies. Both the Herero and Nama campaigns were charac-
terised by attacks on German interests in the territory, undertaken by small groups of 
guerrilla fighters, who were trying to fend of what they would have perceived as an 
alien force in their country. Their guerrilla-style warfare was conducted with small, 
highly flexible units because mobility was of paramount importance for the success 
and security of the swift attacks. To be accompanied by a large group of non-
combatant women, children, elderly and infirm therefore posed a considerable risk 
 
                                                 
224  Lau: 1995, p. 48 
225  Saneitates Bericht, p. 19. 
226  BAB, Reichs-Kolonial-Amt, KAII 1181, Eing. 24 March 1908, p. 161. 
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Swakopmund 
 
It was altogether unhealthy being a prisoner in Swakopmund. Uncommon climate, general maltreat-
ment and forced labour were all part of daily existence in the Swakopmund concentration camp. 
The camp, which was operated by the military, was made up of corrugated iron sheets and had at 
first been placed on polluted soil at the northern entrance of the town, close to the railway station. 
Later on, however, it was moved to a so-far unknown location nearer to the beach.  
In May and June of 1905 large death rates in Swakopmund alarmed missionaries, who started 
petitioning the Colonial Government. Especially Missionaries Eich and Kuhlmann were very vocal. 
They wrote directly to General von Trotha, asking him to send back the Hereros to the areas they 
originally came from before “they are completely destroyed”. Their argument was that the cold 
climate at the coast would continue to claim victims if action was not taken to move the prisoners. 
This did not happen. With their limited means the missionaries were instead forced to ease a pain 
they did not have the cure for. They tried to tend for the sick, offer blessings and, more than 
anything, conducted funerals.  
 
 
 
Child from the military concentration camp lying dead or dying on the beach of Swakopmund, 
clinging to the raggedy bag that was the camp ‘uniform’ 
Sources: 
Missions-Berichte: June, 1905, p. 131, Sanitaets-bericht: 1909, Vol. 1, Estorff: 1996, Zeller: 2001. 
Photo courtesy of Joachim Zeller. 
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for guerrilla fighters. This was especially true in the Nama wars where fighters often 
had to leave non-combatants behind. Where possible, the non-combatants would be 
led into British territory in the Cape or in southern Bechuanaland where it was 
hoped that they would be safe.227 When it was not possible to lead families into 
safety they were left behind, presumably in the hope that the German patrols would 
treat them as non-combatants. 
In spite of the early promise by the Kaiser and von Bülow that women and 
children should be cared for by the missionaries, this obviously did not materialise. 
Instead all Herero and Nama, whether man, woman or child, were all sent to the 
concentration camps. Ostensibly it was done because the Colonial Government was 
trying not to separate families228 but in reality it probably had more to do with the 
labour potential constituted by women and children. Moreover, both women and 
children were regarded as prisoners-of-war and were treated to the same sub-human 
conditions and unpaid forced labour as combatant and non-combatant men. 
Photographic evidence suggests that it was common practise in the colony to have 
women do hard labour, especially, as described in one source,229 moving heavy loads 
with their bare hands: 
“The loads … are out of all proportion to their strength. I have often seen women and children 
dropping down, especially when engaged on this work, and also when carrying very heavy bags 
of grain, weighing from 100 to 160lbs.” 230 
A statistic describing the total number of Kriegsgefangenen on July 25, 1906 
gives a total of 17,018 prisoners-of-war, scattered in camps around the colony.231 
Incidentally this figure included some of the prisoners employed by the rail 
companies and the collection camps, but it completely excluded prisoners kept in 
Shark Island camp, Keetmanshoop and the Bondelslokation by Warmbad. The 
breakdown of the given figures was as follows:  
 
 
Total number of men Total number of women Total number of children 
 4870 7084 5064 
 
                                                 
227  “Perhaps my poor people may come into your country for the sake of water but that is not my meaning for 
them to come across your line but if they do I ask you to let them have water at Tsana for my poor women 
and children my intention is to go back and fight again”. KAB [766: 141], Hendrik Witbooi dated 10th 
May, 1905 to Bechuanaland Protectorate Police in High Commissioner to Mr Lyttelton, 4th September, 
1905.  
228  BKE 224, B.II.74.d. Spec. Vol 2, p. 331, p. 18. 
229  South African transport Riders in GSWA interviewed by the Cape Argus, September 28, 1905.  
230  Cape Argus, September 28, 1905.  
231  ZBU 454, D.IV.l.3. Vol 2, 18 August 1906, p. 305. 
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According to the figures, more than two-thirds of the total number of prisoners-
of-war were women and children. Consequently women constituted the biggest 
demographic group being held in concentration camps and, in fact, men constituted 
the smallest demographic group. In the larger camps, according to the same statistic, 
the margin was even bigger. Windhoek figures described a total of 5183 prisoners in 
July 1906, with 1325 men against 2221 women – 25% men and 43% women. In 
Okahandja 1431 prisoners were 51% female and only 16% male.  
The obvious conclusion to draw on the gender disparity in the camps would be 
that men were used more for heavy construction on the railway, and therefore not 
confined to the camps. This was, however, not the case. The cited number was a 
total figure of female and male prisoners-of-war, which included prisoners working 
on government projects and for private companies such as Firma Lenz (the company 
charged with construction of the embankment for the railroad in the South) as well 
as the military. It must therefore be the conclusion that gender disparity was a 
general trend.  
 
 
 
Photo 1.12   Women forced to labour 
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Perhaps the missionaries had recruited more women than men in the collection 
camps or, even worse, maybe fewer men were actually alive in July 1906. One could 
speculate that with soaring death rates throughout 1904, 05 and 06, men might have 
suffered a higher mortality because of supposedly tougher work conditions. Yet in 
Windhoek the numbers for female mortality in July 1906 were 90 women compared 
to 59 men.232 Considering the higher number of women in the camps, these numbers 
would describe an almost even mortality ratio. For the sake of comparison the 
official statistics relating to Shark Island prisoners officially registered 460 female 
deaths and 496 male deaths among the Nama prisoners (excluding children) – also 
about even figures.233 Whatever the reason for the disparate ratio of women and men, 
the reason for the similar mortality rates must simply have been that women were 
worked as hard as men and therefore also suffered the consequences equally.  
There are numerous accounts of female prisoners as well as children being put to 
work in the camps. Attesting to the fact are three affidavits from so-called Cape 
Boys (a derogatory term referring to migrant labourers from the Cape) that were 
presented to the Cape Governor in August 1906. The three ‘Capetonians’ had 
worked in Swakopmund for seven months and were evidently shocked at the 
conditions in the concentration camps. The migrant labourers explained: 
“These unfortunate [POW] women are daily compelled to carry heavy iron for construction 
work, also big stacks of compressed fodder. I have often noticed cases where women have fallen 
under the load and have been made to go on by being thrashed and kicked by the soldiers and 
conductors. The rations supplied to the women are insufficient and they are made to cook the 
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food themselves. They are always hungry, and we, labourers from the Cape Colony, have 
frequently thrown food into their camp. The women in many cases are not properly clothed. It is 
a common thing to see women going about in public almost naked. Have also noticed that … old 
women are also made to work and are constantly kicked and thrashed by soldiers. This treatment 
is meted out in the presence of the German officers, and I have never noticed any officers 
interfering.”234 
The descriptions are consistent with numerous eyewitness accounts of the camps. 
One example is from the late 1930’s when an interview was conducted with a group 
of Herero elders, who were described by the interviewer as “men of intelligence.”235 
Memories of the latter were consistent with information related here and irrefutably 
close to the above affidavits and other sources in its description of women forced to 
labour: 
“… we were placed by the Germans in Kraals. [Here]…our people suffered terribly from cold. 
No sanitation had been provided for, so that disease soon broke out, especially amongst the 
women folk… The food especially was very bad. Not only was it insufficient but also consisted 
of a nature that we did not know and was mostly rice. Then our bodies began to swell … and our 
gums started to bleed… Under all this we had to do hard labour, even the women having to pull 
wagons and carry heavy loads of ammunition on the head.”236  
There is no evidence to suggest that women and children took physically part in 
the war, apart from possibly shouting words of encouragement at the battle of the 
Waterberg,237 and yet it is obvious that the German military did not make any gender 
distinctions when taking supposed prisoner-of-war. Ultimately the biggest demo-
graphic group among POWs in the colony was women, who were subjected to the 
same conditions in as male prisoners and moreover also had to endure sexual abuse. 
As a result, thousands of Herero women died as German prisoners-of-war.  
 
Conclusion  
The German military under Trotha carried out a stated campaign of extermination 
against the Herero nation. Central to this campaign was a no-prisoners policy made 
official on October 2nd, 1904 at the waterhole of Osombo-Windimbe. In December 
1904, the no-prisoners policy was changed, forcing the local government to also 
change its practise of on-the-spot executions. Instead an official policy of setting up 
concentration camps was implemented. 
 
                                                 
235
234
nd
  KAB, GH 23/97, “Statement under oath by: Jack Seti, John Culayo and James Tolibadi”, Ministers to 
Governor, 22  August, 1906. 
  Steenkamp, p. 12. 
236  Steenkamp, p. 12. 
237  Pool: 1991, p. 275. 
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Photo 1.13  Children and young women captured by the Schutztruppe. The girls’ dresses have been  
 ripped off to expose their breasts. In the background is a burning wagon 
 
 
The purpose of the concentration camps, inter alia, related to the provision of 
labour for a range of private and government projects and enterprises. Collection 
raids were therefore launched by Trotha’s troops, at times with the aid of local 
missionaries, to ‘flush’ out Hereros from the bush. These raids were carried out with 
excessive force, reminiscent of the implementation of the previous months’ 
extermination order and at times resulted in violent massacres. 
With the departure of Trotha and the arrival of Governor Lindequist, the concen-
tration camps policy was escalated. A collection campaign relying heavily on the 
complicity of the mission resulted in the voluntary and involuntary internment of 
close to 12,000 Hereros from the bush, all of whom were declared prisoners-of-war, 
even though they had been collected in the name of peace. These prisoners joined  
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Bambusen 
 
 
Although several children stayed and often died in the concentration camps, many were also taken 
by the troops to serve as menservants. These children in the hands of the army were called 
Bambusenkinder and were mostly made up of boys between the ages of 8 and 14 years. Children of 
this specific age were preferred due to their work potential. Whereas children below 8 years had no 
value as menservants, in being simply too young to fully comprehend instructions, older children 
were considered able to perform hard physical labour and were therefore handed over to govern-
ment or to settlers.  
In November 1906, for example, Deputy Governor Hintrager allocated 32 children between 8 
and 12 years of age to the colonial army. These children had all come from Shark Island and were 
described as members of the Witbooi community. Although the children’s lives were probably 
saved as a result of Hintrager’s action, their new lives as menservants would have been both 
physically and mentally taxing, if not damaging. They were taken away from their parents, who 
were left to die on the island and instead found themselves in the hands of soldiers, who were not 
know for their empathy towards prisoners. Also, some of the Bambusen were girls and it is 
impossible not to consider the sexual implications related to this situation. Soldiers were often 
traumatised men, who were stuck in the Namibian wilderness for months at a time, usually drinking 
heavily. Moreover, German soldiers were known to take sexual advantage of prisoners in the 
camps.  
Settlers would also make use of the Bambusen concept and the popular practise was even 
continued after the war. Consequently, there was an entire generation of Herero, Nama and also San 
children in the hands of the troops and settlers between 1904 and 1915.  
 
 
 
Sources: ZBU 465, D.IV.m.3, Vol. 1, p. 178.; ADM 137, file 6.c.;ZBU 2024, W.III.a.3; Missions-Berichte, 
1906, p. 206; Gewald: 1996, p. 252 ; Hintrager: 1955 (on alcohol). Photos: NAN 04950 and 10861. 
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the many Hereros, who had been collected under Trotha in the military and private 
entration camps around the colony and who were here forced to live, work and in 
many cases die under subhuman conditions. 
Prisoners, of whom at least 70% were women and children, were deprived of 
their humanity in being subjected to beatings, rape and in being made to prostitute 
themselves in these camps. Prisoners were, moreover, forced by barbed wire or 
thorn bush to stay huddled together like animals in areas without sanitation. 
Thousands died under these conditions, a fact exacerbated by the rampant spread of 
disease in the camps, climatic conditions as well as a monotonous and insufficient 
diet. There are no indications that the Colonial Government had any regard for the 
general condition among prisoners nor that significant measures were taken at any 
level to curb the high death rates.  
Prisoners were entirely the responsibility of the colonial administration.238 The 
POWs were not afforded any means of improving their own respective situations 
and they were therefore totally at the mercy of the Colonial Government, which 
must subsequently be singled out as the responsible party in the mass dying of 
African prisoners between 1904 and 1908. 
                                                 
238  ZBU 154, A. IV.a.3, p. 203. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
“The Island of death” 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Although the history of the Shark Island concentration camp in Lüderitz is largely 
unknown, it is often singled out when reference is made to the Namibian concen-
tration camps.1 Shark Island’s main significance to the historiography of the 1904-
1908 wars has been its infamy, which almost entirely relies on a few pages devoted 
to the island in Drechsler’s Let Us Die Fighting.2 In as much as Shark Island already 
                                                 
1  Oermann, p. 112; Nuhn:2000, pp. 267-269; Lau: 1995, p. 45;  
 www.fdj.de/infoportal/dbz/I_1897_1907.html, p. 9; Patemann, p. 122; Zimmerer, pp. 290-293. 
2  Drechsler, pp. 211-214. 
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has a place in the Namibian genocide debate, this chapters seeks to present a more 
in-depth narrative of Shark Island in particular and Lüderitz in general between 1904 
and 1908. What was Shark Island? Who were there and why?  
 
Lüderitz 1883 to 1908  
The history of Lüderitz is intrinsically linked to the founding of the colony of 
German South West Africa. It was in this little anchorage that Heinrich Vogelsang, 
the emissary of Bremen-based businessman Adolf Lüderitz, first landed on April 10, 
1883.3 Apart from the English possession of Walvis Bay, the anchorage, known then 
simply as Angra Pequena, was the best of few other sizeable natural harbour on the 
coast of the territory between Portuguese Angola and British South Africa, and 
therefore a logical beachhead for German colonial aspirations in the territory. Upon 
arrival Vogelsang sought out local leader Joseph Fredericks, the Kaptein of the 
Bethanie community, and entered into negotiations with him about leasing the land. 
Ultimately Fredericks was swindled into signing over a territory reaching 20 geo-
graphical miles (150 km.) inland, instead of the 20 miles (32 km.) of desert he 
thought he had leased out.4 A year later, (April 24, 1884) Chancellor Bismarck 
declared that the territory would henceforth be a protectorate under the German 
Reich.5 
After having visited the protectorate that he had so slyly facilitated, Adolf 
Lüderitz perished at sea off the coast of southern Namibia in 1886. Angra Pequena 
was subsequently renamed Lüderitzbucht (Lüderitz Bay)6 in honour of the colonial 
pioneer. 
After formal colonisation of the territory, Lüderitz grew very slowly parallel to 
the arrival of German officials, soldiers and settlers. Whereas the other main coastal 
town, Swakopmund, had become the main entry point for arrivals to the more 
populated centre of the colony, Lüderitz’s main importance was as a gateway to the 
southern parts of GSWA. With the outbreak of the southern War in late 1904, 
Lüderitz grew in strategic importance and thousands of troops were sent to the 
south, passing through the Lüderitz harbour. As a result the town, which was pic-
turesquely flanked by desert and ocean, now boasted several hotels, bars, brothels, a 
mission, railway links to the interior as well as military and administrative 
installations by 1907. As the first Namibian town, Lüderitz even had its own 
                                                 
3  Baericke, p. 20. 
4  Drechsler, pp. 22-24 
5  Drechsler, p. 22. 
6  The name Lüderitzbucht is interchangeable with the shortened Lüderitz. 
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generator, but the electric supply was initially reserved for military installations as, 
for example, on Shark Island and for lighting up the main street.7 The town had 
grown from a small colonial outpost to a sizeable modern turn-of-the-century 
harbour town in only a few years. 
In the wake of war followed opportunists from around the world8 and subse-
quently Lüderitz saw the arrival of entrepreneurs, skilled and semi-skilled labourers, 
sailors and fortune-seekers, who sought to eke out an existence in the colony. 
Among them were people, who were either running away from trouble elsewhere or, 
presumably, looking for trouble anywhere. The Lüderitz records of criminal cases in 
the first decade of the 20th century bear testimony both to the many different 
nationalities found in the town, which apart form Germans included Argentineans, 
Irish and Scandinavians, and the malice they caused.9 Most files in this bulky 
collection of cases related to drunken behaviour, physical violence or sexual assault 
– all symptomatic of a male-dominated cosmopolitan harbour town in 1905, one 
would suspect. 
In all, Lüderitz was a testosterone-driven town with violence in abundance. Out 
of a total German population of 836 in 1906, only 94 were women – having 
increased from 54 women in the previous year.10 To relieve the rising hormonal 
tension, women were imported from the Cape and, more popularly, from Germany. 
Although women arriving in Lüderitz were not all sex workers,11 they were never-
theless objects of male desire. This was especially true for the waitresses in the three 
hotels “Fürst Bismarck”, Central Hotel” and “Hotel National”. In the words of non-
commissioned officer Mohr there was a ‘special treat’ for soldiers arriving in 
Lüderitz: white waitresses.12 In Mohr’s description, the bestiality of men coming 
from battle was somehow subdued when in the company of these white women and, 
ostensibly, there was no greater joy than to flirt with German women again. He 
wrote: 
“Although war is supposed to make men into beast, it was only in exceptional cases that moral 
violations occurred. On the contrary, these warriors returning home from the field would treat 
the white women with respect and courtesy. Only when German women feel at home in the 
                                                 
7  Weitzel, p. 131. 
8  ZBU 154, A.VI.a.3, pp. 233-234. 
9  The place of origin of accused persons were specified on case files found in the Gerichtsamt Lüderitz 
(GLU) collection held at the National Archives of Namibia (NAN). 
10  ZBU 154, A.VI.a.3. Annual Report for Lüderitz District, 1906, p. 207. 
11  Lüderitz even had regulations for the conduction of sex work, one of the paragraphs stating that police 
would at all times have access to sex workers’ living quarters. BKE 192, B.II 5. ye, June 2, 1905, p. 10. 
12  Brepohl, p. 152. 
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German colony will the men emulate their example. They are, to quote the poet, “heavenly roses 
in an earthly life.”13 
In a colonial and inherently racist paradigm, skin colour was of paramount im-
portance. Although essentially a praise poem to German women, the special empha-
sis on the skin colour given by Mohr suggests that the same respect was not 
extended to African women. Indeed much evidence suggests that African women 
were abused and kept as ‘concubines’ by the German troops.14 Notably, by portray-
ing the behaviour of soldiers when encountering white women as uncommon, 
Mohr’s writings indirectly offered insight into the self-perception of soldiers, who 
were, at some level at least, aware of the callousness of their behaviour under 
‘normal’ circumstances in the field.  
 
 
 
Photo 2.1  Overview of Lüderitz around 1905/06, Shark Island in the top left-hand corner.  
 Notice the construction of a foundation in the foreground 
 
 
A sizeable core of transport riders, bringing regular supplies to the interior from 
the coast, further added to the already large pool of testosterone in Lüderitz. Prior to 
November 1906,15 there had been no railroad towards the interior and towns like 
Keetmanshoop and Gibeon were therefore reliant on provisions arriving via the long 
exhausting Baiweg that linked Keetmanshoop with Lüderitz. For this purpose, 
hundreds of transport riders continually traversed the route between the hinterland 
                                                 
13  Brepohl, p. 152. 
14  For example: ADM 137, File C.6., Report on Administration of Protectorate of South west Africa from 
Date of Surrender to 31st March 1916 or Auer, p. 209. 
15  Bravenboer and Rusch, p. 113. 
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and Lüderitz. These men spent months at a time on the road and mostly consisted of 
poor Afrikaners from South Africa, know colloquially as Boers.  
At the entrance of the town, squeezed between desert and the small Radford Bay, 
a camp was set up to house this large constant in-flow of people. Consequently this 
camp was called the Burenkamp, which was an amalgamation of German appropria-
tions of the words Boer and camp. Apart from large tents erected for the transport 
riders, the camp also contained kraals for livestock as well as a tents and houses for 
‘entertainment’. Essentially the Burenkamp was a village of its own on the outskirts 
of the actual town of Lüderitz.16 
Between 1904 and 1908 the small station of Lüderitz grew to become a sizeable 
town and therefore played an increasingly important role in turning GSWA into an 
attractive colony for potential German settlers. The town had extensive administra-
tive and physical infrastructure as well as a relatively healthy economy that was 
based largely on transportation of people and supplies. However, Lüderitz was 
highly dependent on the colony’s war economy, because the town’s rapid physical 
and financial growth was intrinsically linked to the sizeable military presence. In 
1908 this dependency was eased when Lüderitz’s economy received a further boost 
with the discovery of diamonds in the vicinity. The discovery attracted more settlers 
and fortune-seekers and also had a positive impact on the town’s infrastructure that 
was expanded to accommodate the population growth. In fact there were two 
successive periods in the early history of Lüderitz that resulted in extraordinary 
growth of general physical infrastructure, namely 1904-08 and 1908-1915 – one 
boom fuelled by the war economy and the other by the discovery of diamonds.17 
Incidentally, in 1905 the overall civil administration of Lüderitz fell under the 
Keetmanshoop Local Government, but due to its growing importance, the harbour 
town became its own Bezirk, i.e. district, in 1906, subordinate only to Central 
Government in Windhoek.18 
 
 
                                                 
16  Eventually, however, the transport riders were made obsolete with the creation of a railway line to the 
interior, erasing all traces of the former Burenkamp.  
17  Peters, W.H. et al. 
18  ZBU 154 A.VI.a.3, p. 202. 
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Photo 2.2   German officers sharing a quiet moment in Lüderitz, 1905 
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Shark Island 
 
Poised on the vast South 
Atlantic, the inhospitable 
island known in German as 
Haifischinsel [Shark Island] 
stretches 1200 metres from 
south to north and only about 
300 metres east to west at its 
thickest point. Apart from marine 
life, such as seabirds, mussels and 
seals, the island is entirely barren 
and wind-swept and its surface is 
covered in solid granite rock, carved 
into surreal formations by the hard 
ocean winds. In being the westerly most 
point of the ocean town, Shark Island is 
completely exposed to the gale-force winds 
that besiege Lüderitz for most of the year. 
Adding further to the unpleasant feel of the 
island are the icy waters that surround it, 
which according to early accounts was full 
of sharks,19 thereby explaining the island’s 
gloomy name. 
At the time of the Herero and Nama 
wars, the island was connected to the 
mainland by a small causeway.20 This 
link between coast and island had 
originally been constructed to avoid it 
falling into British hands, as the 
British Empire laid claim all islands 
and islets off the Namibian coast.21  
                                                 
19  Cornell, p. 42 and Mohr, pp. 152-153. 
20  Today the island has been incorporated into the Lüderitz waterfront and forms part of the town’s deep-sea 
harbour. 
21  KAB, 805”428, Memo dated October 25, 1906, enclosed in Governor to Earl of Elgin, October 29, 1906. 
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At the highest point, in the centre of the island, a makeshift lighthouse (no. 2 on 
map) was signalling its presence to ships on the ocean. A few other structures had 
also been erected, mostly relating to the quarantine station and field hospital (see 
nos. 4 and 5 on map)22 that were housed on the south-eastern side of the island. The 
quarantine station was opened as a precaution against typhoid and dysentery. 
German NCO Mohr remembered arriving in Lüderitz and having to report for 
examination and possible quarantine on the island: 
“After reporting to Military Command everyone who had been sick with either typhoid or 
dysentery had to cross the narrow bridge to Shark Island, next to the mainland, for [medical] 
examination. It was not just for examination, but one could also be quarantined here.” 23  
Although Lüderitz’s white population was in this way spared potential infection 
from incoming troops, the same courtesy was not extended to the town’s prisoners-
of-war, who were also on the island. 
Further north on the island, past the lighthouse, lay the largest of Lüderitz’s 
concentration camps, the Shark Island Camp (no. 1 on map). It was placed on the 
far, most exposed, tip of the island where the forces of wind and weather were 
distinctly felt. The camp faced wide-open ocean on one side and was surrounded by 
barbed wire on the other. The barbed wire fence was guarded around the clock by 
the Schutztruppe24 and sentries also stood at the entrance to the island (no. 6).25 Apart 
from small corrugated iron shacks for the guards, Shark Island camp contained no 
actual buildings offering shelter from the harsh climatic conditions. Instead, it was 
supplied with a couple of standard issue military tents, accommodating dozens, as 
well as improvised shelters made from blankets and what little building material was 
made available to prisoners.26 
Imprisonment on Shark Island would inevitably have been both physically and 
psychologically damaging. To the east, north and south was an almost impenetrable 
belt of desert and arid country and to the west was the cold South Atlantic. 
Accentuating their predicament was the fact that Lüderitz was heavily militarised, 
due to the large continual influx of troops. Marooned on the far end of Shark Island, 
the prisoners would therefore have felt isolated and forgotten. 
                                                 
22  NAN, Map collection, (No: 669. (1907)). 
23  Mohr, pp. 152-153. 
24  NAN, L 338, Author unknown, n/a, p. 189. 
25  KAB, 805”428, Memo dated October 25, 1906. 
26  See the Düring album discussed below. 
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Herero POWs in Lüderitz 
The exact date for the first arrival of prisoners-of-war on Shark Island can not be 
pinpointed. However, the first mention of Herero prisoners-of-war in Lüderitz 
related to a group of 28, who were held by the military administration in the 
southern coastal town. On June 27, 1904 the Lüderitz civil administration sent a 
letter to the local military HQ, informing the army that payment for the prisoners’ 
food would have to come from army coffers. The letter did not give any indications 
as to whether other prisoners-of-war were also found in Lüderitz at the time.27 In 
spite of the presence of these 28 prisoners already in 1904, most sources indicate 
that the Shark Island camp was only really begun in early 1905. According to the 
concentration camp’s doctor, the first Herero prisoners came to Lüderitz in the 
beginning of 1905, at the time when the new concentration camps policy was first 
introduced by the Kaiser and PM von Bülow.28  
According to the doctor, one of the main reason for setting up a concentration 
camp in Lüderitz was an increased need for labour in the southern town.29 Yet, 
increased labour was not the only reason for sending prisoners south. The creation of 
the Shark Island camp was also part of a security strategy that sought to minimise 
the risk of renewed rebellions by taking Herero prisoners away from a context and 
environment known to them. This was the expressed reason that large numbers of 
Herero prisoners were transferred from Keetmanshoop in the interior in March 
1905.30  
From very early on it was evident that Shark Island was unfit for human 
habitation. In late May 1905, Missionary Vedder wrote to his colleague Eich about 
very high mortality figures among prisoners in Lüderitz. According to Vedder’s 
information as many as 59 men, 59 women and 73 children had died on Shark Island 
in an unspecified space of time.31 With 191 dead in this early period one wonders 
how many prisoners were in fact there. If the figures were at all comparable to death 
rates for prisoners in the other coastal town, Swakopmund, which had seen 40 
percent of prisoners die in four months, there must have been between 400 and 500 
Herero on Shark Island in early 1905.32 Seeing as the missionaries found the 
mortality figure to be ‘incredibly high’,33 which would mean that it was in advance 
                                                 
27  BLU 29, E.1.K, Vol 1, 27 June 1904.  
28  Bofinger, p. 576. 
29  Bofinger, p. 576. 
30  Missions-Berichte, 1905, p. 74. 
31  RMS Correspondence VII 31.1, Swakopmund, Eich to Vedder, June 14, 1905. 
32  ZBU 454, D. IV.l.3. Vol. 1, pp. 58-59. See also chapter 3. 
33  RMS Correspondence VII 31.1, Swakopmund, Eich to Vedder, June 14, 1905. 
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of other death figures for prisoners in the colony, the total number of prisoners could 
also have been lower. At any rate, Vedder’s information made such an impact on 
Missionary Eich that he still referred to it the following week, writing: “Lüderitz lies 
heavy on my heart”.34 As a result, Eich decided to go to Lüderitz himself, asking 
Vedder to investigate Woermann Lines’ boat fares from Swakopmund to Lüderitz.35 
Regardless of how many prisoners were already on the island when Vedder first 
wrote of high mortalities in Lüderitz, the number was evidently increasing. On June 
26, 1905, Eich sent another letter to Vedder about a group consisting of 280 
prisoners being sent from Okahandja to Lüderitz. According to Eich the reason for 
their deportation was a lack of food in the interior.36 However, as noted by Camp 
Doctor Bofinger,37 southern labour needs clearly also dictated the Herero prisoners’ 
fate. With plans to build a line between Lüderitz and Aus, prisoner transports for 
Lüderitz inevitably increased in the months prior to the beginning of construction 
due to envisaged labour needs.38  
 
 
Photo 2.3   Child standing on Shark Island 1905.  
Von Düring Album. 
 
                                                 
34  RMS Correspondence VII 31.1, Swakopmund, Eich to Vedder, June 19, 1905. 
35  RMS Correspondence VII 31.1, Swakopmund, Eich to Vedder, June 14, 1905. 
36  RMS Correspondence VII 31.1, Swakopmund, Eich to Vedder, June 26, 1905. 
37  Bofinger, p. 576. 
38  Construction actually began in Luderitz several months before the project was officially accepted by the 
German parliament in December 1905. KAB, 766: 217-218, Major Berrange, Upington to Commissioner, 
Cape Mounted Police, Cape Town, 18th November, 1905. (see also Chapter III, Section entitled Labour in 
Luderitz). 
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Around four month after asking Vedder to enquire about fares to Lüderitz, Eich 
eventually went to Lüderitz to inspect Shark Island. There was no official mission in 
Lüderitz at the time, only a Herero teacher by the name of Samuel Kariko who had 
been sent by the RMS to win souls in the name of the Rhenish mission. In October 
Eich was subsequently received by Kariko who introduced him to 487 Herero 
prisoners sitting on the far end of Shark Island.39 Although Eich found their rations 
to be adequate, the prisoners were in a terrible condition and the mortality continual-
ly high.40 
Back in Okahandja two months later, on December 16th, Eich was watching yet 
another group of Herero prisoners gathered for transport to Lüderitz. The missionary 
wanted to speak to the Herero about their destination, but was prevented from doing 
so by the colonial troops. Again, he wrote to his friend and colleague Heinrich 
Vedder in Swakopmund: 
“Today or tomorrow another group of prisoners will leave from here to you; [the group] is to be 
sent to build the railway in Lüderitz. I would have liked first to say a few words, but they are not 
to know where they are being sent, therefore I am not allowed to [speak with them]. Maybe you 
can do it.”41 
In all likelihood, the secrecy was designed to prevent prisoners from escaping, 
which they would probably have attempted out of fear, had they known about the 
high mortalities at the coast. It has already been seen here that information about the 
collection camps and the concentration camps found its way to free Hereros in the 
bush. Similarly information about Shark Island seems to have travelled vast distan-
ces in the colony. In fact such information could have come from a number of oral 
or written sources, bearing in mind that many Hereros were literate and multi-
lingual.42 
Herero knowledge about the South was a reality. According to a report cited by 
German historian Horst Drechsler, Lüderitz was intensely feared by Herero pri-
soners kept in other camps: 
“The Herero are frightened by the idea of being deported there [Lüderitz]. If a sizeable number 
are sent there, the probability is that many prisoners will escape…”43  
Fear and therefore also information about Lüderitz was not geographically speci-
fic. Even Hereros in the Swakopmund camp, which also had excessively high 
                                                 
39  Missions-Berichte, 1905, p. 260  
40  Missions-Berichte, 1905, p. 260 
41  RMS Correspondence VII 31.1, Swakopmund, Eich to Vedder, December 16, 1905. 
42  “Many [Hereros] could read and write in their own language and some even in German”, Ritter von Epp 
in Krumbach, p. 198. 
43  Drechsler, p. 213 
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numbers of casualties, associated Lüderitz with a far worse fate. Vedder described 
one such scene of panic among a group of prisoners, who were being lined up for 
deportation on the beach in Swakopmund. Shortly after the prisoners were informed 
that they were to be sent to the South, one of the Hereros fell to the ground, bleeding 
profusely from the neck. According to Vedder, the prisoner had drilled his fingers 
into his own neck, committing suicide rather than going to Lüderitz.44 
  
 
 
Photo 2.4   Prisoners lined up on the beach in Swakopmund 
 
 
Similar fear of Lüderitz was also found among Herero prisoners forced to work 
on the railroad. The main contractor on construction of the Otavi line, Arthur 
Koppel Company, explained to Government that many prisoners had run away from 
the railway works “solely out of fear that they might be sent to the South.”45 These 
escapees would rather face the high likelihood of being caught and shoot trying to 
escape than risk being sent to Shark Island.  
The few people who would successfully manage to escape the railway lines, had 
two possible escape routes. They could either run back into the bush or try to get to 
British controlled Walvis Bay. Both options entailed perilous journeys through 
inhospitable and dry landscapes, with high risks of being re-captured by German 
troops. Those who managed to escape into British Walvis Bay faced a bleak future. 
They could either sign up with South African mining companies that were actively 
recruiting among escapees or they could stay and fend for themselves in the small 
British enclave. A German report suggests that many chose to eke out a living on the 
street: 
                                                 
44  From Heinrich Vedder’s “Kurtze Geschichten, p. 139, as cited in Zeller: 2001, p. 239. 
45  ZBU 456, D.IV.l.3. Vol. 5, June 10, 1907, p. 98. 
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“Most [escaped Herero] lived of fishing or by begging from the Nama.46 Their mood is subdued; 
in spite of this they would not consider going back into German territory; they declared rather 
wanting to starve to death.”47  
It is obvious that conditions under German rule would have been very bad, for 
escapees to want rather to die of starvation than to go to the concentration camps. 
However, the English authorities in Walvis Bay did not have empathy with the 
plight of the exiled Herero. Instead the British authorities in Walvis Bay were eager 
to get rid of the Herero and proposed that the German police could come and collect 
the escapees.48 These ex-prisoners were thus deprived the little resistance they had 
been able to offer German colonialism, vis-à-vis their escape, and would again face 
death in the camps. 
In a way, however, the flow of information among prisoners was in itself an act 
of resistance in the face of German brutality. Communication was an important tool 
for communities that were trying to reconnect social ties against all odds and, more 
importantly, in defiance of German efforts to destroy these ties.49 This flow of 
information was inevitably the result of a profound social need for knowledge. 
Families and friends, who had been separated during the War, were most likely 
trying to gather data about each other’s whereabouts, trying to find out if people 
were still alive.50 The constant traffic of prisoners between the camps would have 
been an ideal channel for such information. 
Due to generations of political, social and economic interactions between com-
munities in south-western Africa, ethnic distinctions were not necessarily always 
clear cut, in as much as many Herero would speak and understand Khoi-khoigowab 
and vice versa.51 Moreover, the lingua franca in the colony was an early form of 
Afrikaans, which was understood especially in the South but also among many 
Herero and Damara communities. Prisoners would therefore have been able to com-
municate with one another in spite of different ethnic backgrounds, facilitating the 
movement of information. 
It is evident that Herero prisoners had every reason to fear going to Shark Island. 
In September 1905, the Cape Argus ran a series of articles about ‘The German 
                                                 
46  Most likely the Topnaar community residing in Walvis Bay. 
47  ZBU 456, D.IV.l.3. Vol. 5, May 25, 1907, p. 106b. 
48  ZBU 456, Vol. 5, p. 107. 
49  Missions-Berichte, 1905, p. 137. As celebrated, for example, in Deimling’s declaration to Herero 
prisoners at Keetmanshoop in 1905: “… now, that we have defeated and scattered you”. 
50  See textbox entitled ‛Samuel Isaak to Kaptein Johannes Christian’ later in this chapter. 
51  See Lau: 1995, pp. 13-14. Even today ethnic distinctions that often can be traced to the apartheid 
Odendaal plan are blurred. Many Namibians have a mixed lineage and speak or understand a variety of 
indigenous languages. 
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Operations’, with special focus on Angra Pequena, i.e. Lüderitz.52 The informants 
were nearly all former transport riders, who had been recruited in South Africa. The 
South Africans cited remarkably similar accounts relating hundreds of mostly 
women being slowly starved and worked to death in Lüderitz.  
The articles were written in a very descriptive language characteristic of the time 
and somewhat reminiscent of the tone applied 13 years later in the controversial 
Blue Book. Similar to the Blue Book, statements given to the Argus were detailed 
and insightful; unlike the Blue Book, however, they were all given contemporary to 
the events, leaving no possibility for editorial addendum sparked by hindsight. Even 
more compelling in terms of credibility was the fact that the two main Argus articles 
were based on separate rounds of interviews, which nevertheless yielded very 
similar details about horrific conditions, general maltreatment and, above all, spoke 
of women forced to perform hard labour.  
The transport riders had been in GSWA at the beginning and middle of 1905, a 
time when the Shark Island camp housed about 500 Herero women, children and 
men and when Trotha was still in charge of the colony and its concentration camps. 
The transport riders said: 
“The women who are captured and not executed are set to work for the military as prisoners … 
saw numbers of them at Angra Pequena put to the hardest work, and so starved that they were 
nothing but skin and bones (…) They are given hardly anything to eat, and I have very often 
seen them pick up bits of refuse food thrown away by the transport riders. If they are caught 
doing so, they are sjamboked (whipped).”53 
The second article, that ran three days later and used different informants, gave 
more illustrations of events in Lüderitz during early 1905. It read: 
“I have seen women and children with my own eyes at Angra Pequena, dying of starvation and 
overwork, nothing but skin and bone, getting flogged every time they fell under their heavy 
loads. I have seen them picking up bits of bread and refuse food thrown away outside our tents 
(…) … most of the prisoners, who compose the working gangs at Angra Pequena, are sent up 
from Swakopmund. There are hundreds of them, mostly women and children and a few old 
men...“When they fall they are sjamboked by the soldier in charge of the gang, with his full 
force, until they get up. Across the face was the favourite place for the sjamboking and I have 
often seen the blood flowing down the faces of the women and children and from their bodies, 
from the cuts of the weapon. (…) The women had to carry the corpses and dig the hole into 
which they were placed. They had no burial ceremony of any kind … The corpse would be 
wrapped in a blanket and carried on a rough stretcher54 … I have never heard one cry, even when 
their flesh was being cut to pieces with the sjambok. All feeling seemed to have gone out of 
them (…) At the end, when they untied [an unnamed Kaptein] … they made him totter for a mile 
                                                 
52  Cape Argus, September 25, 1905. 
53  Cape Argus, September 25, 1905. 
54  The same burial practises were used in Swakopmund, as seen in a photograph in Leutwein’s “Elf Jahre 
Gouverneur”. 
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to the hill where he was to be hanged. There is a big iron beacon there, on which they had made 
a platform. They put a rope over the beacon, he climbed up, put the noose round his neck 
himself and jumped off… Practically the whole town turned out to see his execution. You could 
see it from a long way off, as it took place on the hill. A lot of people went out into the bay in 
boats to see it. And that was the end of him. This is only a sample of what is going on at Angra 
Pequena.”55 
The information contained in the two articles, which was brutally detailed, match 
accounts cited in other sources about extreme acts of violence committed by soldiers 
and settlers during the 1904-08 period.56 Yet on a human level it is difficult to 
believe that such descriptions of German troops as sadists were grounded in fact. 
There is, however, an important precedent illustrating that German troops were 
capable of committing such acts of brutality. Letters and diaries from soldiers part-
taking in the four year antecedent Boxer Rebellion in China also described similar 
incomprehensible acts of violence.57 Notably, a number of the colonial troops in 
GSWA had fought in the Boxer Rebellion and must have been psychologically 
damaged and traumatised as a result. Moreover, there are many other examples of 
atrocities, murder and genocide in the 20th century that might be hard to believe or 
understand, but they took place nonetheless. It is here believed that the above 
accounts are true, merely because they are entirely consistent with a variety of 
different German and British sources about events in Lüderitz 1904-08, as well as 
modern-day memory.58  
Another eyewitness account from a transport rider was cited in a British Blue 
Book about German atrocities in GSWA, published 13 years after the fact. The Blue 
Book contained a number of interviews with survivors of Shark Island as well as 
testimonies from people who witnessed the event. Johann Noothout was ostensibly a 
transport rider on the Lüderitz Baiweg route in 1907, where, according to his 
testimony, he witnessed conditions and treatment meted out to Shark Island 
prisoners. Noothout’s information is remarkably akin the Argus interviews. He said: 
                                                 
55  Cape Argus, September 28, 1905. 
56  For example: RMS Annual Reports VII, 31.5, 1st Quarterly Report for Barmen, 1907: HeinrichVedder 
described the case against settler Paul Wiehager, who lined up and shot at a number of San to see the 
penetrative power of a .88 calibre bullet. 
57  “… you cannot imagine what is going on here [in China]… everything that stands in our way is destroyed: 
men, women, children. Oh, how the women scream. But, the Kaiser’s orders were: no pardon will be 
granted. We have sworn to uphold our oath.”, Hu Schong, Der Imperialismus und China Politik, 1959, p. 
144, as quoted on: www.zum.de/imperialismus/rums24/rums24_63.php  
58  The story about a platform on the island used for hangings was relayed in an interview done for Namibian 
national television in Lüderitz about the Shark Island Camp. A local Lüderitz business woman explained 
that, according to rumours, a platform on the highest point of the island was the place where people were 
hanged in those days. NBC: May 2000, in ’Open File’. 
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“I left Cape Town during the year 1906, and signed on with the Protectorate troops in South-
West Africa. I arrived at Lüderitzbucht, and after staying there a few minutes I perceived nearly 
500 native women lying on the beach, all bearing indications of being slowly starved to death. 
Every morning and towards evening four women carried a stretcher containing about four or five 
corpses, and they had also to dig the graves and bury them. I then started to trek to Kubub and 
Aus, and on the road I discovered bodies of native women lying between stones and devoured by 
birds of prey. Some bore signs of having been beaten to death … If a prisoner were found 
outside the Herero prisoners' camp, he would be brought before the Lieutenant and flogged with 
a sjambok. Fifty lashes were generally imposed. The manner in which the flogging was carried 
out was the most cruel imaginable … pieces of flesh would fly from the victim's body into the 
air …”59 
Both of the ‘Argus’ accounts were harrowingly similar to Noothout’s testimony, 
speaking of starving women ferociously whipped by soldiers. Contemporaries, most 
notably the ‘coloured’ migrant workers from the Cape, cited in Chapter I, also 
reported identical scenes from other camps.60 The ‘Argus’ riders described daily 
seeing dead prisoners carried off the island on ‘rough’ stretchers, information almost 
indistinguishable from Noothout’s testimony.  
Another overlap between the sources was the description of ‘flesh flying off the 
bodies’. The Blue Book gave evidence of such whippings by showing photos taken 
in the German period of a person hospitalised in Gobabis because of severe beatings 
with a sjambok, which left her whole back without skin.61 The 50 lashes mentioned 
by Noothout as a generally imposed punishment, would most certainly leave a 
person severely injured. However, such a harsh punishment was in contravention of 
article II.b. of the ’Regulations of the State of War’ issued by Von Trotha in 
Swakopmund on June 11, 1904, which specified the general number of lashes to be 
administered as 25 – although two sets of 25 were also allowed if these were 
separated by a period of two weeks.62 But then again, Trotha’s war regulations also 
did not allow for severe beating and rape of female prisoners and the sort of general 
maltreatment that prisoners were actually subjected to in the concentration camps, 
nor did they specify anything about on-the-spot executions, such as those encour-
aged by Trotha’s own Extermination Order.  
 
                                                 
59  Union of, South Africa, p. 100. 
60  GH 23/97, “Statement under oath by: Jack Seti, John Culayo and James Tolibadi”, Ministers to Governor, 
22nd August, 1906. 
61  See photo 2.5. 
62  Regulations booklet found in BKE 220, B.II.74.b. 
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Photo 2.5   Maria from Gobabis, 1912 
 
 
Indeed, Noothout’s testimony was accurate in describing fifty lashes as a 
generally imposed sentence. A list of Nama deportees to Cameroon from 1910, 
trivially notes that a person by the name of Samkamp received 50 lashes and 3 
months imprisonment for being “disobedient and for lying to his master.”63 Sam-
kamp’s punishment was not administered in separate instalments, unlike Otto 
‘Kaffer’ on the same list, who had expressly received 2x 20 lashes. Also in 1910, 
Moses Frenede of Rehoboth received 50 lashes and 2 years imprisonment for theft.64 
Around the same time in King Leopold’s Congo, the local version of the 
sjambok, the chicotte, was also being applied in anger.65 As many as 25 lashes with 
the chicotte was known to render its victim unconscious and upwards to 100 could 
                                                 
63  BKE 224, B.II.74.d, Spec. I, p. 114. 
64  ZBU 466, D.IV.m.3, Vol. 5, p. 142. 
65  Hochschild, p. 120. 
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be fatal. Similar to Trotha’s war regulations, punishment with the chicotte in 
advance of 25 lashes was therefore given in instalments.66  
The incredibly close resemblance between the Argus articles and Noothout’s 
descriptions could have two possible explanations. Either the author of the Blue 
Book, Major O’Reilly, had simply read the old Argus pieces, which of course would 
not render information untrue, only ‘borrowed’; or the Noothout interview was 
genuine. If Noothout was indeed a real person and had seen the exact same 
brutalities performed as the transport riders reported in 1905, this would invariably 
lend further credence to the Argus articles.  
In favour of the latter possibility, Noothout’s statement contained information 
not relayed in the Argus pieces, information that is all verifiable. For example, 
Noothout said that he was trekking on the Baiweg towards Aus in 1906, seeing 
many bodies of dead prisoners. In 1906 the railway line was being built between 
Lüderitz and Aus, drawing heavily on forced prisoner labour, which resulted in 
exceedingly high mortality rates.67 Noothout also gave reference to around five 
hundred prisoners on the beach. In October 1905, Missionary Eich claimed that 
there were 487 prisoners on Shark Island68 and in the official report on mortality 
among POWs, 584 Herero were cited to be on the island in November 1906.69 
Although these numbers seem fairly constant, it should be remembered that an 
unabated mortality rate was continuously countered by influx of new prisoners from 
elsewhere in the colony, especially during the years in question, i.e. end 1905 and 
early 1907, due to railway construction.70  
Even if Noothout did not exist, the information in the Blue Book was well 
researched and based on facts. But Johann Noothout was not Major O’Reilly’s 
invention; he was a real person. The research for this book uncovered a list with 
names of transport riders in the service of the German troops, dated March 1907.71 
The list was sent from Aus to Lüderitzbucht and the third entry read: “2154. J. 
Noothout.” As such, there really was a Johann Noothout, who worked in Aus and 
Lüderitzbucht in early 1907. 
All of the above sources were especially shocked at the treatment of women in 
Lüderitz. According to their testimony, women were severely abused and were 
forced to perform hard labour under the strict supervision of military over-seers. 
                                                 
66  Hochschild, p. 120. 
67  ZBU 456, D.IV.l.3. Vol. 5., p. 170. 
68  Missions-Berichte, 1905, p. 260. 
69  BAB, Reichs-Kolonial-Amt, File 2140, p. 161. 
70  ZBU 454, D. IV.l.3,Vol 2, p. 102, (Lüderitzbucht, 27th April, 1906). 
71  GLU 331, “Listen der im dienste der Truppe befindlichen Buren und Kapboys” 
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Although the German military archives were lost in the Second World War and the 
Namibian copies most likely destroyed before the British arrived in 1915, evidence 
to substantiate the fact that women were forced to labour still exists - as already seen 
in Chapter I. One source stated: 
“Thousands were held on Shark Island, where prisoners lived in fenced enclosures on the beach; 
women, it is reported, were spanned in teams of eight to pull ‘scotch’ carts.”72 
 
 
 
 
Photo 2.6   Female prisoners pulling a cart on narrow-gauge rails 
 
 
The above photograph clearly illustrates the claim that women were ‘in-spanned’ 
like animals.73 At the feet of the women are a set of narrow gauge tracks, as used in 
both Lüderitz and Swakopmund, a clear indication that these women were pulling a 
loaded cart.74 Judging from the smooth topography, the image was taken in Swakop-
mund rather than Lüderitz. In fact the building in the background looks somewhat 
like the Hohenzollern house in central Swakopmund, which was built in 1906. On 
the right-hand side of the picture, a soldier is watching the women from a small 
                                                 
72  Fischer, R. p. 82, as cited in Schrank. 
73  In the Blue Book, survivors of the Cameroon deportations, give similar accounts of having been 
“inspanned to wagons loaded with railway iron”, Union of, South Africa, p. 99. 
74  Other examples of the same practise are depicted in Kolonie und Heimat, Nov. 22, 1908, p. 4, and Ibid. 
January 31, 1909, p. 6. 
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shed. The image is harrowing, especially because the woman in front returned the 
camera gaze with an eerie stare .Her expression was of fatigue and, somehow, 
defiance. All the other women avoided the confrontation, looking away from the 
camera.  
Forcing women to pull carts as if they were animals was in tune with the 
treatment generally meted out to the Herero prisoners in Lüderitz as elsewhere in the 
colony. Missionary Vedder in Swakopmund noted that overall, prisoners were 
regarded no better than animals.75 He said: “Like cattle hundreds were driven to their 
death and like cattle they were buried.” Moreover, language relating to prisoners, as 
applied in government files as well as parliamentary debate in Germany, conse-
quently related to prisoners as were they cattle. As an example, prisoner transports 
and statistics were usually counted in heads rather than people.76 Politicians in 
Germany were also using an animal simile when open likening the Nama to 
‘predators’ that needed to be tamed.77 The racist paradigm, although far from being 
unique to Germany, pervaded the fabric of German colonialism. Notions of savage 
and animal-like Africans were created and nurtured in the colony. David Black-
bourne has described this Wilhelmine preoccupation with race as “an attitude of 
assumed superiority which made possible a treatment of native peoples then almost 
unthinkable within Europe itself”.78 
Lüderitz was a melting pot of old and new in as much as it was the oldest part of 
the colony yet at the same time the most modern of the towns in GSWA, with 
electricity and advanced infrastructure. Moreover, it was the place where veteran 
soldiers leaving for home would meet new recruits as they were arriving in the 
colony. New recruits to GSWA were full of expectations, fears, hopes and above all 
questions about the colony. In this amalgamation of new and old, racism flourished. 
Predisposed to the racist notions and full of ignorance and fear about the colony, 
new arrivals would have paid attention to veterans, to their stories and their 
language.79 Lüderitz was a small locality with only few places for recreation where 
soldiers could socialise. It is not difficult to imagine that new recruits soon adopted 
                                                 
75  Vedder as quoted in Zeller: 2001, and Gaydish. 
76  For example: ZBU 456, D.IV.l.3, vol. 5, p. 102. 
77  Reichstag, 132 Sitzung, December 3, 1906, p. 4096. 
78  Blackbourne, p. 328. 
79  The language used by veterans had incorporated many Afrikaans and English words used by Transport 
Riders and the Alte Afrikaner – a term referring to those soldiers in the colony before the war broke out, 
such as Estorff. Present-day Suedwester deutsch, mainly spoken by German descendants of settlers, in the 
same way has appropriated many local words. 
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thinking and customs of their more experienced peers, who were inadvertently 
‘coaching’ them in the prevailing racist modalities of GSWA.80 
An example of new recruits arriving to Lüderitz is found in the diary of an 
unnamed soldier who arrived in Lüderitz, on June 1907. Upon arrival he and his 
comrades were amazed at the state of prisoners in the town, describing them as ‘thin 
like walking sticks’. A few days later the soldiers mocked rather than pitied the 
Herero, amused at the dried out breast of the women.81 The Writer noted: 
“On July 5th, 200 Hereros were brought to Lüderitz as prisoners. Their kraal was situated in the 
vicinity of our own camp. The prisoners looked incredibly skinny; their legs looked like tender 
walking sticks. Men and women were completely naked. At first our men couldn’t help but to 
stare at the naked figures. But after three days they did not look anymore…Some of the men had 
a funny expression for the long hanging breasts of the women; they called them “straps.” 82 
 
 
 
Photo 2.7  German hand-coloured  
postcard, satisfying male desires 
 
 
Apart from showing the fast transition from shock to amusement, the cited 
passage also contains a very heavy sexual undercurrent found in many soldier 
accounts during the war years. At times such undercurrents came to the surface as 
illustrated by Obermatros Auer, who took pictures of naked black women and 
                                                 
80  “the troops receive a re-schooling”. NAN, Accession 529, Busch, O. 1900-1914, no 14, p. 6.  
81  NAN, Accession 460, “Twelve Years in South West Africa 1907 – 1919: Recollections of the Writer”. 
82  NAN, Accession 460, “Twelve Years in South West Africa 1907 – 1919: Recollections of the Writer”. 
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published them along with his diary.83 In all, German male fantasies of submissive 
black women were celebrated in numerous publications including a series of semi-
pornographic images of black women in GSWA sent as postcards to Germany and 
otherwise distributed in the colony.84 Apart for their sexual purposes, such images 
were symbols and affirmations of colonial power exerted over African women, who 
would physically have been unable to control their own representation. The conse-
quences of failing to comply with male desires would invariably have been very 
severe, especially for women in the concentration camps.85  
During the war there was a de facto state of lawlessness, a situation that many 
settlers and soldiers quickly succumbed to. After all, soldiers, who had mostly come 
from poor backgrounds in ‘overcrowded’ Germany, were now confronted with a 
reality in which they were undisputed masters of subdued men and women whom 
they had supposedly ‘conquered’. They could indulge in sexual activity with women 
who were forced into prostitution as a means of survival (a consideration the sol-
diers could chose to confront or not), or they could rape largely without consequence 
to themselves, provided the women were African. In the Windhoek Camp, for 
example, female prisoners were frequently sexually abused by soldiers, as observed 
by missionary Wandress: 
“Of the free natives, no girl went [to the German fort]… therefore [German soldiers] resorted to 
making use of girl Herero prisoners-of-war, who voluntarily accepted this dirty business. I 
personally doubt this voluntariness.”86 
In 1941 Nigel Farson referred to Herero women as an “everlasting taunt to the 
lonely white man.”87 In Lüderitz there were over a thousand lonely men, and large 
numbers of soldiers about to embark on a long sea journey or just arriving from one. 
As already seen, the majority of prisoners on Shark Island between 1905 and 1908 
were women. With little regard for the humanity of female prisoners, many of 
Lüderitz’s white male resident or transient populations satisfied their male desires 
by force. In the Lüderitz court files from 1906 are found examples of such cases of 
rape or attempted rape. Notably most cases involving prisoners did not go to court if 
                                                 
83  Auer, p. 189 and 208. 
84  See Annex I; also Grobler, Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), 13-19 March, 1998. 
85  This is attested in the Lüderitz court files (for example NAN GLU 242), cited below. 
86  As quoted in Gewald, “Mirrior Images?”, Hartmann et al: 1998, p. 124, footnote 7. 
87  Farson , p. 41. Farson went on to recite a story of Herero women made to wait naked on German officers 
during the 1904-08 wars; also, allegedly, at Namutoni, officers would force girls to strip naked and play 
cards on their stomachs.  
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it were not for a white champion pushing the case.88 As such, the case against 
Carpenter Schneider for breaking into the locked room of Susanna Gabriel, a black 
‘Capetonian’, was only heard because she was living in the back of her German 
employer’s house.89 
Many of the cases in the Lüderitz court files from 1904-08 related to attempted 
rape. In November 1906, following the arrival of Nama prisoners to the concen-
tration camp on the island, two very similar cases appeared before the local court. In 
the first example a Bethanie prisoner, named only as Jacoba, ran away and locked 
herself in a storage room because the Chief of Drilling, Franz Kurrent, had come to 
her hut and demanded that she have sex with him.90 Kurrent responded by nailing the 
door to the storage room shut. Jacoba’s testimony is one of few voices of Shark 
Island prisoners to have survived; Jacoba said: 
“[he]…came in to us in the hut and wanted to have me. I was supposed to go with him to his 
room. I ran straight to the storage room. He closed the door from the outside and nailed the door 
shut. He then tried to come into the room from [illegible]. There were also others present.”91 
A second very similar episode was reported on November 23, 1906 when train 
driver Pollotcheck entered the hut of a Nama woman called Sarah.92 Pollotcheck 
claimed that he had only entered the hut to look for his lost coat. Whatever his 
motive, (no testimony from Sarah is in the file), she apparently protested against his 
action and as a result received a severe beating. Pollotcheck kicked and hit Sarah in 
the chest and in the face several times for failing to comply with his wishes. Ulti-
mately there was no outcome in the case as Pollotcheck left for Germany and Sarah 
was dying on Shark Island. In fact the only outcome in the cases looked at here 
came about as a result of the severe beating of Herero prisoner Eduard by a local 
Lüderitz citizen called Heilbruenner. Eduard had not been able to finish the task of 
making a walking stick on time and as a result was ruthlessly beaten by Heil-
bruenner. Eduard was only saved because a soldier, who had seen the violent casti-
gation, promptly intervened. In the end Heilbruenner was sentenced to a fine of 50 
Marks or five days in prison for the violent beating.93 
                                                 
88  The only case seen during this research, where a prisoner took up his or her own case, was that of ’Herero 
Simon’ who was ended up in jail on account of ’false accusations’. ZBU 455, D.V.l.3, Vol. 3, pp. 180a-
180b. 
89  GLU 242, “Criminal case against the Carpenter Schneider”, case closed 21/12/06. 
90  GLU 242, “Criminal case against Franz Kurrent”, case closed 14/12/06 at 9 1/2 hrs. 
91  GLU 242, “Criminal case against Franz Kurrent”, case closed 14/12/06 at 91/2 hrs. 
92  GLU 242 “Criminal case against train driver Pollotcheck”, case closed 18/01/07. In the case file she was 
called Sarah No. 21594, in accordance with the identification tags prisoners were forced to wear.  
93  GLU 240, ’Criminal Case against Heilbronner”, case closed 30/10/06. 
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Photographic evidence 
As argued by Hayes et al94 the photograph constitutes a ‘language’ of its own and 
therefore requires more interactions than its usual employment as mere illustration. 
The photographic medium should in other words be regarded as a source of 
information as well as a backdrop to textual references. Because images are 
inherently subjective, like text and a language, reading of images offers a wealth of 
information to the reader, which reaches beyond the physical imprint. Variables 
such as angles, composition, and juxtapositions coupled with information about the 
wider context, i.e. who took the image, when, where and, if possible, why, provide 
the basis for a much deeper understanding of the medium and its relevance to the 
subject under study. This method has already been applied here as Images have been 
scrutinised and analysed on par with textual sources. 
Until recently, only two images of the Shark Island Camp were known to exist. 
This limited photographic catalogue was surprising, in comparison with other camps 
such as in Swakopmund and Windhoek that seem to have been photographed far 
more frequently.95 The reason for this limited catalogue inevitably has to do with the 
military nature of Shark Island. During the war years Shark Island was off-limits to 
all non-military personnel as sentries were posted at the entrance of the island to 
limit access to and from the site. Apart from the concentration camp, the island also 
housed a military quarantine station and a hospital, which would make the site 
further off-bounds for non-essential personnel.96  
It was therefore a very important contribution to this research when more photo-
graphs of Shark Island were found in a private collection in the Sam Cohen Library 
in Swakopmund.97 The uncovered images were taken by Lieutenant von Düring, 
who documented his journey along the Baiweg when travelling from the interior to 
Lüderitzbucht. The fact that these pictures were taken by an officer could logically 
also explain their existence. In being a lieutenant, Düring would have had access to 
the military site, and would have been free to take such pictures. Düring’s photo-
graphic series contains a number of new, more detailed, photographs of Shark 
Island, which not only support many textual references about the camp, but also 
provide new insights. Moreover the images illustrate a perspective of the camp that 
                                                 
94  Hayes et al, “Photography, history and memory”, in Hartmann et al (eds). 
95  See Zeller: 2001. 
96  KAB, 805”428, Memo dated October 25, 1906, enclosed in Governor to Earl of Elgin, October 29, 1906. 
97  In 2000, Dr. Jan Bart Gewald found a collection of photos in Swakopmund’s Sam Cohen Library that he 
photocopied and showed to me. I was recently able to retrieve copies of the entire collection, with the kind 
assistance of the Sam Cohen Library. 
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textual sources are unable to capture,such as faces, expressions, clothes and 
facilities, all preserved in harrowing detail. 
It is difficult to pinpoint the exact dates of the photos, but because they portray 
hundreds of Hereros on Shark Island, they must necessarily have been taken 
between January 1905, when the camps were first introduced, and app. January 1907 
when the Herero were again taken off the island. Another clue is the appearance of 
General von Trotha in one of the images, which would date it to before November 
1905, when the General departed from the colony. It would be logical that Trotha’s 
presence in the photos coincided with his departure and the images could therefore 
well be from October 1905. 
Silvester et al argue that photos taken in especially the war years were designed 
to sway public opinion in favour of colonial conquest, a form of propaganda pursued 
through, for example, postcards. But, there was also another catalogue of photo-
graphs from the war years, namely images taken privately, for personal consump-
tion, with a much different dynamic. Such images were not necessarily taken to 
sway any particular opinion or for a larger purpose, but much in the sense of the 
later-day ‘snapshot’ served primarily as an aide-de-memoir and also as a self-
choreographed narrative of colonial exploits aimed at impressing family and friends. 
Lieutenant von Düring’s photographic diary of the South was in the latter category; 
and as such described basic values and colonial realities as perceived and related by 
a Schutztruppler in 1905. 
Pictures of the colonised, namely the people who were subjected to a new reality 
dictated and enforced by a foreign power, inevitably formed part of this self-
choreographed narrative of colonial conquest. Gewald wrote in his paper on colonial 
photography that many of the images taken during the War showed “the utter 
shamelessness of the colonial endeavour.”98 This is particularly true of the private 
manifestations of power constituted by the personal photographic gaze on the 
colonised. On a human level, private pictures of prisoners-of-war such as Düring’s 
revealed a basic irreverence and abhorrence with which prisoners must essentially 
have been regarded by the Schutztruplers.99 Such ‘power photos’ were crude images 
of often subdued and humiliated prisoners, prompting Gewald to write: “people 
being photographed had ceased to exist as people.”100 Indeed these ‘power photos’ 
commonly presented an arranged juxtaposition of the powerful and powerless to 
underscore themes of conquest, racial dominance and personal superiority as well 
                                                 
98  Gewald, “Mirrior Images?”, Hartmann et al: 1998, p. 119. 
99  Other such private catalogues are also found. I have in my personal possession a collection of private 
pictures with similar theme. One of these pictures appears in this chapter. 
100  Gewald, “Mirrior Images?”, Hartmann et al: 1998, p. 119. 
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as, at some level, machismo. The subjects in these pictures were therefore ironically 
rendered mere objects, a backdrop to the personal power narrative, i.e. they ceased 
to exist as people. In other words, the real subjects of the photos were not the 
colonised, but the colonisers at the other end of the lens, or, in some cases, physic-
cally present within the picture’s narrative.  
The ‘power photo’ did not only exist in the private catalogue, but was also, and 
perhaps to a larger extent, celebrated in public photography, in images designed for 
mass-consumption. Diamond prospector Fred Cornell, described with repulsion a 
series of postcards he encountered while travelling in the German colony:  
“I had seen something of this myself, and had heard more from ex-German soldiers themselves 
who with extraordinary callousness used to show whole series of illustrated postcards, depicting 
wholesale executions and similar gruesome doings to death of these poor natives. One of these, 
that enjoyed great vogue at the time, showed a line of ten Hottentots dangling from a single 
gallows, some still standing on the packing-cases with a noose round their necks, waiting for the 
soldiers to kick their last standing-place away; some kicking and writhing in the death struggle, 
for the short drop did not break their necks, but only strangled them slowly, and one having a 
German soldier hanging on to his legs to finish the work more quickly.”101 
Düring’s catalogue was the epitome of power photography. In this sense 
Düring’s photographic diary was a time-typical representation of German–Herero 
relations, specifically with reference to the very obvious power imbalance in the 
years following the Herero War. The juxtapose of power and total submission was a 
recurrent theme celebrated in Düring’s photos, but most pronounced in the below 
example of coloniser and colonised on Shark Island. Here, standing tall among 
seated prisoners, the German soldier choreographed his own representation as a 
coloniser among a defeated, ‘tamed’ enemy (note the walking stick or cane held by 
the soldier). The angle of the photo accentuated the desired narrative, depicting the 
soldier from a slightly lower angle, making him look more imposing. The angle also 
served to include the Herero women sitting in front of the soldier, submissively 
looking away from the camera, a pose typical of prisoners ‘captured’ on film. The 
image therefore does not only convey a message of colonial power, but also portrays 
male power exerted over brutalised female prisoners, the camera feeding off their 
trauma. 
 
 
                                                 
101  Cornell: 1986, p. 41. 
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Photo 2.8  Düring album. Shark Island prisoners and German  
                  Officer (possibly von Düring himself) 
 
 
Backing up information given in textual sources, the image clearly shows that 
there were far more women on the island than men. The image also shows that 
people only had the possessions they had managed to bring to the camp, for some, 
like the woman in the foreground, this meant sitting half naked on the barren, wind-
swept island, at the mercy of wind and weather.  
In the below image, it is evident that the island was not properly equipped to deal 
with the large prisoner population. A number of children and infants sit huddled 
together, wrapped in blankets trying to resist the cold winds. One of the infants sits 
completely naked on the bare rock (bottom left), with arms crossed. These freezing 
prisoners are backdrops to the actual subject of the photo. A subject under study of 
an ethnographic gaze, the Herero woman is standing, passively posing for the 
camera. Such an image could have been taken with a German audience in mind, as 
an ethnographic illustration of the photographer’s colonial adventures – it is not 
known if Düring was on his way home, but is likely considering his long journey 
from the interior. The woman looked to be malcontent and uneasy about the clearly 
intrusive action, yet she still complied with Düring’s gaze, because she would not 
 
 
 
92 
have had any choice regardless. As with other prisoners photographed by Düring, 
the Herero woman in this image looked away from the camera, submissive and non-
confrontational. 
 
 
 
Photo 2.9   Düring album. Shark Island prisoners 
 
 
Another element in the above image is the colonial symbolism applied to the mis 
en scene. Behind the standing woman, on her right, at the entrance to the camp, the 
German Imperial flag (black, white and red) was flying high. The inclusion of the 
flag in the picture again emphasises the power juxtaposition, here replacing the 
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physical presence of a soldier with the most recognisable symbol of the coloniser, 
his flag. It could of course also be coincidental that the flag was included, even 
though it fits well within the constructed narrative in the rest of Düring’s pictures. 
The flag is also included in another of Düring’s pictures, with a similar purpose one 
might add, this time providing an overview of the southern side of the camp. 
Moreover, when looking at the below picture, the inclusion of the flag in the limited 
frame of both photos appears to be intended, in as much as there was only the one 
flag in the entire camp.  
 
 
 
Photo 2.10   Partial overview of Shark Island concentration camp, Düring album 
 
 
The above image, facing in a southern direction towards Lüderitz Harbour (not 
Robert Harbour, which was the main harbour with piers), shows the fence running 
across the island. One clearly sees the German flag flying high, next to an impro-
vised corrugated iron shed that was probably used by the guards to shelter them 
from the strong winds – notice the flag clearly beating in the strong wind. As seen in 
photo 2.9, a small tent stood next to the guard’s shed. This tent was quite possibly 
the camp’s Lazarett, an improvised medical facility for sick prisoners – see later in 
this chapter for more information about the Lazarett. The image also shows the 
makeshift shelters erected on the island by prisoners, consisting mainly blankets, 
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rock and pieces of wood. From the photograph it is evident that Shark Island was 
not a place conducive for survival. When German military officers first chose this 
location, it must have been equally evident to them that many of the prisoners would 
die as a result of their incarceration on the barren, wind-swept island.  
While on Shark Island, Düring did not refrain from exploring the sexual potential 
of the Herero prisoners. Forming part of his Shark Island series is an image of a 
female prisoner photographed naked. The photo was a continuation of the male 
power theme, applied throughout his tour of the camp. The girl looked in her early 
or mid-teens, standing uneasy and violated, exposing herself to the camera. 
Indicating the involuntary nature of the picture, her dress was squeezed between her 
thighs. Her uncomfortable pose suggests that she was trying to hold on to the dress, 
as if it had it been ripped off her body. The photo underscores the completely 
disregard shown for prisoners’ humanity. In fact Düring’s shot was tantamount to 
rape. It makes the image even more haunting that the girl had a look of indifference 
on her face; it almost seems as if this was a daily routine. Notably, the image looks 
to have been taken inside the guard’s corrugated iron shed at the entrance to the 
camp. 
The Düring album is a disturbing testament to the triviality of callousness, as the 
on-going dehumanisation of Nama and Herero prisoners was recorded and cele-
brated in minute detail. The camera was used to rape, demean and, moreover, to re-
capture photographically an already defeated people, who were gradually succumb-
ing to a new colonial reality. Ironically such ‘power photos’ now form an integral 
part in the reconstruction of a largely repressed history. 
 
Samuel Kariko 
Although there are many German sources that refer to and/or describe Shark Island, 
few voices and stories from people who actually experienced captivity in the camp 
were ever recorded. The scary reality of Shark Island is that the majority of people 
sent there would die in the camp and with them the oral chronicle of their demise. 
There are therefore no known, credible oral histories about Shark Island in the 
present. However, in the past a number of voices were inadvertently recorded such 
as the testimonies of the prisoners Eduard and Jacoba, cited above. Other examples 
of surviving accounts are those published in the British Blue Book on the treatment 
of ‘natives’ by the German state (see the discussion on Johan noothout’s testimony 
earlier in this chapter). The Herero teacher Samuel Kariko, who went to Shark 
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Island in June 1905,102 was also interviewed for the Blue Book and his account is 
probably the most in-depth oral description of life in the camp. The interview was 
done 13 years after the event, in 1918, yet Kariko vividly recalled the cold, damp 
climate and the dire consequences incarceration had for the prisoners. Kariko 
ostensibly said under oath: 
“I was sent down with others to an island far in the south, at Lüderitzbucht. There on that island 
were thousands of Herero and Hottentot (Sic.) prisoners. We had to live there. Men, women and 
children were all huddled together. We had no proper clothing, no blankets, and the night air on 
the sea was bitterly cold. The wet sea fogs drenched us and made our teeth chatter. The people 
died there like flies that had been poisoned. The great majority died there. The little children and 
the old people died first, and then the women and the weaker men. No day passed without many 
deaths. We begged and prayed and appealed for leave to go back to our own country, which is 
warmer, but the Germans refused. Those men who were fit had to work during the day in the 
harbour and railway depots. The younger women were selected by the soldiers and taken to their 
camps as concubines.”103 
Kariko’s testimony is chilling and lachrymose. His description captivates the 
sensation of disbelief and abandonment that prisoners must necessarily have felt, 
marooned on the island at the end of the world. Similar to other sources, Kariko also 
emphasised the plight of women, who were forced to prostitution or subjected to 
rape. Furthermore, the testimony spelled out the total disregard for prisoners’ health 
and rudimentary conditions that were to blame for trauma and death on the island. 
The temperature was uncommonly cold and humid yet prisoners were insufficiently 
equipped by the authorities to allow them to resist, or even exist under, such condi-
tions.  
Based on Kariko’s testimony it seems irrefutably clear that Shark Island was a 
place of death. But, the testimonies given in the Blue Book are not generally 
accepted and have come under criticism for being based on selective evidence 
designed primarily for propaganda purposes in painting a very negative picture of 
German colonialism.104 Although clearly the aim of the then British government to 
declare Germany unfit of having colonies and thereby to take over the colony 
following the treaty of Versailles, this did (and does) not necessarily render inform-
ation contained in the book untrue.105 The information given in the Blue Book was 
                                                 
102  RMS Correspondence VII 31.1, Swakopmund, Eich to Vedder, June 13, 1905. 
103  South Africa, Union of. 
104  Lau: 1995, p. 46; and also Rahn, pp. 83-84. Tragicomically, Rahn refers to Lau’s dismissal of the Blue 
Book as used in Drechsler, and concludes his rebuttal by accentuating the fact that Drechsler was a ‘GDR 
Historian!’ It is difficult to see how this fact would even remotely have anything to do with the credibility 
of information in the Blue Book, which was written in 1918 – as if there was some sort of communist 
conspiracy to defame German colonialism stretching back to the beginning of the century. 
105  Silvester and Gewald, p. xxii. 
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subsequently also not officially refuted by the German Government, that instead 
launched a counter-smear publication, containing a ‘you-did-it-too’ list of British 
colonial atrocities.106 The main line of defence employed by Germany in relation to 
the ‘native’ testimonies was to highlight the fact that they were given by Africans, 
who, according to the German defence, were inherently prone to lying.107 Safe to say 
that this racist notion is as invalid today as it was then and that Blue Book state-
ments are not undermined by such arguments. 
 
 
 
Photo 2.11   Herero prisoners on Shark Island 1905, Düring Album 
 
 
Nonetheless, there are some oddities in Kariko’s statement that merit a deeper 
scrutiny of the historical data it contains. There are some facts that do not exactly 
add up. The mention, for example, of a number of ‘Hottentot’108 prisoners, on the 
                                                 
106  German Colonial Office: 1919. 
107  German Colonial Office, p. 71. 
108  Derogatory word for Nama. 
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island in 1905 seems not to correlate with other facts. Indeed this would have been 
very unlikely at the time Kariko was supposed to have been on the Island, because 
the Witbooi only surrendered in November 1905 and the Bethanie much later. 
Kariko left the island in late December 1905 and would therefore not have been on 
the island at the same time as these Nama prisoners. Furthermore, Kariko ostensibly 
said: “After being there over a year, those of us who had survived were allowed to 
return home.”109 This is a rather curious statement, since the Herero were only given 
their freedom in 1908,110 many years after Kariko had left the island. Also, Kariko 
was not on the island for more than six months in total. 
In spite of these inconsistencies, most of the evidence found in Kariko’s testi-
mony matches others pieces of information about the camp and the island. It is, for 
example, a proven fact that Kariko was on Shark Island. From the Rhenish mission-
aries we know that in June 1905 the learned and respected Herero teacher Samuel 
Kariko, who was working for the mission, was sent with his family to do missionary 
work among the prisoners on Shark Island.111 His task was to convert prisoners and 
provide spiritual support to those already converted. When missionary Kuhlmann 
went to the island in September 1905, it was with the specific purpose of visiting the 
“evangelist Samuel” and when Missionary Laaf arrived in Lüderitz on Christmas 
Eve 1905, Kariko functioned as his interpreter, i.e. he was still on the Island.112  
Kariko worked for the mission, but it is nevertheless apparent that no special 
facilities were provided for him. He had to physically stay on the island along with 
the prisoners-of-war. In fact Kuhlmann stated that an unnamed camp commander 
eventually relieved Samuel Kariko of his working duties, so that he instead could 
perform his missionary work.113 Kariko must therefore have been working alongside 
other prisoners for a good couple of months before being allowed to save souls for 
the mission. Kuhlmann does not suggest that Kariko had any other special privileges 
and one would assume that Kariko must have been suffering the same conditions as 
the other Hereros on the island.  
Kariko’s experience was most likely true to his testimony if one is to judge from 
his actions. In December 1905, desperate to get away from the concentration camp, 
Kariko sent a forlorn appeal to the missionaries asking if he and eight of his family 
could be evacuated from the island – little over five months after going to 
                                                 
109  South Africa, Union of.  
110  BKE 224, B.II.74.d. Spec. Vol 2, p. 331. 
111  RMS Correspondence VII 31, Swakopmund 1-7, Eich to Vedder, June 13, 1906. 
112  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 59. This information came from Inspector Spiecker. 
113  Missions-Berichte, 1905, p. 260. 
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Lüderitz.114 The reason for his desired departure from the island was cited as health 
related. One can imagine the torment it must have been to work among friends, 
family and fellow human beings, dying in scores around Kariko. He would not have 
been able to offer any kind of help apart from prayer. If the cold climate didn’t make 
him sick, the trauma of his experience would surely have made a physical as well as 
psychological impact on him, as is evident from his testimony. 
Kariko’s appeal to be evacuated from Shark Island was initially ignored by his 
Rhenish missionary colleagues, who would only let him go if another ‘native’ assist-
ant was found to take his place.115 Eventually, however, a replacement was found, a 
certain Heinrich Ururua, who was immediately appointed to take the depressing and 
obviously dangerous position at Lüderitz.116 Because of the large number of Herero 
souls on Shark Island, the Rhenish Mission had at the same time decided to set up a 
permanent mission station in Lüderitz.117 The new station was to be headed by Emil 
Laaf, who before the war had been responsible for the now defunct Veldschoen-
drager mission in Khoes.118 Ururua spoke fluent Dutch and could therefore also act 
as an interpreter for the German Missionary Laaf, whose language proficiencies 
were inadequate.119 
Kariko and family was bound for Usakos by early 1906, where the resident 
Herero teacher, Gottlieb, had defected to the Roman Catholic Church, leaving his 
position vacant.120 As such, Kariko was in fact allowed to leave the island with other 
Herero and return to their own land, as stated in his Blue Book testimony. In the 
1906 Omaruru Missionary Chronicle, Samuel Kariko reflected on his escape. His 
words contained a deep-felt remorse that he as a Christian did not have the strength 
to persevere Shark Island, being implicitly ashamed of his departure from the island 
while many hundreds if not over a thousand of his fellow Hereros remained: 
“As a prisoner I travelled by sea to Lüderitzbucht, to do the Lord’s work there. People wanted to 
make me similar to Paul. It was my pity, though, that unlike him I did not have the spirit of 
holiness in my heart.”121 
                                                 
114  Missions-Berichte, 1906, pp. 9-11. 
115  RMS Correspondence VII 31.1, Swakopmund, Eich to Vedder, November 25, 1905. 
116  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 59. 
117  Missions-Berichte, 1905, p. 260. 
118  Allgemeine zeitung (Windhoek), “50 Jahre Rheinische Mission in Luderitzbucht” (Nr. 27, February 8, 
1956). 
119  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 59. 
120  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 11 
121  RMS Chronicle V, 23.1, Omaruru, 1906, as quoted in Gewald: 1996, p. 246. Also quoted in Missions-
Berichte, 1906, p. 147. 
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The author of the Blue Book, Major O’Reilly, could hardly have found a more 
appropriate subject to interview about Shark Island than Samuel Kariko, who 
moreover resided in Omaruru where O’Reilly compiled and wrote the exhaustive 
report.122 There is consistent evidence to show that Kariko was on Shark Island and 
that he suffered from the experience. On closer inspection even the inconsistencies 
in Kariko’s testimony were perhaps not as implausible as first believed. It does seem 
entirely possible that Kariko’s statement were in essence completely factual. In the 
case of the alleged Nama prisoners found in Lüderitz in 1905, for example, there are 
several possibilities. It could be that Kariko added his knowledge of the Nama 
prisoners to his evidence, which in 1918 he would have been well aware of. It could 
also be that the translators of Kariko’s testimony, who did perhaps not know the 
exact chronology of events in Lüderitz, added this information themselves (possibly 
even O’Reilly himself). There is yet another option, however: maybe there were in 
actual fact Nama on the island already in 1905 that have not yet been documented.  
When the Nama War broke out, approximately 80 Witbooi men, who at the time 
had still been fighting with German troops in the Herero campaign, were rounded up 
and sent to Swakopmund.123 It is a distinct possibility that Nama taken prisoner in 
the South were in this same manner sent off to Lüderitz. In support of this possi-
bility is a letter sent to the Lüderitz Local Government by the Lüderitzbucht Com-
pany in late 1904.124 Having heard the news of the Witbooi uprising, the Lüderitz-
bucht Company requested that the mobility Nama working for the German com-
panies in the South be severely restricted. The company feared that their Nama 
labourers would leave Lüderitz and possibly join in the fighting.125 Although this 
correspondence did not suggest that the Nama labourers were actually sent to Shark 
Island, the letter does prove that the War in the South would have had a negative 
effect on Namas in Lüderitz and surroundings and perhaps even that they would 
have been arrested.  
On a similar theme a letter from District Commissioner Böhmer on April 29, 
1907 referred to a group of Nama, mostly from the Bethanie community, who were 
working on the English Guano islands off the coast of Lüderitz and in Radford Bay 
at the outbreak of the War.126 In light of the Lüderitzbucht Company’s request it is 
very likely that these people were in some way detained or interned. 
                                                 
122  Silvester and Gewald, p. xx. 
123  The Witbooi fighters were subsequently deportation to German Togo in West Africa. Drechsler, p. 185. 
124  BLU 29, E.1.K. Vol 1, October 11, 1904. 
125  BLU 29, E.1.K. Vol 1, October 11, 1904. 
126  ZBU 456, D.IV.l.3, Vol 5, pp. 112-114 
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Photo 2.12  Cornelius Fredericks’ people captured and photographed in around  
 October 1905. Düring album 
 
 
Returning to missionary sources, Missionary Diehl wrote from Okahandja in 
January 1905 (i.e. long before the Witboois surrendered) that there were a number of 
Nama prisoners in the Osona camp by Okahandja.127 Similarly, in June 1906 the 
Rhenish Mission’s newsletter mentioned that Missionary Laaf’s community com-
prised predominantly Herero – an indication that other ethnic groups were also 
present.128 Also, in Düring’s photo diary, which was most probably taken in October 
1905, a number of Bethanie prisoners were photographed in Kubub by Aus (see 
photo 2.12). The most compelling peace of evidence, however, comes from Mis-
sionary Fenchel in Keetmanshoop, who in January 1906 described a group of 
prisoners, stemming from Cornelius and Morenga’s people, who were being held in 
Lüderitzbucht129 These prisoners are likely to be the same women photographed in 
                                                 
127  Missions-Berichte, 1905, p. 79. 
128  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 127. 
129  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 33. Morenga had resumed the Bondelswartz uprising in August 1904 and 
continued fighting the German troops until September 20, 1907 when he was killed by the Cape Mounted 
Police near Upington, i.e. in British territory. Drechsler, pp. 179, 199-204. 
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Kubub by Düring. As such Kariko may well have been correct in referring to Nama 
on the island. Overall, therefore, the Kariko interview in the Blue Book correlated 
with other evidence and descriptions of the island to such an extent that it cannot be 
dismissed as simple propaganda.  
 
Nama prisoners-of-war: Dat Volk is Gedaan 
On July 27, 1905, two months before he died, the leader of the Witbooi community, 
Kaptein Hendrik Witbooi wrote a letter to Keetmanshoop District Commissioner 
Schmidt. In this letter the old Kaptein stated in no uncertain terms that he did not 
consider surrender to be an option. He wrote:  
 
 
 
Photo 2.13   Samuel Isaak and Hendrik Witbooi (right) 
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“…[your] peace is the same as my death and the death of my people…all I see in your peace is 
the extermination of all of us and our people” 130  
True to his word, Hendrik Witbooi continued his anti-colonial campaign of 
attacking German-owned farms with his band of fighters. The campaign came to an 
abrupt end in late October 1905, when Hendrik Witbooi was shot in the thigh during 
such an attack and subsequently died from his wounds. Following Hendrik Wit-
booi’s death, the remaining fighters and their families were forced to evaluate their 
situation. They needed to decide whether or not they should carry on fighting. Con-
trary to his July letter, Hendrik Witbooi’s last words were supposedly: “It is enough 
now. It is over with me. The children shall have peace.”131  
Leadership befell the old Kaptein’s son, Isaak Witbooi. But, when he decided to 
keep fighting, elder members of the group raised their objections.132 Eventually the 
under-Kaptein and Hendrik Witbooi’s close friend, Samuel Isaak, decided to split 
with the late Kaptein’s son.133 Samuel Isaak and a number of people, including Hans 
Hendriks, the Kaptein of the Veldschoendragers, reportedly no longer wanted to 
fight and decided to rather attempt a peace settlement with the Germans.134 
Before the southern wars had broken out, Samuel Isaak was on good terms with 
the German authorities. Isaak had never really been convinced about the war, a fact 
that he had communicated to the German army,135 and perhaps therefore expected his 
peace offering to be greeted with lenience. Moreover, in making his decision to 
surrender, Samuel Isaak would have had an important frame of reference. In 1894 
the Witbooi community had conducted an exhausting campaign against the Germans 
in the Naukluft Mountains. Although the Witbooi were eventually defeated in the 
Naukluft, they had managed to negotiate reasonable terms, securing both mobility 
and tenure for the community. Nevertheless, Samuel Isaak’s decision would also 
have been dictated out of necessity, because the Witboois would have been 
dispirited by the death of their leader and been physically drained from a drawn-out 
guerrilla campaign with minimal rations of food and drink.  
Before walking into the ‘lion’s den’ Samuel Isaak entered into correspondence 
with the German authorities, hinting at the prospect of peace negotiations. Subse-
quently, Major von Estorff, who as a veteran in the colony was both known and 
trusted by Samuel Isaak, assured the Witbooi leader that he and his people would 
                                                 
130  BKE 305 , G.A. 10/2, Witbooi to Schmidt, July 27,1905, p. 79. 
131  Weber, p. 162. 
132  Nuhn: 2000, p. 177. 
133  Nuhn: 2000, p. 177 and also Drechsler, p. 190. 
134  Nuhn: 2000, p. 177.  
135  BKE 305 , G.A. 10/2, Goliath to Schmidt, July 25,1905, p. 78. 
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receive life and liberty in exchange for giving up their weapons.136 Von Estorff 
would later describe how he in fact had been given the mandate from central 
command to make such a promise.137 Samuel Isaak’s cautious approach had there-
fore, on the face of it, worked out relatively well. Samuel Isaak arrived in Berseba 
on November 20, presenting himself to Lieutenant von Westernhagen with a total of 
74 men and 65 women and children.138 It is worth noting that Samuel Isaak's group 
only carried a total of 36 guns, which supports the idea that the fighters remained 
with Isaak Witbooi, as did most of the weapons. 
Upon arrival in Berseba, the final conditions of the surrender were negotiated. 
Lieutenant von Westernhagen and the local Nama Kaptein Goliath, who was still 
‘loyal’ to the Germans, conducted terms of the peace.139 Samuel Isaak was promised 
that all personal effects in possession upon surrendering would remain Witbooi 
property.140 A week later, Samuel and his people were on their way back home to 
Gibeon, where, according to the peace agreement, they were supposed to stay.141 
Before they left Berseba, though, their possessions were confiscated, to be held in 
custody for a period not exceeding three years.142 Other Witboois held at Berseba 
joined Samuel Isaak’s group and when they reached Gibeon on December 2nd, 1905, 
they were 80 men and 110 women and children.143 Soon more Nama groups emu-
lated their example, giving up weapons in large numbers, largely due to Samuel 
Isaak’s appeal. 
On December 1st, 1905, newly arrived Governor Friedrich von Lindequist 
announced that he had annulled any concessions given to the Witbooi, in accordance 
with orders given to him by the Kaiser.144 The wheels were set in motion to rectify 
what Lindequist perceived to have been a grave mistake; according to him the Wit-
booi should be punished, not promised their freedom. As a result Samuel Isaak’s 
group of Witbooi soon found themselves marching from Gibeon to Windhoek, 
where they would be interned in the concentration camp next to the Alte Feste.145 On 
February 25, 1906 there were therefore around 500 Nama in Windhoek’s concen-
tration camp of whom the majority were Witboois and Veldshoendragers.146  
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Before long, Isaak Witbooi and the rest of the Witbooi community joined 
Samuel Isaak and Hans Hendriks147 in the Windhoek camp.148 Ostensibly Isaak 
Witbooi was later sent to the area between Maltahoehe and Fish River to help secure 
the surrender of parts of the Witbooi community scattered there.149 This act of colla-
boration could explain why he and his immediate family were spared the fate of 
their fellow Witboois in as much as they were not sent to Shark Island, but instead 
spent the remanding decade of German colonialism in the small military depot at 
Okandjande, close to the Waterberg area. 
As part of Lindequist’s policy of sending southerners north and vice versa, a 
steady inflow of Nama prisoner kept arriving in the Windhoek camp. 150 The Red 
Nation from Hoachanas, who had fought under Kaptein Manasse until his war- 
related death had cut their campaign short, arrived in the Windhoek camp around 
June 1906.151 Members of Hans Hendriks’ Veldschoendragers, as well as members 
 
 
 
Photo 2.14  Samuel Isaak (middle) with other Witboois proudly wearing characteristic white  
 bandanna in the Windhoek camp. Postcard erroneously captioned: Herero captains  
 and headmen 
                                                 
147  Hans Hendrik was eventually sent onto the Osona Camp in Okahandja. Missions-Berichte, 1907, p. 42. 
148  ZBU 465, D.IV.m.3, vol. 1, p. 76; and Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 104. 
149  ZBU 465, D.IV.m.3, vol. 1, p. 76.  
150  Estorff, p. 134. 
151  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 127. and Missions-Berichte, 1907, p. 42. Another of the smaller southern 
communities, the Groot Doden [Great Dead], also known as the //O-gain, were confined to a minor camp 
at Spitzkop in the South (not the Spitzkoppe between Swakopmund and Karibib).  
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of the Bondelswartz community were also sent to the Windhoek concentration camp 
from the South.152 The biggest group of prisoners to arrive in central GSWA, 
however, was the many Bethanie people, who had gradually surrendered to German 
patrols between January and March 1906.  
When Hendrik Witbooi took up arms in October 1904, the Bethanie community 
was caught in an acute dilemma. One the one hand, Bethanie Kaptein, Paul Frede-
ricks appealed to his community not to support the Witbooi uprising. On the other 
hand the Kaptein’s cousin,153 Cornelius Fredericks, who was also Hendrik Witbooi’s 
son-in-law,154 had gone into battle with several hundred fellow Bethanies.  
Cornelius Fredericks and his Bethanie fighters embarked on a long, effective 
campaign against German troops and the young leader’s name became known 
throughout the colony. Among German troops he had a reputation as gentleman of 
war, because he ostensibly conducted a fair fight and, where possible, avoided 
killing Germans.155 Fredericks was even mentioned in the official War History, a 
document sanctioned by the German Military Command, as being a noble opponent. 
This accolade stands out in the official history where the Empire’s enemies are 
otherwise regarded as traitors and bandits. 
On March 13, 1906, Governor Lindequist went to visit the Nama prisoners in 
Windhoek. Lindequist, who had served as deputy Governor under Leutwein, knew 
Samuel Isaak personally from long rides through the South.156 In spite of any such 
familiarity or indeed the promises given to the Witbooi and Venldshoendrager 
communities upon their surrender, the new Governor gave somewhat patronising 
speech that would leave no illusions about the future plight of the Nama. He said: 
“Of course you no longer have Kapteins [leaders] among you. However, I trust that you, Samuel 
Isaak, and you, Hans Hendrik, have so much influence over your tribes-people [Volksgenossen] 
that you will be able to prevent them from further unsound action… You will be put to work; I 
advise you: be diligent and follow the instructions given to you in my name… Those who 
behave well, will be treated well. Have you understood this and will you behave accordingly?”157  
True to his word, Lindequist arranged for the respective Nama communities to 
be distributed to different sites in the centre of the colony, where they were put to 
work. Hans Hendriks and his Veldschoendragers were sent to Osona Camp in Oka-
                                                 
152  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 145. 
153  NAW 43, Magistrate Owens, ’Frederiks’ Family Tree’, Bethanie 3/8/22. 
154  Patemann, p.122. Also, Missions-Berichte, 1905, p. 37. 
155  Accession 460, “Twelve Years in South West Africa 1907 – 1919: Recollections of the Writer”; Rahn, 
p.58 and Baericke, p. 30. Also Trench: KAB, PMO 227 – 35/07, British Military Attaché, Col. F. Trench 
to British Embassy, Berlin, 21st November, 1906. 
156  BAK, Kl. Erw. 275, Lindequist Memoirs, p. 83. 
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handja;158 Isaak Witbooi and family were taken to Okandjande station close to 
Otavi,159 Bethanie prisoners were sent to Karibib via Lüderitz to work on the Tsumeb 
railway;160 and the Witboois remained in Windhoek’s concentration camp until 
August 1906.161  
While in Windhoek, Samuel Isaak’s group of Witboois were ostensibly given 
preferential treatment.162 In a memo on February 16, 1906 it was specifically stated 
that Samuel Isaak’s group of 70 were to be given a private ‘Kraal’ with only limited 
military supervision. As a means of preventing escapes, Samuel Isaak was to be held 
personally responsible for any actions taken by this group.163 In spite of these 
supposed privileges, the group was nonetheless forced to work in the town and were 
even rented out on a daily basis to private people. To rent a Witbooi, it would cost a 
Windhoek citizen 5 or 3 Marks for men and woman respectively. This lease of 
labour was a moneymaking enterprise for the colonial Government, since none of 
the rental fee would end up with to the prisoners.164 
The below photo depicts distribution of food to concentration camp prisoners. 
There are two pieces of information in the photo that suggests it to be from the 
period that Nama prisoners were kept in the Windhoek camp. Firstly, in the 
background, it is possible to make out one of the ‘Alte Feste’ towers. Secondly, a 
man standing in the right side of the image, leaning against a stick, was wearing a 
white bandanna on his head – the symbol of the Witbooi. He wore a broad-brimmed 
hat, a white blazer and carried a cane; it could therefore well be that this mystery 
man was in fact Samuel Isaak, who was known to dress in a similar fashion.165 
Notably the image was clearly posed and can be categorised as a propaganda photo 
designed for mass consumption.166 It might therefore not be an accurate reflection of 
conditions in the camp. 
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159  ZBU 2369, Geheimakten, Nr. VIII.g (Vol. 1to 2), relating to the Witboi-Hottentotten. [sic.] 1905-1909, p. 
84. 
160  Nuhn: 2000, p. 266. 
161  Missions-Berichte, 1906, p. 251. 
162  ZBU 2369, Witbooi Geheimakten, pp. 56-57. 
163  ZBU 2369, Witbooi Geheimakten, pp. 56-57. 
164  ZBU 2369, Witbooi Geheimakten, pp. 56-57. 
165  See photos 2.13 and 2.14. 
166  See Silvester et al in Hartmann et al (eds.): 1998, pp. 12-14. 
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Photo 2.15  Nama prisoners receiving rations in Windhoek 
 
 
 
Photo 2.16  Isaak Witbooi and family in Okandjande 
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Deportation 
 
When the Witboois first rose up, a number of their fighters were still in German ranks. They 
had been part of the German campaign at the Waterberg. Although the uprising had presumably 
happened without their knowledge, they were immediately disarmed, arrested and eventually 
deported to the German colony of Togo. 
More than two years later, the new Governor, Friedrich von Lindequist, gave very serious 
thought to completely removing the troublesome Witbooi and Bethanie communities from the 
colony. Although the colony stood to loose a considerable part of its labour pool, this was 
deemed of secondary importance to the security risk they potentially posed. Moreover, by 
deporting the prisoners, labour would be lost to the colony but not to the German Empire. 
Hence, the feasibility of moving around a couple of thousand people from GSWA to either the 
Cameroon or Togo in western Africa was investigated. 
While these discussions were taking place, the initial Togo deportees were repatriated, 
because the authorities in Togo simply wouldn’t take responsibility for their deaths. This 
brought about strong reactions from the settler community. Lindequist, surely aware that his 
‘constituency’ was unhappy, sent a telegram to the Colonial Department on July 10, 1906 
urging that the Witboois be sent to Samoa and the captured Bethanie and Franzmanns be sent to 
Adamaua in northern Cameroon. The colonial Department did not concur. They dismissed the 
idea, citing the enormous cost involved in such an exercise. The transport alone would amount 
to large sums of money that the colonial department was not willing to spend. The failure of the 
Togo deportees would also have played a part in the proposal’s rejection. Instead, Lindequist 
was told to find a suitable and safe location inside the colony where he could dispose of the 
Nama. Eventually the Nama communities were sent to Shark Island in Lüderitz. 
 
 
This picture most likely shows the Bethanie doing work on 600mm gauge Swakopmund to Tsumeb line.  
Note the Bambusenkind on the left. 
Sources: 
Alexander in Saunders (ed.), pp. 64-65. 
Hillebrecht & Melber in Mbumba (ed.), pp. 132-136. 
Nuhn: 2000, pp. 265-267. 
Drechsler, pp. 185-186. 
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Nama prisoners go to Lüderitz 
In mid 1906, the increasing number of Witbooi prisoners was becoming increasingly 
unpopular with German settlers in Windhoek. Both soldiers and settlers were report-
edly upset at what they regarded a far too relaxed approach to security and treatment 
of the Witbooi prisoners.167 The anger stemmed in large part from the fact that 13 
Witboois had managed to escape from the Windhoek concentration camp.168 
In late June 1906, Colonel Deimling replaced Colonel Dame as the commander-
in-chief of the Schutztruppe. The incumbent Colonel was an outspoken militarist, 
who immediately took a hard-line stance on the Nama ‘problem’. Soon after taking 
his position, he advised Governor Lindequist to deport the Nama to other German 
colonies.169 When the Colonial Department in Berlin eventually turned down this 
request, citing costs, Nama prisoners were instead sent to Lüderitz, to the Shark 
Island Camp.170  
From August onwards, Nama prisoners were gradually transferred to Lüderitz 
from their various locations in concentration camps and construction sites. They 
were loaded into cattle trucks and sent to Swakopmund, from where they were trans-
ported by sea to Lüderitz.  
Samuel Isaak and a large section of the imprisoned Witboois comprised the first 
consignment of Nama to the South. As such, in mid August 1906, a somewhat 
bewildered Samuel Isaak found himself in Swakopmund. The Witbooi leader 
protested fiercely to the local military administration in Swakopmund, insisting that 
incarceration in Lüderitz had never been part of the peace agreement with Major von 
Estorff when the Witbooi first surrendered.171 Because of his continued protest, the 
Swakopmund military eventually sent a telegram back to Windhoek, relaying 
Samuel Isaak’s claims. In short, the Swakopmund military was asking if Isaak’s 
accusations were true and whether the deportation could still go ahead.172 Colonel 
Deimling replied personally. His one-line telegram, which sealed the fate of Samuel 
Isaak and the Witboois, read: “no objections against leaving Samuel Isaak on Shark 
Island”.173 At the end of August, therefore, the Witboois were deported to Lüderitz.  
 
                                                 
167  ”Der Deutsche”, August 1, 1906, as cited in Nuhn: 2000, p. 266. 
168  ”Der Deutsche”, August 1, 1906, as cited in Nuhn: 2000, p. 266. 
169  Drechsler, pp. 210-211. 
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Apart from Samuel Isaak’s people, the biggest group of Witbooi and probably 
Veldshoendragers, arrived on September 9, 1906 and consisted over 1700 people. 
All had been sent by sea directly to the Island, where they joined Herero and Nama 
prisoners already there.174 More Nama prisoners kept trickling in from different parts 
of the colony such as a group of 81 Nama arriving from Keetmanshoop as late as 
October 17, 1906.175 With the arrival of Cornelius Fredericks and his Bethanies, 
there were more than 2000 Nama prisoners on the island all together. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Missionary Laaf’s map from October 1906, 
 showing the nama and Herero (right) 
 
 
A German soldier named Hünniger, who was described as being the ‘Prisoner 
Overseer’ on Shark Island, compiled figures of prisoners in late November 1906. 
According to him there were 514 Herero prisoner on the island in November 1906.176 
To accommodate the new arrivals at Shark Island, an extra section was added to the 
old camp.177  
For unknown reasons, the Nama prisoners were kept separately from the 
Hereros. It is not know from where the Herero on the island had come, although 
there is evidence that some of Maharero’s people were in Lüderitz.178 Considering 
that both Witbooi and Bethanie had fought alongside the Germans at Waterberg, it is 
not unlikely that some animosity existed, which could explain the split. Perhaps the 
division was meant to keep the new arrivals from learning the extent of their 
predicament, i.e. a measure to prevent information spreading about the severity of 
condition and high mortality rates. Another, more humane, reason for the division 
                                                 
174  RMS, V.16, pp. 1–31, Chronik der Gemeinde Lüderitzbucht. 
175  Bofinger: 1910, p. 577. 
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could have related to disease. By preventing contact, there would also be less of a 
risk of infection with the deadly diseases spreading on the island. However, the most 
probable reason for dividing the camp would have been increased control with 
prisoners. The number of prisoners greatly outnumbered that of Lüderitz’s white 
population and by separating the two groups, or perhaps even fuelling animosity 
between them, the Germans would be able to kept them from joining forces and 
potentially resist their incarceration. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Shark Island was actually split into two camps, 
there was a second camp in the harbour town. This camp was found next to the 
stranded English steamer HMS Dunbeth, on the Nautilus side of Roberthafen (the 
side opposite Shark Island). On Missionary Laaf’s October 1906 map, the camp was 
labelled “Prisoner Hereros”, “Firma Lenz”. The latter referred to Lenz and Co., 
which was the company contracted to prepare the railway lines embankment 
between Lüderitz to Aus. At the time Laaf drew his map, railway construction was 
no longer in Lüderitzbucht, in fact construction was almost complete. Nevertheless 
it is clear that Lenz kept a large number of prisoners in Lüderitz, in spite of the 
increasingly removed site of construction. Indeed the railway company had three 
different locations for their prisoners: 1. Lüderitz, i.e. the Lenz Camp; 2. The actual 
line (ephemeral and scattered); 3.The Aus Camp.179 Most likely Lenz kept its 
prisoners in the knowledge that the southern railway line’s second stretch, between 
Aus and Keetmanshoop, would still have to be constructed, depending on its final 
approval by the German Reichstag. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Lenz camp on the mainland, next to the 
 stranded HMS Dunbeth 
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Lenz Camp was not a site of heavenly appeal, much like the concentration camps 
on Shark Island. A British Mining Prospector, Fred Cornell, who was in Lüderitz at 
the time, described the Lenz camp. He wrote: 
“There were also a large number caged in a wire enclosure on the beach; these were slightly 
better off, as, although they received no rations from the military in charge of them, a few of 
their number were let out each morning and went ravenously foraging in the refuse-buckets, 
bringing what offal they could back to their starving fellow-prisoners.”180 
In Cornell’s estimation, the people kept on the beach where better off than their 
fellow prisoners on Shark Island, although being given no rations by their captors. 
Another eerie description of the Lenz camp was given by non-commissioned officer 
Mohr: 
“On February 21 we were ordered out of quarantine and on the same night sent on guard duty. 
We … guarded the Herero prisoners, who were placed on the north-side of the bay on the ocean 
beach… The ice-cold ocean winds were beating ropes against the ships in the harbour, which 
resulted in us having to sharpen our hearing in order to realise what the POWs were doing in the 
camp.”181 
Although Lenz was effectively a private company contracted by the German 
Government, Herero prisoners in the camp were still under military administration, 
explaining why Mohr and his companion would stand guard at the camp and why 
Cornell described it as pertaining to the army. In fact all prisoners, regardless where 
they were assigned to work or what camp they were put in, were under the 
administration of the Etappenkommando.  
 
 
 
 
Photo 2.17 The Lenz Camp seen from Shark Island. HMS Dunbeth in the foreground. Dunbeth  
 stranded on June 6, 1906 
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The Etappenkommando was the division in charge of supplies for the military, 
providing anything from ammunition to food, clothing, transport or labour. Accord-
ing to the rules and regulations for the use of prisoners, anyone in the colony 
wanting prisoners for labour purposes would first have to motivate their need with 
the Etappenkommando.182 Even local governments would have to go through the 
Etappenkommando to get labourers from the concentration camp.183 The general 
motivation behind forced labour, especially in Lüderitz, was to speed up and reduce 
cost in construction and maintenance of urgently needed infrastructure. It is evident 
that the military supply division’s main interest and mandate would have been to 
maximise the prisoners’ labour potential. Human issues such as prisoner welfare and 
state of health would have been secondary concerns, to the extent they were consi-
dered at all.  
Much like the other towns with concentration camps, Lüderitz grew rapidly 
during the war. Indeed the sudden strategic importance of Lüderitz, resulting from 
the southern wars, made pressing demands for renewed and expanded infrastructure 
in the small town. In essence, the outbreak of war in the South meant that Lüderitz 
became a vital gateway for troops arriving in their thousands, needing corresponding 
amounts of supplies in their hunt for southern Guerrilla fighters. A mediocre outpost 
at the turn of the century, Lüderitz was now forced to rapidly adapt to the new 
demands. As such, there was an imminent and sizeable need for labour to construct 
and maintain lasting general infrastructure. 
The task of dressing Lüderitz for its new role befell the prisoners-of-war. 
Notwithstanding the fact that these prisoners were in dire physical and mental shape, 
they were deported to the South against their will and forced to build the infrastruc-
ture of Lüderitz, doing hard, unpaid labour. Camp Doctor Bofinger described the 
main purpose of Herero prisoners arriving in early 1905, as being much needed 
labour for the expansion of Lüderitz.184 Whereas the southern railway and local 
projects in Lüderitz in 1905-06 were largely ‘employing’ Herero prisoner labour, the 
Nama, who arrived in September 1906, were forced to work on continued construc-
tion and modernisation of the harbour.  
In the annual report for Lüderitz district during 1906, compiled by local govern-
ment officials, it was noted that apart from the two new piers, constructed by Herero 
POWs, the harbour would need further upgrading.185 The new project would include 
a new pier on the eastern side of Shark Island as well as a wave breaker on the 
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northern side. The pier was meant to form part of a deep-sea harbour that would 
cater for larger long-distance ships. This would make Lüderitz the only other place 
in the German colony, considering that Walvis Bay was British, where large ship 
would be able to dock. The second part of the upgrade was a wave-breaker on the 
northern side of the island, which was designed to protect ships anchored in the 
harbour against the stormy seas often experienced in Lüderitz. High seas would at 
times cause ships to run aground in the harbour, as seen on June 6, 1906 when the 
British steamer HMS Dunbeth stranded following strong gales. The new harbour 
project was included on a hand-drawn map (Fig. 39) made by Missionary Laaf in 
October 1906, i.e. exactly at the time Nama prisoners were arriving on Shark 
Island.186  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3   Missionary Laaf's hand-drawn map of Lüderitz’s main Harbour 
 
 
                                                 
186  Vereinte Evangelische Mission, Wuppertal-Barmen, Germany, RMG 1.656a,B/c II 83, p. 46-49, Laaf to 
Rheinische Missionsgesellschaft Director, October 21, 1906. Note that Laaf had his directions confused in 
indicating north-west as being north. 
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The new pier project was planned to coincide with the arrival of more than 2000 
Nama prisoners to Shark Island, who constituted a considerable labour resource. In 
the words of the 1906 annual report:  
“To provide labour for this pier and at the same time make good use of the Hottentot [Nama] 
prisoners-of-war on Shark Island, the Harbour Division commenced exploding [rocks] and 
dumping [it] on the eastern shore of the island on September 26, 1906.” 187 
The project on Shark Island fell under the Harbour Division in Swakopmund, 
which sent a German technician to supervise construction. Technician Müller kept a 
meticulous diary of the works and also sent numerous progress reports to the 
Swakopmund Harbour Division.188 All cost incurred was covered by the Harbour 
Division, although this actually meant that money came directly from Colonial 
Government coffers.189 The bulk of costs for the project would however, not relate to 
provision of labour, seeing as the Colonial Government had promised Technician 
Müller as many as 1,600 Nama prisoners for the sole use of his project. The fact that 
the majority of Nama prisoners on Shark Island were assigned to Müller illustrates 
not only the administration’s desire for harbour expansions but more so underscores 
the Colonial Government’s willingness to sacrifice human life in the pursuit of cost 
reduction. Eventually, however, Müller did not make use of his entire ‘consign-
ment’, using only around 300 Nama labourers at a time, although the cumulative 
number may well have been much higher.190  
The work undertaken by the Nama on Müller’s project was physically draining 
and undoubtedly quite dangerous. The nature of the work was extreme and consisted 
mostly of blowing up large boulders on Shark Island. Boxes of dynamite were 
continually ordered for the works as explosions continued to take place on the 
island, week after week. In fact explosions were such an integral part of the project 
that Müller named it the ‘Explosion Project’ [Sprengarbeit]. The role of prisoners on 
Müller’s Explosion Project was to set charges and, when the fireworks were over, to 
clear away rocks and rubble. 
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Photo 2.18  This, perhaps, best known image of Shark Island clearly shows prisoners collecting  
 rubble into small boxes. In the background are seen the more than a thousand  
 prisoners on Shark Island in early 1907, huddled together for warmth. 
 
 
It was a thoroughly planned project that sought to maximise the use of labour 
and resources. The solid rock-face on the island had to be smoothened on the sites of 
construction, i.e. blown into large and small pieces of rock. The large rocks and 
boulders would be used for the wave-breaker and pier projects, whereas smaller rock 
was building material for the proposed Harbour Division houses.191 From the blast 
site materials were transported to their respective destinations - presumably by hand, 
with small carts192 or wheelbarrows, since these were the only methods available on 
the island.193 In November prisoners were subsequently also instructed to construct 
small roads on Shark Island in order to make the transport of material easier.194 
When the rock and rubble was off-loaded at either the pier, wave-breaker or house 
                                                 
191  HBS 52, November 5, 1906. 
192  Later, when the number of available prisoners were dropping, it was reported that a number of donkey 
carts were used for transportation of rocks. HBS 53, November 27.  
193  Müller repeated the fact that only few tools were at his disposal. Moreover there was no infrastructure on 
the eastern side of the island, apart from roads made by prisoners. 
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projects, it was handed over to other prisoners who were forced to do the physical 
parts of the construction under supervision of skilled labourers and soldiers on 
site.195 
Collecting debris often meant standing in ice-cold water, picking up rocks and 
clearing the beach of material. The same was true for the pier and wave-breaker 
construction, where large boulders were dumped into the sea. Camp Doctor 
Bofinger described how women in the camp would massage and care for the sick 
men, whose legs were paining severely from the knee down. Although the learned 
doctor curiously accredited this symptom found in most sick prisoners to rheuma-
tism,196 It would appear more likely that the leg pains had to do with work performed 
while standing in freezing ocean waters around Shark Island. 
A German Schutztruppe diary recounted how Nama women on Shark Island 
were allowed to cross the bridge every day to work in town, while Nama men were 
blowing ‘gigantic boulders’ on the beach of the island.197 Judging from this source 
alone one would assume that only men were sent to work for Müller, whereas 
women were spared such hard labour. However, in Müller’s ‘works diary’ [Bautage-
buch] numbers of prisoners working on Shark Island were given as between 30 and 
50 percent female. On November 1, 1906 141 women were working with 165 men 
and on November 30 there were 66 men and 37 women.198 In other words, all 
available ‘manpower’ was mobilised, regardless of gender.  
Considering the generally weakened state of prisoners, who had to deal with 
maltreatment and malnourishment on shark Island, hard and dangerous labour would 
invariably have had consequences. It did. As early as November 30, 1906 Müller 
began complaining to the Harbour Division that the number of Arbeitsfähige 
[workable] Nama had shrunk to around a hundred prisoners.199 According to Müller, 
the majority of prisoners were either sick or dying. Between November 1906 and 
January 1907, the situation gradually worsened. More prisoners fell ill and Müller 
became increasingly frustrated and nervous at the impact this reduction of labourers 
would have on the project. In a letter to his employers in Swakopmund, written on 
Christmas Eve in 1906, Müller’s gave a depressing status report. He wrote: 
“Contrary to the report of the Imperial Harbour Division of October 6, 1906 (…), in which it is 
expressly said that 1600 Nama prisoners will be set at the disposal of the Hafenamt, I now have 
only 30-40 men at my disposal. The desired outcome is therefore not achievable. The reason for 
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the decline [in productivity] is to be found in the fact that 7-8 Nama die daily. On the 7th of this 
month as many as 17 died in one night. If measures are not actively taken to acquire [new] 
labourers, I fear the work will not be completed.”200 
Müller’s letter bore little hint of empathy for prisoners, who, among other causes 
of death, were worked until they dropped on his and other projects. Instead of 
requesting that better care be taken of prisoners working for him, which would 
ultimately have resulted in a healthier workforce, Müller asked that immediate 
measures be taken to secure more prisoners from elsewhere. Either Müller had given 
up hope that the Nama could be saved or he simply didn’t care. The Colonial 
Government most definitely didn’t care. In a telegram to Müller, he was told that his 
request for labour could not be met but that he should attempt a “more thorough 
exploitation of the Nama labour force.”201 In other words, the Government thought it 
a good idea to ‘flog’ the proverbial ‘dead horse’. 
At the end of January 1907, the Nama workforce had been further diminished. In 
the Annual Repor for 1906/07, Müller’s harbour works were described as having 
been abandoned by mid-January due to death and disease, which had reduced the 
number of Arbeitsfähige Nama to around 20 – bearing in mind that in end-
September 1906 more than 2000 Nama had arrived on Shark Island.202 In Müller’s 
report, it was simply noted that only 20 Nama were still able to work, and that these 
were claimed by the military administration for urgent tasks. On January 30, 1907 
the project had officially been termintated. The works diary read: 
“January 30. Wednesday morning. Handed over the tools still on Shark Island to technician 
Heintz of the Railway District”.203  
     For obvious reasons the military suspended the use of Nama prisoners at the 
same time as the harbour project was abandoned. Head of the Lüderitz Etappen-
kommado, von Zülow, told Müller that the prisoners would be allowed to rest until 
April, when they would once again be set at the disposal of the Local Government. 
In the meantime they were to do only light work for the Etappenkommando.204 Even 
though as good as all Nama prisoners in Lüderitz had already succumbed to the 
effects of internment and forced labour on the island, there would be only limited 
respite for survivors. Instead of caring for the exhausted Nama prisoners, von Zülow 
evidently still expected the remaining 20 Arbeitsfähige to do light work for the  
 
                                                 
200  HBS 52, Dec. 24, 1906. 
201  HBS 52, Report, November 30, 1906. 
202 ZBU 1452, A. VI.a.3, p. 220. 
203 HBS 52, January 30, 1907. 
204  HBS 52, January 26, 1907. 
 
 
  119 
Private labour 
 
 
 
Although the use of prisoners by companies such as Woermann had been common practise since the war 
began, it only became official policy in March 1905 when Government specified rules and regulations for the 
provision of prisoners to private individuals. Most prisoners were used on government-sponsored projects, but 
the new regulations also paved the way for a moneymaking enterprise that would earn considerable amounts 
of revenue for the colony. Government could in future rent out prisoner to farmers, private businesses, large 
companies, and individual settlers. In exchange for labour, Government expected a monthly payment of 10 
German Marks for every prisoner, whether man, woman or child. This rental fee was sent directly to state 
coffers, essentially amounting to a sizeable source of income. The collection of revenue on use of prisoners 
was dubbed ‘Head Tax’ [Kopfsteuer]. 
In the image above, captioned “It’s going to be her”, a German soldier is seen pointing his stick at a 
woman, while a settler lady takes down his choice in her ledger. The picture illustrates a human trade 
tantamount to slavery that resulted from the 1905 government regulations. Von Düring took this haunting 
picture on his trip through southern GSWA. Apart from obvious sexual undertones, the image clearly 
celebrated the theme of slavery.  
Following the war, the trade in human labour continued unabated, and although the prisoner-of-war 
status was formally revoked on April 1, 1908, Herero, Nama and San still found themselves in the hands of 
the former enemy, building up the colony.  
 
 
Source: ZBU 456, D.IV.l.3, Vol. 6, pp.34-194; Photo SCL PA08 no. 048 
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military. One suspects that forced labour would continue to be implemented until the 
able-bodied shared the fate of those already dead or dying. A contemporary had the 
same suspicion and noted in an internal British embassy report that: 
“The Hottentots [Nama] are poor labourers, though troublesome guerrilla warriors, and I think 
that there is a general hope that they will soon die out.”205 
 
Death Island 
Although the main reasons for sending prisoners to Lüderitz was to prevent their 
escape and to provide labour for the construction of local infrastructure, there was  
also a more sinister reason behind the banishment of Nama to Lüderitz. As expressly 
stated by Governor Lindequist, there was a calculated hope that the prisoners would 
die out and thereby reduce the cost of a potential, future deportation:  
“Since the Hottentots are at present safely confined to Shark Island where they are performing 
very useful work, I feel that their deportation may still be postponed somewhat. Perhaps one 
should wait and see first how the situation will develop and whether the numbers to be deported 
might be reduced so as to cut down the cost incurred.”206 
There seemed to be no illusions as to what incarceration on Shark Island entailed 
for prisoners. The fact that Herero prisoners had died in droves at the island 
throughout 1905 and 1906, as witnessed by Kariko and others, meant that Linde-
quist’s government was well aware of the death warrant it had signed for the Nama 
prisoners. There was a reason the small, barren outcrop was called ‘Death Island’.207 
Lindequist was not ignorant about conditions in the main Lüderitz concentration 
camp, seeing as he had visited Shark Island shortly after the southerners first arrived 
there. Following a short conference with headmen from the Nama communities, he 
deduced that “the prisoners were as a whole content with the their treatment and 
rations”.208 However, Lindequist’s positive memory of the camp was recounted in a 
1908 report to the Reichstag about the treatment of POWs on Shark Island. 
Considering that Lindequist was overall responsible for the plight of the Nama, his 
testimony was perhaps not entirely credible. It was, in fact, one of very few accounts 
that described conditions in a favourable light. Colonial Director Dernburg, who 
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visited the camp only in mid 1908, after the camp had been closed, was more direct 
in his description, stating:  
“Sure, Shark Island was no paradise; a prison camp shouldn’t be [paradise]. But, it was 
adequately equipped for prisoners.”209  
Shark Island was no paradise; it was rather the opposite. Conditions on the Island 
and the consequences these had on prisoners left a lasting impression on many sol-
diers entering or departing from the colony. This is evident in a number of literary 
references to Shark Island, particularly in Schutztruppe diaries published following 
the war.210 These references all took a very similar form, explaining who was on the 
island and the misery they suffered. A good example is Schutztruppe officer Mohr, 
who wrote: 
“On the south-western side of the island there was a camp of up to 3000 Hottentot prisoners. 
This part of the camp was separated from the rest by a barbed wire fence and was also guarded. 
Apart from the few fires and the huddled groups around it, one could not see much from the 
camp. The cold nights and probably also the misery of their fate, as well as outbreak of disease 
resulted in the poor souls dying in large numbers.”211  
These later-day references did little in the way of improving the plight of pri-
soners. Biographies and memoirs of the colonial troops would typically only be 
published after 1908, when the Herero and Nama wars were officially over. By that 
time, most prisoners on Shark Island would already have died. The same retrospect-
tive testament to Shark Island was found in the British Blue Book on ‘The Natives 
of South-West Africa and Their Treatment by Germany’. Yet contrary to the Schutz-
truppe sources, the Blue Book offered a perspective on Shark Island that had not 
been heard before, namely that of people who had actually been in the concentration 
camp.  
It has already been discussed here how some of the Blue Book testimonies gave 
evidence that at times conflicted with existing knowledge about Shark Island and the 
people interned there. One of the more dubious accounts was given by Edward 
Fredericks, described as “the son of the old Chief Joseph Fredericks and a present 
Headman of the Bethany Hottentots”.212 He ostensibly stated that: 
“In 1906 the Germans took me a prisoner after we had made peace, and sent me with about a 
thousand other Hottentots to Aus, thence to Lüderitzbucht, and finally to Shark Island. We were 
placed on the island, men, women, and children. We were beaten daily by the Germans, who 
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used sjamboks. They were most cruel to us. We lived in tents on the island; food, blankets, and 
lashes were given to us in plenty, and the young girls were violated at night by the guards. Six 
months later we went by boat to Swakopmund, and thence by train to Karibib. Lots of my people 
died on Shark Island. I put in a list of those who died. (Note.- This list comprises 168 males, 
including the Chief, Cornelius Fredericks, 97 females, 66 children, and also 18 Bushwomen 
[sic.] and children) … but it is not complete. I gave up compiling it, as I was afraid we were all 
going to die. We remained at Karibib six months, and were returned to Shark Island for a further 
six months, when we were again removed by sea to Karibib and thence to Okawayo, where we 
remained till 1915, when the British sent us back by train to Bethany. We had to work for the 
troops and received wages and a good deal of lashes with sjamboks. I received 10s per month, 
and later 20s per month for a year, but this only commenced in 1911. Lots of my people died in 
Damaraland…”213 
Edward Fredericks’ confused narrative of goings and comings is at odds with 
existing knowledge about the camp. For example, the research for this thesis has not 
turned up any records showing that the Bethanies returned to Shark Island for a 
further six months after leaving Lüderitz in 1907. This did in all probability not 
happen. In light of the criticism levelled against the Blue Book, inconsistencies such 
as Fredericks’ inverted narrative hardly serve to prove the validity of statements held 
in the book. On the other hand, however, any disparity between an event and its 
historiography, could just as well relate to the former as to the latter, i.e. just because 
something is not known or written about, this does not mean that it did not happen. 
It has been seen here that what was initially perceived to be untrue in Samuel 
Kariko’s account, proved to be a very credible description of events when new 
evidence was presented that supported the stated narrative.  
Keeping the Kariko example in mind, Edward Fredericks’ statement generally 
correlates with other verifiable facts and events to a surprising extent. First of all, 
different sources agree that, much like Kariko, Edward Fredericks did indeed go to 
Shark Island.214 In his testimony, Fredericks also said that prisoners were sent to 
Okawayo, close to Karibib, following their incarceration on Shark Island; this also 
did happen.215  
A very specific piece of evidence is Edward Fredericks’ claim that from 1911 
onwards, work performed in Okawayo was remunerated at the rate of 10 shillings 
per month, and later 20 shillings.216 The same amounts were mentioned in a report 
from Bethanie Magistrate Owens in 1922, which was presumably based on local 
information readily at hand.217 It could, of course, be that the Magistrate Owens had 
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received his information directly from the Blue Book, although his report also 
contained descriptions and information about Okawayo (it was a military horse 
depot) not contained in Major O’Reilly’s Blue Book. More convincingly, however, 
is the fact that German records also support Fredericks’ statement about these 
payments. In mid 1910 Major Haydebruch asked Government for clarification on 
whether to start paying the Witboois and Bethanies at Okawayo for their labour. 218 
This would indicate that the prisoners at Okawayo had not been paid up until that 
point. These almost random pieces of information are therefore consistent with other 
information about the Nama and Okawayo, adding at least some credence to the 
Blue Book statement. 
Looking at the more contentious aspect of Fredericks’ statement, i.e. the return to 
Shark Island, it should be considered that Fredericks did not speak English and that 
the statement would have been translated. The language and wording applied were 
therefore not Fredericks’, but those of an unknown interpreter and the author of the 
Blue Book, Major O’Reilly. It is entirely possible that either (or both) the interpreter 
and/or O’Reilly misrepresented Fredericks’ narrative. It should also be considered 
that Fredericks’ narrative is very similar to events already described here, even 
though the chronology is slightly different. 
In the discussion about Kariko’s sworn statement to the Blue Book it was shown 
that a group of Bethanies were indeed sent to Shark Island in 1905,219 a period 
known for its brutality and abuse of prisoners. It is also true that in mid 1906, 
Cornelius Fredericks and his group of Bethanies were sent via Aus to Lüderitz and 
from there to Karibib, as stated by Edward Fredericks. In all probability the group of 
Bethanies already sitting on Shark Island at that time would have accompanied the 
larger group going to Karibib. After approximately six months, the Bethanies were 
sent back to Lüderitz where the majority would die in the subsequent six months. 
After Shark Island, all the Nama communities on the island, or what was left of 
them, were sent to the Burenkamp in Lüderitz for five months and eventually from 
there to Okawayo horse depot near Karibib. As also reflected in Fredericks’ state-
ment, the surviving Nama staid at Okawayo until the British troops arrived in 
1915.220  
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Photo 2.19  Retouched photo of Nama prisoners on Shark Island; probably one of the first  
 groups arriving in late 1906. The topography matches Laaf’s map, showing the  
 Nama camp on the middle of the island. In the background are seen shelters  
 and the entrance to the Nama camp. The beacon on top of the island would  
 have had an eerie watchtower-like effect in the camp. 
 
Silvester and Gewald have stated that although the Blue Book was propaganda, 
this did not necessarily mean that information contained in it, and here especially the 
sworn statements, were untrue.221 The Blue Book was written in only two months, 
which is a very short time to ‘fabricate’ very precise information about real events 
and real people, thirteen years after the event. In view of O’Reilly’s time constraints 
it would have been much easier to actually take statements about events than to 
construct or fabricate evidence, which could effortlessly be denied by Germany. In 
fact, Germany never denied the Blue Book claims.222  
Information in Blue Book statements corresponded closely with information in 
German and British sources from the time. Consequently it would be fair to consider 
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the Blue Book statements both plausible and credible, in spite of the document’s use 
as post-World War I propaganda. 
Edward Fredericks’ and Samuel Kariko’s evidence about mortality on Shark 
Island, as presented in the Blue Book, was certainly not exaggerated. In the Colonial 
Government’s secret files on the Witbooi community there are copies of letters sent 
by Lüderitz missionary Laaf and Keetmanshoop missionary Fenchel. The letters had 
been sent to the Rhenish Mission Society headquarters in Germany from where they 
were taken to the Colonial Department in Berlin and presented to officials.223 The re-
typed copy, which was sent back to the colony as proof of claims made by the 
mission, was marked: Top Secret. One can speculate as to whether this label was 
applied because of the truths about Shark Island contained in the letters. On October 
6, 1906 Laaf wrote: 
“Large numbers of the people are sick, mostly from scurvy, and every week around 15 to 20 
[people] die … of the Herero just as many are dying, so that a weekly average of 50 is 
counted.”224 
The same ‘Top Secret’ file also contained a letter from Laaf, dated two months later. 
He wrote: 
“The dying among the Nama is frighteningly high. There are often days where as many as 18 
people die. Today Samuel Izaak (Sic.) told Brother Nyhof225: “The community is doomed” [Dat 
Volk is Gedaan]. If it continues like this, it will not be long before the entire people has 
completely died out.”226 
Laaf and Samuel Isaak’s ominous predictions were to prove correct. In spite of 
repeated petitioning of the colonial and military administrations by the missionaries, 
Nama prisoners were not moved from Shark Island, with disastrous consequences. 
By March 1907, 1203 Nama prisoners had died on the island, of these 460 were 
women and 274 were children.227 In the month of December 1906 alone, 263 
prisoners died, which was an average of 8,5 per day – this number did not include 
the Herero prisoners kept on the island, who Laaf claimed to have died in similar 
numbers, although the few existing statistics do not support this claim.228 Of the 
people still alive, the following breakdown was provided:229 
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 Men Women Children Total 
Witbooi 82 160 83 325 
Bethanie 69 119 60 248 
Total 151 279 143 573 
 
 
Furthermore, out of the 573 survivors, 123 were deemed to be so ill that they 
would most likely die in the near future and an additional 100 described as sick yet 
believed able to survive. If the German statistics were correct (one would only 
assume them to be on the conservative side if incorrect), there were only 450 
survivors in March 1907out of a total of more than 2000 Nama prisoners.230  
A general lack of nutrition was one of many factors that resulted in high 
mortality on the island. Provisions given to the prisoners consisted largely of rice, 
which was a foodstuff most were unaccustomed to and did not know how to prepare 
– provided they had pots or even firewood (not many trees in Lüderitz). Coupled 
with insufficient shelter from the cold ocean climes, the lack of proper nutrition gave 
prisoners few chances to build up their resistance to diseases. The lack of nutrition 
was illustrated in an appeal from Witbooi under-Kaptein, Samuel Isaak to the 
missionaries, emphasising the need for proper food.231 Samuel Isaak remarked that in 
order to survive, the prisoners had been forced to eat all the mussels and other sea-
life (presumably anything edible) found on the island. Since all marine nutrients had 
now been eaten, the situation was becoming even more desperate.232 It should also be 
added that most Witboois in 1906-7 would never have been at the sea and that none 
of them would ever before have eaten mussels, seaweed or the like.  
One of the island’s many casualties was Bethanie Kaptein Cornelius Fredericks, 
who had been regarded by German troops as a Gentleman of war. A telegram to the 
Colonial Government from Colonel von Deimling, coldly noted Cornelius’ passing 
on February 16, 1907.233 When Cornelius died he left behind his wife to endure 
Shark Island on her own.234 His cousin Paul Fredericks, who staid loyal to the 
Germans, had died about two months earlier on December 21st, 1906 in Bethanie.235 
And, on June 4, 1907, four months after Cornelius’ passing, Paul Fredericks’ 
brother, Lazarus Fredericks, also died in Lüderitz.236 In a matter of six month, 
                                                 
230  ZBU 2369, Witbooi Geheimakten, p. 116. 
231  RMS, V.16, pp. 1 –31, Chronicle for Lüderitzbucht. 
232  RMS, V.16, pp. 1 –31, Chronicle for Lüderitzbucht. 
233  ZBU 465, D.IV.M.3, Vol. 2, p. 211 (February 19, 1907). 
234  Patemann, p. 122. 
235  Missions-Berichte, 1907, p. 43. 
236  ZBU 2369, Witbooi geheimakten, p. 124 (June 5, 1907). 
 
 
  127 
therefore, an entire generation of Bethanie leaders had perished as a result of the 
Nama -German War and its aftermath.  
The German non-commissioned officer Mohr was in Lüderitz on February 16, 
1907, the day Cornelius Frederick’s died. His eye-witness account is the only evi-
dence that Cornelius was actually given a proper funeral. He wrote: 
“On February 16, we saw the burial of the deceased Hottentot Kaptein Cornelius Fredericks. In 
captivity he soon faded away and was now buried with a substantial funeral procession.”237  
 
 
 
Photo 2.20   German postcard depicting funeral 
 
 
Sources describing funerals of prisoners relate very unceremonious events of 
bodies being carried on makeshift stretchers and thrown into shallow graves.238 One 
source even described bodies being buried in sand on the beach, later to be washed 
out to sea when the tide came in.239 Today there is no memory or any markers of the 
thousands of prisoners who died in Lüderitz’s concentration camps, their remains 
forgotten like their history. It is therefore not sure where prisoners were buried. 
Missionary Laaf referred to burials taking place in the Burenkamp, but did not 
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specify whether these were prisoners’ funerals.240 Nevertheless, in accordance with 
Mohr’s diary, we know that there must have been at least one prisoner grave in 
Lüderitz, namely that of Kaptein Cornelius Fredericks. It must moreover be assumed 
that the remains of Fredericks still lie buried somewhere in the coastal town.  
A possible cluse about this funeral is a postcard (photo 2.20) from the German 
colonial period that is captioned: “At the burial of a heathen native”. The hard, rocky 
landscape on the picture hints that the image could well have been taken in Lüderitz, 
which has a very similar topography. The people in the image were clearly Nama, a 
fact further underlined by the cloth worn around the pallbearers’ hats.241 Such 
insignia typically related to southern communities such as the Witboois, who wore 
white armbands or bandannas around their hats. Moreover, uniforms worn in the 
photo look very similar to those worn by Nama on Shark Island, as seen in Figure 41 
above. The fact that the depicted body was carried on a piece of corrugated iron, 
further hints that this might have been a picture of a Shark Island funeral,because 
this would not have been done unless circumstances rendered a more dignified 
transportation of the body impossible. It is therefore entirely likely that the above 
postcard actually depicts Cornelius Fredericks’ Funeral or that of another Shark 
Island prisoner. 
     Approximately two months after Cornelius’ passing, the Shark Island concen-
tration camp was finally closed down. Ironically, the same person, who had facili-
tated the Witboois’ surrender in late 1905, was now responsible for closing down 
Shark Island. In early 1907, Major Ludwig von Estorff, who had originally signed 
the peace treaty with the Witbooi and who had promised them fair treatment, was 
named new commander-in-chief of the Schutztruppe. While escorting Governor 
Lindequist to Lüderitz, Estorff had for the first time witnessed the actual situation on 
Shark Island.242 As a result, after weeks of negotiation with the Colonial Department 
in Berlin, Estorff finally ordered ‘Death Island’ closed.243 The few survivors were 
transferred to the open area below Radford Bay in Lüderitz, the so-called Buren-
kamp. After relocating to the Burenkamp, mortality figures eventually dropped, 
although they were still relatively high. In the course of July, August and September, 
46 Nama died in the Burenkamp, which at that time still accounted for between 10-
20% of the entire Nama prisoner population in Lüderitz.244 
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Samuel Isaak to Kaptein Johannes Christian 
 Lüderitzbucht, June 18, 1907 
 
I write to you to let you know that I am still alive, although I am not able to walk, but I hope that I 
soon will be. 
The teacher Nyhof will tell you all about the conditions here, because he has lived through 
everything here with us in the time of dying. My God, how he helped us … we were always happy 
with him, but now he is going to Warmbad to you. That is why I got the idea of writing this letter. 
My dear old Kaptein, I would like for you to inform me about Joseph Thimotaus Frederiks. 
Where is he? His daughter Martha Elisabeth would like to know and she thought it a good 
opportunity to ask the teacher [Nyhof] through me.  
I hereby finish this letter with heartfelt greetings, 
 
I am 
Samuel Isaak,  
Kapitein 
 
 
Samuel Isaak under healthier circumstances 
Source: ZBU 2369, Witbooi Geheimakten, pp. 131-132; Photo: NAN 1876. 
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     From the Burenkamp the survivors were eventually sent back into the hinterland. 
The main group of Witbooi and Bethanie were transported to Swakopmund on 
September 23, 1907, having spent an additional five months in Lüderitz since being 
taken off the island. In all the Nama prisoners had spent little over a year in Lüderitz 
and were nearly exterminated as a result. One of the Nama who survive both Shark 
Island and the Burenkamp was the Witbooi leader Samuel Isaak. He was sent to the 
military horse depot in Okawayo245 with other Witboois and Bethanies, among them 
his son Fritz Isaak, who was later interviewed for the Blue Book.246 Samuel Isaak 
would never again leave Okawayo, as he died while still a German prisoner-of-war 
in June 1915.247 Tragically his passing came only one month before British Union 
troops took over the colony. Under British military administration the colony’s last 
prisoners-of-war were finally allowed to return home, where they would find out if 
their families had survived the last decade of German colonial rule. At the end of 
February 1916 Edward Fredericks returned to Bethanie, where he was ‘allocated’ 
the chieftaincy by the British and instated in the presence of his community on 
March 26, 1916.248  
A fitting summary of the Nama prisoner’s plight was inadvertently given by the 
British Military Attaché to GSWA, Colonel Trench in 1906. He wrote:  
“The Witboois were promised their freedom, when they surrendered, and (as I reported at the 
time from Windhuk) this was explained to the Home Authorities as meaning only freedom to 
build their shelters as they liked, but not where they liked – still less to dispose as they liked of 
their time and persons. [Sic.] From the south they were moved to Windhuk, etc, after six months 
– several of them having run away – they were moved to Shark Island at Lüderitz bay. I have 
already – from Lüderitz Bay – reported on the exposure and lack of sanitation obtaining here; if 
they [the Witboois] still exist, it is not easy to avoid the impression that the extinction of the 
tribe would be welcomed by the authorities. The hardness of their fate (anglice, harshness of 
their treatment) excited even the sympathy of two officers who had known them, and who 
reminded me that they had never murdered or ill-treated civilians or prisoners, but wager war 
without cruelty…”.249 
Overall the Witbooi, Bethanie and Veldschoendragers communities were not 
only decimated but also almost entirely annihilated as a result of the concentration 
camps. Apart from the between 1500 and 1900250 (Estorff’s estimate) Nama that died 
on Shark Island, a further 517 Witboois had died between the time they left Gibeon 
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246  ZBU 2369, Witbooi Geheimakten, pp. 82-83. 
247  NAW 43. 
248  NAN, Accession 08, Book 1, p. 6 (March 26, 1916). 
249  KAB, PMO 227 –35/07, Col. F. Trench to British Embassy, Berlin, 21st November, 1906. 
250  ZBU 2369, Witbooi Geheimakten, pp. 152b-153. 
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in early 1906 and when they arrive in Luderitz in mid September, 1906.251 It is 
highly probable that the same happened to the Veldschoendragers and Bethanie 
communities. Accordingly, at least 2000 Nama died in little over a year whilst in the 
hands of the German Colonial and Military Administrations.  
It was estimated before the War that the entire Nama population, including 
communities such as the Bondelswartz and the Berseba community, tallied about 
20,000.252 The Nama population was therefore decimated, in the true sense of the 
word, solely as a result of deaths among Witboois, Bethanies and Veldschoen-
dragers, in a one-year period. Although deaths were drastically reduced after the 
closing of Shark Island Camp, many more also died in the Burenkamp and in 
Okawayo.253 If the German and/or Colonial Governments had intended to kill off the 
Nama people, as Colonel Trench suggested was the case, the numbers show that the 
objective was being achievied. Major von Estorff made a similar point when he 
informed the Colonial Government that only one single Feldshoendrager had 
survived the concentration camps, leaving them virtually exterminated as a people.254 
Kaptein Hendrik Witbooi’s words in July 1905, as already cited, were almost 
prophetic. He wrote:  
“… all I see in your peace is the extermination of all of us and our people.”255 
 
The numbers 
In mid 1907, the Lüderitz District Commissioner, Böhmer, sent central administra-
tion in Windhoek an official statistics on mortality among POWs in the Lüderitz 
District between April 1906 and March 1907. According to the statistic, which 
included Herero on the railroad as well as Nama on Shark Island, a total of 2,219 
POW fatalities were reported during this period.256 However, the figure did not 
accurately describe the total number of deaths resulting from incarceration and 
forced labour in Lüderitz during the Herero and Nama wars. The real number would 
invariably have been much higher.  
For example, in September 1907 Böhmer received a revised mortality statistic 
from the railways which claimed that as many as 1359 Herero prisoners died 
                                                 
251  ZBU 2369, Witbooi Geheimakten, p. 103. 
252  Drechlser, p. 181. 
253  A tally of Nama prisoners-of-war in 1909, a term referring to the former Shark Island prisoners now held 
in Okawayo, counted among the Witboois: 39 men, 65 women and 52 children , i.e. a total of 156 people, 
and a further 92 Bethanies. All together: 248 people. ZBU 465, D.IV.m.3, pp. 147a-b. 
254  ZBU 2369, Witbooi Geheimakten, pp. 152-153. 
255  BKE 305, G.A. 10/2, Witbooi to Schmidt, July 27, 1905, p 79. 
256  ZBU 456, D IV, l.3. Vol 5. p. 134 
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between January 06 and June 07.257 According to these figures, 67,48% of prisoners 
working on the line in that period, died as a result.258 The revised figure also had a 
much higher death toll than Böhmer’s original statistic, counting as many as 1190 
Herero deaths on the line between March 06 and April 07. There were therefore 
more POW casualties in Lüderitz than Böhmer’s original ‘official’ numbers indi-
cated.  
It was not only the railway mortality numbers that were wrong. Böhmer’s num-
bers for Nama deaths on Shark Island were equally skew. From end October 1907, 
when the last contingent of prisoners arrived in Lüderitz, there had been in advance 
of 2000 Nama prisoners on Shark Island.259 Moreover, according to Böhmer’s own 
records there were only around 450 survivors in April 1907.260 Relying on these 
figures alone, there would in fact have been as many as 1550 Nama deaths between 
September 06 and April 07, notwithstanding the fact that Head of the Schutztruppe, 
Major von Estorff, in late October 29, 1907 claimed that more than 1900 Nama had 
died on Shark Island.261  
When the revised figures for Nama deaths and railway mortalities are added, it is 
evident that Böhmer’s original numbers were far from accurate. There were, at least, 
1550 Nama deaths in Lüderitz and as many as 1190 railway mortalities between 
March 06 and April 07, which comes to a total of 2740 prisoners dying in Lüderitz 
District in this period. A further 167 Hereros died on the railroad in May and June 
1907, thereby bringing the total to 2907 dead prisoners in Lüderitz.262 
However, this number can also not possibly be an accurate description of total 
mortality among prisoner-of-war in Lüderitz, because there are a number of other 
factors that have not yet been considered. For example, the official mortality count 
only began in April 1906, whereas the camp had been in existence since early 1905 
at the latest. In fact, there had been more than a thousand Herero prisoners on the 
island in the 15 months preceding Böhmer’s official death-count, and fatalities 
among these prisoners were not included in his statistic.  
According to the transport riders cited in the Cape Argus, 1905 was a time with 
rampant mortality rates in Lüderitz. The doctor on Shark Island, Bofinger, also 
emphasised that there had initially been a very high death rate among Herero 
                                                 
257  ZBU 456, D IV, l.3. Vol. 5, p. 135. 
258  ZBU 456, D IV, l.3. Vol. 5, p. 170. 
259  Rounded down from a higher estimate of around 2200 Nama prisoner. 
260  ZBU 2369, Witbooi Geheimakten, pp. 116-118. 
261  ZBU 2369, Witbooi Geheimakten, pp. 152-153. 
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prisoners on the island.263 The same information was shared between missionaries 
Vedder and Kuhlmann, who in their correspondence from early 1905 wrote about 
‘incredibly high’ mortalities in Lüderitz.264 When Missionary Kuhlmann, later visited 
Shark Island in September 05, he described a group of 487 Herero imprisoned on the 
island who were in a sad state.265 It is not possible to put exact figures on mortality 
between early 1905 and mid 1906, but judging from Vedder’s knowledge that 191 
prisoners had died by May 1905, fatalities must have been in the high hundreds at 
best. 
Other factors not properly accounted for by Böhmer were the Hereros still on 
shark Island during 1906 as well as the Nama, who were in Lüderitz sometime 
during 1905, as seen in Edward Frederick’s and Samuel Kariko’s respective testimo-
nies. It should also not be forgotten that whereas Böhmer’s statistic was compiled in 
April 1907, Nama and Herero prisoners would continue to suffer causalities in 
Lüderitz beyond this date. In fact, Herero prisoners would remain on the railroad 
until mid 1908 and although Nama prisoners were eventually shipped out of 
Lüderitz, hundreds more Herero prisoner would continue to arrive in the town.266 In 
January 1908, therefore, there were 1122 Herero prisoners in the Lüderitz district.267 
Mortality was also still quite high, with 80 Herero prisoner dying between July and 
September 1907.268 
In summation, the total number of prisoners dying in Lüderitz between 1905 and 
1908 must necessarily have been well in advance of 3000 people and could even be 
as high as 4000. In comparison, the entire German population of Lüderitz in January 
1907 totalled 979 people (children included).269 
Mortality percentages on the railway were in the high 60s and an estimated 
mortality rate of around 70 percent for Nama prisoners on Shark Island would 
probably even be moderate. It would therefore not be an overstatement to say that 
the vast majority of people, who were sent to Lüderitz as prisoners-of-war, died as a 
result. 
                                                 
263  Bofinger, p. 576. 
264  RMS Correspondence VII 31.1, Swakopmund, Eich to Vedder, June 14, 1905. 
265  Missions-Berichte, 1905, p. 130. 
266  “… on the 5th of July, (1907) around 200 Herero prisoners came to Luderitzbucht.”, NAN, Accession 460, 
“Twelve Years in South West Africa 1907 – 1919: Recollections of the Writer”. 
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Concentration camp causalities 
In spite of the high mortalities among prisoners in Lüderitz there have been apolo-
getic voices raised about the fact that many German troops were dying from diseases 
such as typhoid, thereby implicitly suggesting that mortality in the camps were a 
result of a general epidemic rather than German neglect and/or maltreatment.270 This 
argument is not new as in fact, most official contemporary references to the Lüderitz 
mortality figures described outbreak of disease such as typhoid, syphilis or scurvy as 
the main cause of death on shark Island.271 
 
 
 
Photo 2.21   POW burial in Swakopmund. Possibly missionary vedder on horse 
 
 
In 1910, the former Shark Island doctor, Bofinger, similarly charged that the 
concentration camp prisoners were responsible for their own demise. In the doctor’s 
narrative, prisoners fell victim to their own supposedly inherent lack of personal 
hygiene, which resulted in massive spread of diseases.272 This generalised notion did 
not at any level engage with the regime of violence and general maltreatment so 
liberally meted out to prisoners. Neither did the doctor’s argument deal with the fact 
that minimal rations and general conditions in the camp, including a lack of sanitary  
  
                                                 
270  Lau: 1995, p. 48. 
271  For example: ZBU 154, A. VI. a.3. Annual Report for Lüderitz District 1906, pp. 211–212. 
272  Bofinger, p. 575. 
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A final resting place 
 
 
Above is seen an aerial photo of the Swakopmund concentration camp cemetery, ‘where hundreds were 
buried like cattle’ to paraphrase Missionary Vedder. Hundreds turned into over a thousand dead prisoners 
whose graves are the only existing testament to their existence. Disturbingly, however, the site has not been 
officially recognised, and is still used as a playground for local dune buggy enthusiasts. Standing at the site it 
is difficult to see the thousands of little mounds, worn by time and elements, but this photo clearly shows row 
upon row of human graves. 
Less than a century ago, more than 3000 people died in the Lüderitz District, and most of those in Lüderitz 
town itself. Where did a small locality like Lüderitz with a white population of around 1000 people put more 
than 3000 bodies of dead prisoners? It would be incredible if in the last 100 years, no one ever came across 
the remains of buried prisoners or perhaps built on such sites in an expanding town. A mass grave was 
recently discovered behind the hills of Lüderitz. Since its discovery the Namibian Police has declared the site 
a no-go-zone. Nonetheless, pictures exist of the site, showing hundreds of bones scattered among the dunes. 
The former State Archaeologist, who visited the site, has said that the people buried here were most likely of 
Khoi origin, i.e. Nama. According to the curator of the Lutheran mission archives in Namibia, Pastor Pauli, 
who himself lived for many years in Lüderitz, it was well-known in the small town that these bones are the 
remains of those who fell victim to Shark Island’s concentration camp. 
 
 
Photos courtesy of Jeff Barbee and Jeff Gaydish. 
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facilities or appropriate medical assistance, were main factors in the spread of 
disease and the resulting mass deaths in the camp. In effect the argument conve-
niently exonerated the German authorities as well as the doctor himself of any com-
plicity or responsibility for these deaths.  
Nonetheless, it is still worthwhile to examine whether the high number of deaths 
on Shark Island were in some way related to a general epidemic in the colony as 
suggested by genocide sceptic Brigitte Lau, who held that the Germany army was 
also struck by disease during 1904-08.273 To accurately establish whether a general 
epidemic was responsible for the mass deaths among prisoners, it must first be seen 
how disease among prisoners compared to deaths in the Lüderitz district. 
Prisoners are known to have been working in town, on the rails and in the 
harbour. Women from the camp were also forced into prostitution and raped by 
soldiers who had access to the prisoners. There was therefore a fair amount of 
contact between prisoners and the white population, and if it is supposed that an 
epidemic killed close to 70% of all Nama prisoners on the island, how then did 
white deaths compare? Based on Böhmer’s inaccurate official statistic on prisoner 
deaths in Lüderitz274 (cited above), showing too few deaths,275 and the Lüderitz 
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annual report276 showing white deaths, the following comparison on mortality in 
1906 was made. 
According to Böhmer there were ‘only’ 66 White deaths in the entire year of 
1906, and of these 31 were attributed to typhoid. Even when the ratio difference 
between the white population and the prisoner population is evened out, there is still 
no comparison to be made. The 31 typhoid deaths amount to approximately 3 per-
cent of Lüderitz’s white population, which hardly compares to a mortality of 33 
percent among Nama prisoners on shark Island in the course of only 3½ months. It 
should also be considered that the Shark Island and Railway mortality figures used 
here are far too low.277  
The different mortality rates become even more polarised when deaths are 
described as a monthly figure. Accordingly, an average of 187.4 Nama died monthly 
between mid-September and end December, compared to a monthly average of 5.5 
Luderitz ‘whites’ based on deaths in the entire year. As seen below, not even railway 
prisoners, forced to construct a track through harsh desert landscapes, died at a rate 
comparable to Shark Island Nama. 
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Incidentally, the fact that an average of 2.6 white people died of typhoid in 
Lüderitz every month, resulted in the adoption of very strict measures by the District 
Commissioner Böhmer’s office to combat the disease. On February 1, 1907 
                                                 
 
275  The real number of Shark Island and railway deaths were, as already described, much higher than official 
figures. These are nevertheless applied here for the sake of argument. 
276  ZBU 154, A.VI.a.3. p. 209. 
277  There were more than 1000 white people in the town, not counting the high number of soldiers coming 
and going. There were more than 2000 Nama. 
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Boehmer issued an order [verordnung] about the “fight against typhoid and other 
infectious diseases”.278 Accordingly it would in future be punishable by law not to 
report typhoid related deaths, not to keep streets clean and not to provide roofed 
shelter and sanitary facilities for ‘natives’ in domestic service.  
Apart from the revelation that a number of African deaths seem to have gone 
unreported (considering that meticulous records were kept on white deaths) and that 
prisoners ‘employed’ by Lüderitz residents where in some cases forced to live 
without shelter or sanitary facilities, there was no mention nor measures in the order 
that dealt with the two concentration camps and their fading populations. Indeed the 
only parts of the order that was directed at Africans, specified that any ‘native’ 
found relieving him or herself outside of designated facilities, i.e. toilets, would be 
liable to receive 6 months hard labour and/or corporal punishment. 279 The ‘natives’ 
referred to here must therefore inevitably have excluded the concentration camp 
prisoners, seeing as these were already subjected to forced labour, corporal 
punishment and imprisonment (without toilet facilities, one might add). 
Consequently it is evident that although efforts were being made to halt the 
spread of disease in Lüderitz town, no such provisions were made for prisoners on 
the island, who were simply allowed to continue dying.  
Below is a statistic of all registered deaths in Lüderitz between May and Decem-
ber 1906, that makes it abundantly clear that white and African mortality in the 
Lüderitz district were in no way comparable. The graphic gives a basic understand-
ing of general mortality trends in the coastal town by specifically comparing pri-
soner mortality with white mortality. The difference is pronounced, and again it 
should be remembered that the numbers used here for African mortality are much to 
low.280  
Total prisoner deaths were dramatically higher than white population deaths and 
totally disproportionate to white typhoid deaths, rendering the argument of a random 
typhoid epidemic wide of the mark. In fact, it would seem more logical that factors 
such as housing, nutrition, variation of food, confinement, concentration, exposure 
to forced labour, physical and psychological effects of violence, sanitary facilities 
and protection from climatic conditions would have been underlying reasons for the 
incomparable mortality rates in the relatively small locality.  
The below graph also clearly shows the almost exponential increase in total 
prisoner deaths following the arrival of Nama prisoners on the island. There is no 
                                                 
278  ZBU 154, A.VI.a.3 Vol 15, p. 252, “Order on the fight against typhoid and other infectious diseases”. 
279  ZBU 154, A.VI.a.3, p.252 “Order on the fight against typhoid and other infectious diseases”. 
280  The numbers used here all relate to official German statistics. ZBU 456, D IV, l.3. Vol 5, p. 135 , 170; 
ZBU 154, A.VI.a.3. p. 209. 
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doubt that the island had a severe impact on overall prisoner mortality. No com-
prehensive figures are available for Herero mortality on the island, and the low death 
rate recorded in the above graph should be seen in this light. Indeed, the numbers are 
from Böhmer’s official figures that are both inconsistent and implausible. Death 
rates on the railroad testify that imprisonment in Lüderitz district had deadly conse-
quences for the vast majority of people sent there. Moreover, confinement on Shark 
Island also resulted in soaring mortality rates for the Herero who sat on the island 
from early 1905, because, truth be told, Shark Island was not in any way conducive 
for the survival of concentration camp prisoners. 
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Anatomy of evil  
Although there can be little doubt that disease was a major killer on Shark Island, 
medical facilities provided for prisoners were both insufficient and inefficient. The 
very limited medical assistance provided for prisoners, in the face of an apparent 
epidemic, was entirely unsuccessful, in as much attempts were even made to prevent 
or treat prisoners’ diseases. In stead, bodies of dead prisoners were evidently seen as 
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a resource for medical experimentation and pseudo-scientific racially prejudiced 
research. 
In 1910 Shark Island’s camp doctor published a medical paper on the death the 
Shark Island prisoners, which among other curious observations speculated that the 
extreme fatalities were caused by a viral or even bacterial spread of scurvy in close 
quarters.281 The basis of this ill-informed theory was a series of autopsies conducted 
on the bodies of diseased prisoners. Doctor Bofinger cut the bodies open and looked 
at cadavers for traces of bacteria, professing that the supposedly unhygienic nature 
of the prisoners and a subsequent spread of germs were to blame for deaths. The 
overly general description of Nama prisoners as totally lacking an understanding of 
personal hygiene282 was typical of the paradigm of racial intolerance and ‘cultural 
illiteracy’ that German colonial troops, settlers and bureaucrats hailed from. For 
example, Bofinger’s detailed depiction of dirt peeling off the face and hands of 
prisoners in large crusts explained more about the doctor’s inability to understand 
the situation forced upon prisoners than it did about the ‘nature’ of Nama norms and 
values. 
The camp doctor did not limit his research to bacteria, but also investigated the 
possibility that malnutrition could have been a factor in the high number of prisoner 
fatalities. Ultimately, however, he concluded this to be improbable since the rice and 
flour given to prisoners would, in his opinion, have been of sufficient nutritional 
value to sustain the prisoners. He added that prisoners were allowed a small ration of 
chocolate and Fruchtmos (crushed fruit) and twice a week an additional small 
portion of meat – usually from old transport animals.283 Bofinger’s paper was written 
before it had been elucidated that lack of ascorbic acid284 [vitamin c] was the real 
cause of scurvy. With the benefit of hindsight, one tends to question Dr. Bofinger’s 
truthfulness, because had prisoners really been given crushed fruits on a daily basis, 
they would surely not have been suffering from scurvy.  
Many other points in the doctor’s paper also fail to convince. Bofinger argued 
that forced labour was healthy for prisoners, and that the Herero who were working 
in town, were less sick as a result. Indeed Bofinger’s concluding remark in his paper 
stated that an important factor in combating scurvy among concentration camp 
prisoners was that they be increasingly subjected to labour. The doctor’s logic 
                                                 
281  Bofinger, p. 581. 
282  Bofinger, p. 575. 
283  Bofinger, pp. 577-579. 
284  Only in 1928 did Charles G. King elucidate that the lack of vitamin c (now also known as ascorbic acid, 
which literally means anti-scurvy acid) was the reason behind scurvy.  
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related to the fact that the Nama prisoners, who were largely confined to the island, 
suffered more from the supposed scurvy epidemic than Herero prisoners.  
Bofinger’s knowledge of scurvy was limited in as much as the disease was still 
an enigma, but there are also indications that the abilities of the doctor on the whole 
left a lot to be desired. Indeed Doctor Bofinger was not known for a high success 
rate. In his paper, Bofinger referred to the lack of co-operation showed by prisoners 
to aid him in his research. The medical facility provided to Shark Island prisoners 
consisted of a tent located inside the camp, and it was often the case that prisoners 
tried to sneak out of the tent at night, hiding themselves among their families in the 
crowded camp. This was not without reason, as noted by the missionaries: 
“… the medical care was inadequate. The people were only with difficulty to be convinced to go 
to the Lazarett [field hospital], because they maintained that, “who goes in, will not come out 
alive”. And in fact, it was never the case that even a single person recovered in the Lazarett.”285 
Little wonder that prisoners feared the ‘hospital’ intensely, when no one ever came 
out alive and the bodies of the dead were cut open and studied.  
German medical experimentation with the bodies of prisoners (in rich supply) 
was not uncommon. In the early part of the 20th century there was an upsurge in 
studies based on racial theories. Fischer and Birkner were among a number of 
scientist in Germany who theorised and postulated on eugenics and social Dar-
winism in terms of a perceived Caucasian physical and mental superiority to other 
races. The studies were empirical and quantitative to the point of the ridiculous. 
Weighing brains to compare intelligence or analysing the muscular system to place 
races on different steps of the evolutionary ladder were the modus operandi.286  
It is within this discourse that an article in a medical journal on ‘17 Hottentot 
heads’ appeared. The article was written by Christian Fetzer, who, with the assist-
ance of Dr. Bartels, proceeded to study dissimilarities between Europeans and 
seventeen decapitated heads of Shark Island prisoners.287 As a comparative template 
for the research, the Doctors used studies by Fischer, Forster, Eggeling and Birkner, 
who in their respective works investigated anatomical similarities of different (non-
white) races with that of the anthropoid Ape. 288  
Before being shipped to Germany the skulls of the 17 dead prisoners had been 
cracked open for the removal and preservation of their brains. The heads were then 
preserved in formalin and sent in tins to Germany where Dr. P. Bartels and Christian 
Fetzer received the body parts. The two scientists scrutinised the heads in meticu-
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lous detail, trying to find proof that the Hottentot were a more primitive race than 
‘whites’. They took pictures and made plaster casts, and observed every last muscle 
on bone and scull. 
 
 
Photo 2.22  Severed head of former 
 Shark Island prisoner 
 
 
In accordance with the Lineaen principle, the study had two points of reference: 
apes known to be on a lower evolutionary level than human beings and, secondly, 
Europeans believed by Fetzer et al to be on a higher evolutionary plane than non-
Europeans. The deductive ‘logic’ of the exercise was therefore that traits found to be 
similar with apes and not with ‘whites’ would sustain racial theories and furthermore 
provide proof of the Hottentot niche on the evolutionary ladder. Accordingly, 
Fetzer’s study scrutinised the heads to locate differences between the Nama and the 
white ‘type’ in order to catalogue them. The bizarre rationale even included facial 
traits such as a double chin, “never observed in the Hottentot” or curious observa-
tions like “poorly developed cheeks” – one wonders what sort of criteria were used 
to establish whether cheeks were poorly or well developed.289 
Many other examples exist from GSWA of morbid research of prisoners’ cada-
vers or body parts. In Swakopmund, female prisoners were forced to boil the 
severed heads of concentration camp inmates and then scrape them to the bone with 
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shards of glass.290 The result of their horrific labour is seen in this German postcard 
from GSWA. One shudders to think of the emotional impact it would have had on 
these women, who were forced to scrape severed heads clean of flesh, to remove 
brains, scalp and eyes that could easily have belonged to friends or family members.  
 
 
 
Photo 2.23  German postcard showing colonial  
 soldiers putting skulls in boxes 
 
 
Following the cleaning process the skulls were sold off to German universities 
and schools to be scrutinised by learners and scientists. Moreover, the image was 
mass-produced and sold as a post card. It was therefore clearly not deemed inappro-
priate to show this inhumanity to the entire world – a ‘quaint’ greeting from a 
German colony. As seen here in photos 2.23 and 2.24, the soldiers took time to pose 
and smile for the camera and even to meticulously turn the skulls around, to get a 
more sinister effect of empty eye sockets starring straight at the camera. 
In Lüderitz, the British diamond prospector, Fred Cornell, had seen a similar 
series of German postcards depicting hangings of Nama and Herero prisoners. He 
wrote about it in his travelogue of GSWA, where he noted that:  
  
“… each and every German soldier in the photo was striking an attitude and smirking towards 
the camera in pleasurable anticipation of the fine figure he would cut when the photo was 
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published. This, I repeat, was only one of many that enjoyed a big sale in German South-West 
for the delectation of admiring friends in the Fatherland.”291 
 
 
 
Photo 2.24   Same picture as above. Note how the skulls have been turned in this pose 
 
 
The profiteering of Herero body parts was not unique to Swakopmund or 
Lüderitz. In fact, one of the contributing factors to the outbreak of the war was a 
morbid trade in Herero skulls, supplied by of a number of German soldiers, who dug 
up Herero graves, stealing the sculls.292 Incidentally Gerhard Pool, who cited this 
information, apologetically explained this practise to be bound in cultural misunder-
standings! 
There was no misunderstanding in 1914 when Dr. Eugen Fischer sent a telegram 
to the colonial authorities in Windhoek requesting a consignment of Bushman 
penises and ears sent to him at the University of Freiburg.293 Fischer, who had also 
inspired Fetzer’s study on the Shark Island heads, was an avid eugenicist, who 
sought to prove the supposed genetic dangers of inter-racial sexual relations. His 
ideas gained broad acceptance internationally and during the 3rd Reich, Fischer 
played an important role in the formation and implementation of Nazi policies on 
racial hygiene.294  
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Report on administration of protectorate of South west Africa from date of 
surrender to 31st March 1916 
 
On July 9, 1915 German troops finally surrendered to the Union of South Africa, following a ten 
month engagement that formed part of World War I. Between July 9, 1915 and December 17, 1920, 
when the German colony was formally entrusted to Britain by the League of Nations, GSWA was in 
a state of martial law under British military administration. It is in the files of this administration 
that the below report is found. It was the first report of its kind and primarily sought to inform 
South African Prime Minister Louis Botha about the state of the former German colony, providing 
chilling evidence about events in the preceding decade. 
 
To General [Sic.] 
The honourable Louis Botha, P.C., 
  Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, Cape Town. 
17. Gaols 
The late German Colonial Administration devoted very little attention to its penal institutions… 
Prisoners were prevented from escaping by neck chains, handcuffs, chains fastened to rings in the 
cell floors, and other barbarous methods of a bygone age…Needless to say all irons have been 
removed; some to the Departmental Museum in the Union. 
 
18. Native Affairs 
The shooting of natives on the most trivial pretexts seems also to have been very prevalent under 
the German regime, and also for the most part to have gone unpunished. 
 
20. Native Affairs Cont. 
The hstory of the treatment of the natives in this Protectorate by the Germans makes bad reading. 
Their policy during the last great rebellion was one of extermination, as is evident by the reduced 
numbers of some of the Tribes…Von Trotha and his myrmidons…openly boasted that they had 
accounted for 30,000 Hereros. The unbridled licentiousness of the Soldiers [Sic.] and police in their 
relations with the native women regardless of objections on the part of the natives to the intercourse 
of their women with white men contributed in no small degree to the causes which led to the last 
rebellion. 
With the destruction of the tribal system…the rapid demoralisation of the Native set in, so much 
so that concubinage with Europeans became almost a general practise in the Protectorate with the 
inevitable result that the natives have now the most supreme contempt for their Masters [Sic.], who 
in turn have endeavoured, by a policy of severity (often amounting to brutality) to maintain their 
prestige. 
The German moreover seems to have regarded his native servants purely as slaves, and besides 
exercising “parental authority” (as described by them in their defence before our Magistrates), 
showed extreme reluctance to pay them wages contracted for. 
 
Source: 
ADM 137, File C. 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
Responsibility 
 
 
 
 
 
Where to place the blame 
Inasmuch as prisoners were already severely weakened and fatigued due to the wars 
and their aftermath, they were allowed no respite in the camps, where they were 
forced to perform unpaid physical labour, given few rations and generally allowed to 
die without recourse to medical assistance. But, to what extent were the colonial 
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Government and, by extension, the German National Government aware and/or 
actively complicit in the concentration camp mortalities? Were, for example, the 
high death rates among prisoners-of-war merely the result of neglect or coincidence? 
A report sent to Windhoek by a very frustrated Swakopmund District Com-
mis
 evidence that climatic conditions at the coast were 
les
                                                
sioner in early 1905, i.e. soon after the concentration camps were introduced, 
attests the degree of knowledge that the Colonial Government in Windhoek had 
about conditions and mortality in the military-run concentration camps. The 
Swakopmund Commissioner was horrified at death rates in his town, which he 
described as ‘disturbingly high.’1 Indeed 40 percent of the entire prisoner population 
in Swakopmund’s concentration camp had died between February and May 05.2 
These figures prompted the Swakopmund Commissioner to complain that the 
rapidly increasing number of deaths was a direct result of poor food and a general 
lack of clothing. He compared the situation with Africans detained under his own 
(Local Government) supervision, of whom “as long as I have been here [since 
September 15, 1903] not even a single one has died.”3 The concerned District 
Commissioner proceeded to explain what was needed to keep prisoners alive, such 
as shelter, sufficient space, warm clothes, shoes and a variation in food4 as well as 
recourse to medical attention.  
The Swakopmund report is
s to blame for soaring mortality under Trotha than were treatment and lack of 
rations and otherwise provisions for prisoners. The report also testifies that lack of 
knowledge was not the reason behind mass dying of prisoners. The District Com-
missioner clearly outlined very specific measures that needed to be implemented and 
underscored the implication that it would have to ignore these specifications. 
Trotha’s military and the colonial government nevertheless chose to disregard the 
commissioner’s suggestions and prisoners subsequently kept dying in the concen-
tration camps for another 3 years. 
 
 
 
1  ZBU 454, D. IV.l.3. Vol. 1, pp 58-59. 
2  Deaths in the military concentration camp, which was begun early February 1905, until May 29 were 399 
prisoners out of 1100 – 111 of these died in the last two weeks of May. ZBU 454, D. IV.l.3. Vol. 1, pp. 
58-59. 
3  ZBU 454, D. IV.l.3. Vol. 1, pp. 58-59. 
4  Here he went on to list a number of foods required to keep prisoners alive. Incidentally, these were the 
same foods that the Government claimed they were giving prisoners – judging from the report this was not 
the case. 
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Photo 3.1  Ludwig von Estorff, known as  
 “The Old Roman“ 
 
 
Overall, the camps under Trotha were not conducive for survival as particularly 
evident in the General’s notification to the army not to prioritise provisions for 
prisoners. Firstly, he said, prisoners were to be fed to the extend it did not interfere 
with supplies for the troops and secondly, medical attention was to be granted only 
where possible; if, however, diseases were to break out among the prisoners, they 
were to be removed from the ‘white’ settlements by a couple of kilometres and the 
old camp burned.5 These orders marked the beginning of the concentration camp 
policy. Inevitably the military, which had recently been ordered to kill on sight, did 
also not make special arrangements to keep prisoners alive in the camps, especially 
in the light of the above orders relayed by Trotha.  
There was also no respite to prisoners under the Lindequist administration, which 
essentially allowed mortality rates to soar by not improving conditions in the camps 
while at the same time stepping up collection efforts and the use of prisoners as free 
labour. Perhaps the continued and persistently high mortality figures under Linde-
quist had to do with the fact that a precedent of brutality had been set under Trotha, 
which was only to be halted by strict intervention from the new Colonial Govern-
                                                 
5  BKE 221, B.II.74.c, January 16, 1905, p. 33 
 
 
  149 
ment. Yet no such intervention was made; instead the use of forced labour was 
escalated. Lindequist’s brief from National Government and Kaiser could not possi-
bly have been to counter the abuses of Trotha’s rule, because had it been, he would 
clearly have been in contravention of such an order. Major von Estorff, who accom-
panied Governor Lindequist on his last journey of the colony, later pointed out in his 
memoirs that Lindequist was directly responsible for the disastrous outcome of the 
concentration camp policy. He wrote: 
“His insights were not all equally profound and he therefore often went down the wrong road 
and the more wrong it proved, the more he went down it with immense stubbornness. His worst 
mistake was his policies concerning native affairs. He had decided in Germany, that he would 
move the Hereros to the south and the Hottentots to the north, so that in future it would be easier 
to keep them in line. To that end, the Herero, who had surrendered, were kept in concentration 
camps in Windhoek. This measure is even less understandable in light of the fact that Lindequist 
had seen the horrible effects of the concentration camps on the Boer families in South Africa. 
The same happened here (…) Because of the War, the pursuit in the desert and this last irrational 
measure [the concentration camps], the Herero people were almost exterminated (…) Trotha had 
begun the evil work and Lindequist had finished it. I could only stand aside, sad but powerless to 
do anything about it…”6 
     Estorff was a much-respected officer among fellow soldiers7 and as such was 
appointed leader of the GSWA Schutztruppe in 1907. In being a contemporary with 
influence and insights into Colonial Government strategies applied during the war, 
Estorff’s very honest descriptions of events and his own feelings of betrayal are 
evidence of the extreme nature of the measures applied by Trotha and Lindequist 
respectively. It is quite clear that Estorff though the campaign in the desert, the 
Extermination Order and the use of concentration camps as excessive and 
unnecessary. Essentially, Estorff considered the colony’s first civilian Governor as 
being nothing more than a natural continuation of Trotha’s genocidal campaign – a 
further indication that Lindequist was under no instruction to halt the extermination 
of Herero or Nama. Estorff specifically saw the concentration camps under 
Lindequist as an intricate part of the extermination plan, on par with the Waterberg 
battle/massacre and the pursuit in the sandveld.  
In spite of the continuously high mortality rates, mass dying of concentration 
camp prisoners was not actively sought stopped or reduced anywhere in the colony, 
neither by Trotha nor Lindequist. Large numbers of prisoners were dying from the 
moment the camps were set up and mortality rates never subsided. Judging from  
  
                                                 
6  Estorff, p. 134. 
7  “… called the ’Old Roman’, [he was] a skilful and a just soldier to the core. The troops really cherished 
him.” NAN, Accession 531, “Diary of Schutztruppe private Richard Christel”, p. 8. 
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General to Governor 
              
General von Trotha and Friedrich von Lindequist 
 
In November 1905, General von Trotha finally departed from GSWA. He had just finished a 
meeting in Lüderitz with the new incumbent Friedrich von Lindequist, who was on his way to 
Swakopmund to take over command of the colony. Trotha’s last view of the colony before 
departing would therefore have been the marooned prisoners on the far end of Shark Island; the 
same view that had ‘greeted’ the new Governor on arrival. Friedrich von Lindequist was the 
former Deputy Governor under Leutwein and previous to his appointment as Governor had 
served as the German Consul in Cape Town. He was therefore familiar with the colony and the 
situation he was to inherit. 
Lindequist and Trotha sailed together to Swakopmund and the Governor later noted in his 
memoirs that Trotha had been an amicable travelling companion and that the two had got along 
fabulously on their short sea journey. 
Described as a ‘darling of the German settlers’ and “admired and supported by the right-
wing in the Reichstag”, Lindequist was handed responsibility of a colony that needed 
restructuring following Trotha’s military rule. Lindequist was therefore appointed as a 
coloniser, as opposed to a soldier.  
In November 1906, Lindequist was recalled to Germany in order to lobby parliament for a 
large grant that was needed to convert GSWA into a settler colony. While in Germany, he was 
appointed Deputy Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs and only returned for a brief visit to 
GSWA before again departing from Lüderitz. Like Trotha, his last view of the colony was the 
prisoners dying on Shark Island. Although Lindequist’s period as Governor was the shortest in 
the history of the colony, it had a pronounced impact. 
 
Sources: 
Nuhn: 2000 
Schrank: 1974 
Drechsler: 1986 
BAK, Kl. Erwb. 275. 
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Photo 3.2  An unknown prisoner standing in  
 front of a tent, such as commonly  
 used in the concentration camps.  
 Could be Shark Island 
 
 
existing records, no official efforts were made by Lindequist or his colonial 
government to prevent the very obvious mass dying in the camps. It must therefore 
be concluded that the mass dying was, at some level at least, an acceptable outcome. 
 
The Lüderitz example 
Shark Island in Lüderitz was undoubtedly the worst of the concentration camps, in 
terms of treatment, conditions and general mortality. Notwithstanding the many 
prisoners who succumbed to Shark Island before August 1906, the camp ‘accommo-
dated’ approximately 2000 Nama and 6-700 Herero prisoners between mid 1906 and 
mid 1907. Considering the fate of these prisoners, of whom the vast majority were 
to die within a six months period, it is important to note that mortality on the island 
was not only much too high but entirely preventable. Why, for example, were 
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prisoner sent to Shark Island in the first place, when it was evident from death rates 
among prisoners in 1905 and early 1906 that death was the most likely result of 
incarceration on the wind-swept island? As reflected in Estorff’s memoirs and the 
Swakopmund district commissioner’s 1905 report, it seems entirely likely that 
prisoner deaths on Shark Island was a desired outcome for the colonial Government. 
Moreover, looking at the Government ‘paper trail’ prior to and following the closing 
of the camp, it is evident that responsibility for the continued use of Shark Island 
related directly to Colonial Government and indirectly also to National Government. 
Between October and December 1906, the Rhenish Mission Society lobbied 
intensely to have prisoner removed from Shark Island, asking that they be relocated 
to a less death-prone location. It was not only a humanitarian concern, however, 
seeing as Lüderitz missionary, Emil Laaf, told the Mission Head quarters in 
Germany that labour demands in the colony would not be able to bear losing the 
prisoner labour force.8 Laaf’s letter was dated October 5th, only a few weeks 
following the arrival of most Nama prisoners to Lüderitz, indicating that almost 
from the time of their arrival the missionary thought it obvious that the Nama would 
not survive imprisonment on the Island. 
In December 1906, Missionary Fenchel in Keetmanshoop approached the Head 
of the Schutztruppe, von Deimling, about the fate of the Nama prisoners in Lüderitz. 
It was Deimling who had first conceived of the idea to send the Nama to Shark 
Island, so it was especially appropriate to confront him about the dire situation in 
Lüderitz.9 Fenchel asked Deimling to reconsider his stance on Shark Island and to 
instead move the prisoners to a secure location on the mainland, especially the 
women and children.10 Deimling was apparently very open to the idea, telling the 
Keetmanshoop missionary: “It had never dawned on me that there are more women 
than men there [Shark Island]. I will make arrangements immediately.”11 Over a 
month later, the Lüderitz missionaries had also convinced the head of the Lüderitz 
Etappenkommando, Commander von Zülow, to lobby Deimling for a relocation of 
prisoners to a more benign environment. According to Missionary Nyhof, Deimling 
answered Zülow with the words: “as long as I am in power, the Nama will not be 
removed from the island.”12 In the mind of the mission, the latter remark made 
                                                 
8  ZBU 2369, Witbooi Geheimakten, pp. 102-103. 
9  Nuhn: 2000, pp. 267-268. 
10  ZBU 2369, Witbooi Geheimakten, pp. 102-103. 
11  ZBU 2369, Witbooi Geheimakten, pp. 102-103. 
12  Archiv der Vereinten Evangelischen Mission Wuppertal-Barmen, RMG 2.509a, C/h 23a, Bl. 348, letter 
the Rhenish Mission Society in Barmen, Inspector Spiecker by hand. 
 
 
  153 
Deimling responsible for the deaths on Shark Island.13 The anger ran so deep that 
Deimling was singled out in the Lüderitz Mission Chronicle for his role in the Nama 
decimation. The same blame was levelled at Deimling in recent German publica-
tions, echoing the missionary source.14  
Unbeknownst to the mission, however, Deimling had in fact heeded the call of 
Zülow and the missionaries. In mid February, Deimling had ordered 230 women and 
children off the island and into the Burenkamp, from where it was the intention that 
they be shipped to Okahandja and Windhoek via Swakopmund.15 On February 19, 
1907 Deimling sent a letter to acting Governor Hintrager, asking for final approval 
of his orders.16 Hintrager’s response sums up top-level strategies relating to Shark 
Island. He replied: 
“I sincerely ask that the relocation of Nama women and children to Damaraland [central GSWA] 
be cancelled and also that the women and children removed from Shark Island be taken back … 
it will leave an impression of inconsistency and half [serious] regulations on the natives and the 
white population if the important measures taken in the last few months go begging … must also 
not loose sight of the security of the territory. Those prisoners transferred to Shark Island 
through trickery will not likely forget their time of imprisonment on the island any time soon; 
[if] they are let loose they will spread their stories of hate and mistrust against us. It will not be 
possible for them to return to their homes and to tell others of their treatment there [in 
Lüderitz].”17 
In Hintrager’s emphatic dismissal of Deimling’s measures, it was clear that 
security of ‘whites’ was prioritised far above the health and almost certain death of 
several thousand women, men and children. The mere suggestion that survivors 
would speak badly about German colonialism was enough to effectively sentence 
them to death; a curious argument considering that Nama and Herero sentiments 
towards the German coloniser were inevitably already very negative, irrespective of 
what stories Shark Island survivors might tell. More importantly, however, 
Hintrager’s letter to Deimling clearly shows that responsibility for the continued 
internment and death of Nama prisoners on Shark Island rested with the Colonial 
Governor’s Office. Both Zülow and Deimling were willing to transfer prisoners off 
the island already in February, a measure that would have saved many lives. This 
did not happen, however, due to an inflexible policy applied by the civil authority 
that sought to ensure white safety against a hypothetical threat by a defeated and 
broken people. 
                                                 
13  Archiv der Vereinten Evangelischen Mission Wuppertal-Barmen,RMG 2.509, Bl. 348. 
14  See Zimmerer: 1999, p. 292. 
15  ZBU 2396, Witbooi Geheimakten, pp. 96a-96b. 
16  ZBU 2396, Witbooi Geheimakten, pp. 96a-96b. 
17  ZBU 2396, Witbooi Geheimakten, pp. 97-98. 
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National Government may also have been directly complicit in this strategy; 
from the consideration that the Governor’s office was not autonomous. One would 
assume that information on a matter such as the dying of hundreds and eventually 
thousands of prisoners in Lüderitz would have reached Berlin. It has been seen 
above that the Colonial Government was well aware of the dying from an early date, 
and it must be assumed that word was passed on to Colonial Director Dernburg’s 
office as well. As such, National Government apparently did nothing to intervene in 
the on-going mass dying on Shark Island, simply allowing or even accepting the 
status quo.  
The Shark Island camp was only closed when von Estorff gave the order in April 
1907, contrary to what he later wrote in his book about being powerless to do 
anything about the measures applied by Trotha and Lindequist. In early April 1907, 
Estorff communicated with Colonial Director Dernburg in Berlin, protesting at the 
state of prisoners in Lüderitzbucht, ordering the camp closed and prisoner removed 
to a less dangerous location. The German historian Drechsler described Estorff’s 
telegram as hitting the Colonial Department ‘like a bolt out of the blue’, insinuating 
that Dernburg was oblivious to the fact18 – this notion has also been echoed in other 
sources.19 Drechsler’s phrasing referred to the subsequent telegram to Windhoek by 
Dernburg, questioning Deputy Governor Oskar Hintrager about the state of affairs. 
He asked: “Was Government not informed about the situation on Shark Island by 
the Lüderitz local government?”20 Hintrager’s answer was scribbled below the letter, 
confirming that he had indeed been informed by Lüderitz. Central to the polemic 
between Colonial Department and Colonial Government following the ‘bolt out of 
the blue’, therefore, was the issue of knowledge. 
In spite of Dernburg’s supposed surprise, he was nevertheless already informed. 
On February 21, 1907 following a meeting with the Rhenish Mission in Berlin, 
Dernburg sent copies of missionaries Laaf and Fenchel’s letters about mortalities on 
Shark Island (cited above) back to Windhoek. Dernburg finished the letter off urging 
the Colonial Government to take suitable precautions in future.21 In other words, 
Estorff’s telegram did not come as a bolt out of the blue; Dernburg had known since 
mid February and had not actively sought to interfere, but rather encouraged Colo-
nial Government to be careful in its endeavour. 
Dernburg’s reaction two months later, when the camp was finally closed down, 
must have had other reasons. The most obvious reason would have been the 
                                                 
18  Drechsler, p. 212. 
19  Drechsler, p. 212. Nuhn: 2000. ‛Hit like a bombshell’. 
20  ZBU 2369, Witbooi Geheimakten, p. 113. 
21  ZBU 2369, Witbooi Geheimakten, p. 101. 
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potential scandal that could have come about as a result of the ‘revelation’. It was 
important for National and Colonial Government to plead ignorance about Shark 
Island, because the mass dying could become ammunition for the German left wing, 
who did not refrain from exposing colonial atrocities in parliament. Indeed already 
in December 1906 Ledebour of the Social Democrats had brought up the issue of 
Shark Island in parliament. Somebody in Lüderitz had foreseen the very foreseeable 
outcome of deportation of Nama POWs to Shark Island and had raised the issue in 
the German media. This concerned German settler in Lüderitz had sent a letter dated 
September 20, 1906, i.e. almost upon arrival of the Nama, to the Koenigsberger 
Volkszeitung in Germany, protesting the Nama banishment to the island. The article 
was picked up by Ledebour, who recited it in parliament: 
“Around 2000 are presently under German imprisonment. They surrendered against the guaranty 
of life, but were nevertheless transferred to Shark Island in Lüderitz, where, as a doctor ensured 
me, they will all die within two years due to the climate.” 
Present in the auditorium were Prime Minister Bülow and Colonial Director 
Dernburg, who were both agitating for a bill that would allow more funds for the 
development of DSWA. The letter was read as part of a campaign by left and centre 
parties to block this proposal and in the subsequent vote, which incidentally fell on 
the same day as Ledebour’s Shark Island speech, the bill was defeat. The defeat 
prompted the Reichskanzler and the Kaiser to dissolve parliament. More impor-
tantly, however, both Bülow and Dernburg had heard about the island in GSWA 
already in December 1906. Ledebour had even posed the question directly to them:  
“I direct a question to the gentlemen dealing with colonial administration about what they know 
about Shark Island. It is self-evident that they have been receiving information about conditions 
in the prisoner camps, and I demand that you communicate this information to us about the 
extent of mortality rates on Shark Island and in other camps.”22 
Shark Island equalled death; the author of the Koenigsberger Volkszeitung article 
knew this already in September 1906. The missionaries also knew what imprison-
ment on Shark Island meant, and by October had started lobbying for the removal of 
prisoners. Moreover, as stated by Ledebour, the situation on Shark Island was 
inevitably known by High Command. In fact, it was known in all tiers of colonial 
decision-making, from Bülow to Dernburg to Hintrager to Deimling to Zülow and 
Böhmer. Everyone knew about Shark Island and the consequences of imprisonment 
there. When the many deaths were sought halted by Zülow and Deimling, Hintrager 
blocked it with no interference from Dernburg or Bülow. Lindequist was in 
Germany at the time, but had before he left expressed hopes that Shark Island would 
                                                 
22  Reichstag, 140 Sitzung, December 13, 1906, p.4366. 
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serve to reduce the number of Nama, thus lowering the price of deportation else-
where should this become necessary.  
Events on Shark Island were not accidental. In January Commander von Zülow 
had pointed out that most prisoners were incapable of escape due to their condition, 
thus arguing that a removal of prisoners would be in order.23 Regardless, the 
Colonial Government insisted on keeping the camp open under the guise of security 
and to prevent potential escapes. Had it not been for von Estorff, the Colonial 
Government would in all likelihood not have closed down the camp, leaving pri-
soners to die out entirely, as the British military attaché to DSWA, Colonel Trench, 
believed was the desired outcome by the German authorities.24 Not coincidentally 
Kaiser Wilhelm issued a decree on May 8, 1907, a few weeks after Shark Island 
Camp had finally been closed, expropriating all Nama lands, apart from Berseba and 
parts of the Bondelswartz’ territory.25 Consequently, GSWA had been largely rid of 
any, if even hypothetical, Nama threat and also gained a total of 46 million hectares 
of crown lands that had previously belonged to Nama, Damara, Herero and San 
communities.26 Had the prisoners been allowed to return home instead of being 
deported to Okawayo in Karibib, they would not have had a home nor any belong-
ings to return to – contrary to promises made to them by Estorff on behalf of the 
Government when they surrendered in 1905. 
 
                                                 
23  ZBU 2369, Witbooi Geheimakten, Lüderitz, von Zülow to Gov. January 6, 1907. 
24  KAB, PMO 227 –35/07, Col. F. Trench to British Embassy, Berlin, 21st November, 1906. 
25  Schrank, p. 212. 
26  Schrank, p. 212. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
Conclusion  
 
 
 
 
It has been claimed by a number of authors that the word ‘extermination’ [Ver-
nichtung] meant a military pacification rather than a total onslaught resulting in 
Herero mass deaths. Lau cited Poewe who had argued the word extermination to be 
“a successful attempt at psychological warfare, never followed in deed.”1 Pool 
translated the word Vernichtung as annihilate, which, although in English it is just as 
unambiguous as the word ‘extermination’, was downplayed to mean nothing more 
than military might (?). Pool also argued that “Trotha’s application of the word 
‘annihilate’ was probably connected to his participation in the Battle of Sedan 
during the Franco-Prussian War” where France’s hopes of victory were ‘annihilated’ 
by the Prussian tactics. 2 
A seen, however, the longest sitting governor in GSWA, Theodor Leutwein, 
warned about an extermination of the Herero months before Trotha ever arrived in 
GSWA. Leutwein made a very clear distinction between being ‘political dead’ and 
what he defined as ‘annihilation of 60,000 or 70,000 people’.3 Trotha, who Lau 
incidentally referred to as a nascent fascist and a necrophiliac fanatic,4 wrote in his 
diary on October 3, 1904, the day after releasing the Extermination Order: “the 
Negro does not respect treaties but only brutal force”.5 The result of the regimes of 
Trotha and Lindequist resulted in a severe decimation of the Herero population; 
approximately 75 percent of the Herero nation no longer existed in 1911 according 
to official census figures. In the face of this irrefutable outcome of the Herero War, 
suggestions of ‘psychological extermination’ and semantics relating to the Franco-
Prussian War are not so much ludicrous as they are indefensible. 
                                                 
1  Lau: 1995, p. 46. 
2  Pool: 1991, p. 252. 
3  As translated by Drechsler, p. 148, and used in Pool: 1991, p. 246. 
4  Lau: 1995, p. 46, footnote 10. 
5  Pool: 1991, p. 273. 
157 
 
 
158 
Leutwein’s letter to Government, cited above, is also proof that there was a plan 
to annihilate the Hereros, which more than suggests German intent. Similarly, Count 
von Stillfried’s report to the Kaiser, which was a virtual blueprint for subsequent 
events, is also evidence of intent. Trotha’s actions from arrival to departure, 
including Ohamakari, the pursuit in the sandveld, the Extermination Order, military 
‘collection’ patrols and the concentration camps show a persistent modus operandi, 
consistent with professed objectives of exterminating the Hereros – rather than any 
psychological ploy or annihilation of hopes of victory. Trotha’s regime invariably 
amounted to mass murder, planned and executed. 
Lindequist’s year-and-a-half in power was equally deadly for both Hereros and 
Nama. Using missionaries to lure Hereros out of the bush, Lindequist escalated the 
application of concentration camps and the use of prisoners as forced, unpaid 
labourers. In spite of high mortality figures under Trotha, Lindequist did not 
represent a new line, but instead allowed many thousands to die in the camps as well 
as forcing other POWs to work and die on government and private projects. As seen 
here the Witbooi, Bethanie and the Veldschoendragers were nearly exterminated as 
a people. Had it not been for the conscionable actions of Schutztruppe Head von 
Estorff, all the island’s prisoners would have died there. Lindequist’s horrific 
statement, vis-à-vis Shark Island, that for reasons pertaining to cost, the deportation 
of the Nama could be postponed until their numbers had been somewhat reduced,6 
makes it abundantly clear that deaths were both planned and accepted. Lindequist 
also continued the de facto slave trade, actively seeking payment for prisoners 
rented out to settlers. Such actions were just as unjustifiable and illegal in 1906 as 
they are today.  
Internationally there were already laws relating to warfare that specified how 
prisoner combatants were to be handled. The second Hague agreement of 1899,7 
which Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II was a signatory to, plainly stated the exact 
regulations concerning confinement, treatment and provisions allowed prisoners-of-
war. According to Chapter Two, Article Five, Six and Seven: the confinement of 
combatants in camps could only be done ‘as an indispensable measure of safety’; 
prisoners put to work had to be paid regular wages for the work they were to do and, 
moreover, work should not be excessive and should under no circumstances be 
related to military operations. As regards food, quarters and clothing “prisoners 
                                                 
6  Drechsler, p. 211. 
7  Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II), Annex to the Convention: 
“ Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land”, (29 July 1899), Section I, Chapter II 
(Articles 4-20). 
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should be treated on par with the ‘troops of the Government.”8 These points were all 
clearly stipulated in the agreement, but were not implemented in GSWA. 
On February 3, 1909 Trotha remarked in a German newspaper: “It goes without 
saying that war in Africa cannot be waged according to the Geneva Convention”.9 
The same views were clearly applied to the antecedent Hague Agreement, because 
none of the Hague articles were fulfilled in respect to the GSWA prisoners-of-war, 
although the agreement had entered into effect (September 4, 1900) only little more 
than three years before the outbreak of the Herero War. The well being of prisoners 
was the responsibility of the Colonial Government, who according to The Hague 
Convention was accountable for prisoners in its custody. It is nevertheless evident 
from information relayed in this thesis that: a) prisoners were not a present threat; b) 
that they were forced to work until they died; c) they were not paid wages; d) non-
combatant women and children were forced to work; and e) prisoners were not 
treated on par with German soldiers as regarded clothes, food and quarters. Instead, 
prisoners died in droves while in the hands of the German Government by way of its 
subsidiaries, namely the colonial army and the Colonial Government.  
Moreover, the Colonial Government and its military counterpart referred to 
concentration camp prisoners as Kriegsgefangenen, meaning, prisoners-of-war. The 
prisoners must therefore have been regarded as combatants considered to have posed 
a military threat or were captured in a war situation. This would be the most basic 
definition of a prisoner-of-war. However, the so-called Kriegsgefangenen comprised 
a large majority of women and children, who were not combatants and their 
confinement in camps was not ‘an indispensable measure of safety’. In fact, as has 
been show in previous chapters, the Herero prisoners were in many cases mere 
skeletons upon arrival in the collection camps. There are also questions as to 
whether the Herero were still at war, seeing that socially they had been destroyed 
and no longer existed as a homogenous people, or whether they were rather scattered 
in, for the large part, unorganised groups in the eastern and central parts of the 
colony. Another consideration is the fact that most so-called prisoners-of-war were 
gathered in collection camps where they voluntarily surrendered to missionaries, 
thinking that the war had ended – as did the missionaries initially. Indeed Lindequist 
had stated that the war was over and Trotha was on his way home.  
The Nama ‘prisoners-of-war’ and especially the Witboois, Veldshoendragers and 
Bethanies, had actually made agreements with German officers, allowing them 
                                                 
8  Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II), Annex to the Convention: 
“ Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land”, (29 July 1899), Section I, Chapter II 
(Articles 4-20). 
9  Pool: 1991, p. 274. 
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freedom and rights to retain livestock, yet they were also sent to camps (women 
children and elderly included). Deputy Governor Hintrager later insisted that the 
Nama prisoners continued to be imprisoned on Shark Island despite soaring death 
rates, because they might otherwise go and tell others of the German trickery.  
In early 1906, District Commissioner Böhmer wrote in the Annual Report for the 
Lüderitz District that the ‘Angel of Death’ had ‘descended violently’ among the 
many Nama and Herero prisoners in Lüderitz.10 Böhmer’s descriptive metaphor 
somehow implied that responsibility for the deaths rested elsewhere. The many 
deaths were, however, not the work of angels, but related directly to non-compliance 
with Hague II, Annex I, Section I, Articles 4-20. In Lüderitz, therefore, the Kaiser, 
Bülow, Lindequist, Hintrager, Deimling, Zülow, Hunniger, Bofinger, Muller and 
Böhmer all in some way represented this ‘Angel of Death’. 
Having gone through a wealth of German and British sources relating to 1904-08 
in GSWA, this research has inadvertently come to much the same conclusion as 
O’Reilly’s Blue Book did in 1918, namely: 
“After von Trotha had left and surrenders were once more possible, the Germans decided to use 
their prisoners (men and women) as labourers on the harbour works at Lüderitzbucht and 
Swakopmund, and also on railway construction… Probably 60 per cent. of the natives who had 
surrendered after von Trotha left perished in this way. True indeed the cold and raw climate of 
the two coast ports contributed greatly to this huge death-toll. But for this the Germans who 
placed these naked remnants of starving humanity on the barren islets of Lüderitzbucht and on 
the moisture-oozing shores of Swakopmund must take the fullest blame and submit to the 
condemnation of all persons with even an elementary feeling of humanity towards the native 
races.”11 
 
                                                 
10  ZBU 154, A. VI.a.3, pp. 211-212. 
11  South Africa, Union of, P. 98. 
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 Photo 4.1  Adolescent prisoners working in the cold waters at the  
  coast 
 
 
 
Photo 4.2   Shark Island concentration camp 1905 (SCL PA08 no. 143) 
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Photo 4.3  Shark Island Campsite 2004 – the site of the former concentration camp today  
 accommodates camper vans, barbeques and sanitation blocks. Notably the  
 topography of the island has been flattened to allow cars onto the island.  
 (Casper W. Erichsen) 
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